1 fatality

19 Jul 2009: James O'Bert Vari-Eze (N39DX) — Columbus, GA

Columbus, GA, United States

On 19 Jul 2009, a James O'Bert Vari-Eze (registration N39DX) was involved in an aviation accident near Columbus, GA. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilots improper fuel management, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. This summary draws on records from NTSB.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On July 19, 2009, a Rutan VariEze (N39DX) crashed after engine hesitation during a low approach, hitting a hangar and tractor. The commercial pilot was fatally injured; no preimpact malfunctions were found.

History of Flight

On July 19, 2009, about 1815 eastern daylight time, an amateur-built Rutan VariEze, N39DX, was substantially damaged when it impacted a tractor during a low approach at Columbus Regional Airport (CSG), Columbus, Georgia. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. No flight plan was filed for the local personal flight, conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to witness statements, the pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings (touch and goes) on runway 31. The airplane had taken off, entered a left-hand traffic pattern, and was cleared by air traffic control for the option. After descending from pattern altitude, the airplane landed and took off again. The airplane was then observed flying over the runway at approximately 30 feet above ground level in a level attitude. The engine was heard to pop, sputter, and then hesitate. The airplane veered off the runway heading to the right and struck the side of a hangar with its right wing. The right wing separated, and the airplane rolled right, skipped off a shed, continued to roll until inverted, and impacted an unoccupied tractor, breaking apart.

Voice data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) showed that the pilot was cleared for the option at 1812:07 and acknowledged at 1812:13. At 1814:05, the pilot radioed, "ah tower three niner delta x-ray's got problems." During this transmission, a sound similar to the engine losing power was audible.

Personnel Information

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on August 21, 2007. He had accrued 1,771.8 total hours of flight experience.

Aircraft Information

The amateur-built airplane was a rear-engined, two-place, composite construction, canard-configured airplane with tricycle landing gear (fixed main, retractable nose). Its special airworthiness certificate was issued on September 16, 1993. The last conditional inspection was completed on November 2, 2008, at which time it had accumulated 3,304 total hours of operation.

Meteorological Information

A weather observation at CSG 24 minutes before the accident reported winds from 340 degrees at 9 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear sky, temperature 28°C, dew point 13°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.05 inches of mercury.

Airport Information

Runway 31 was asphalt, in good condition, with basic markings in fair condition. Its total length was 3,997 feet, width 150 feet. It was equipped with medium intensity runway edge lights, runway end identifier lights, and a 2-box visual approach slope indicator on the left side providing a 3-degree glide path. An obstruction—a 10-foot-high light pole—existed 300 feet from the approach end and 50 feet left of centerline.

Wreckage and Impact Information

Examination revealed no evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures. The wreckage showed heavy fragmentation: wings separated at fuselage junctures, nose separated forward of the instrument panel, forward cockpit separated from rear cockpit, engine separated from mounts. The nose landing gear was extended; main gear assembly separated. Flight control system had impact damage and multiple fractures consistent with overload; control continuity was confirmed from ailerons, elevator, and rudders to the cockpit area.

In the front cockpit, the canopy was latched, carburetor heat full forward (off), throttle full forward, mixture full rich, ignition selector on "BOTH," alternator on, and landing airbrake handle stowed. The 2-blade fixed-pitch wooden propeller showed only impact damage; one blade intact, the other broken within 6 inches of the hub, with no evidence of leading edge gouging or chordwise scratching.

The engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Oil was present internally and in rocker boxes; oil filter contained no debris. The crankshaft rotated by hand without binding; thumb compression was obtained on all cylinders. The dual electronic ignition system was impact damaged and could not be functionally tested, but physical examination showed no apparent preimpact anomalies. All four ignition coils were impact damaged; spark plug electrodes were dark gray except No. 3 cylinder plugs which had oil residue. The alternator was intact; auxiliary battery held 12.86 volts.

A witness reported fuel on the ground that evaporated within 4–5 minutes. All three fuel filler caps were closed and latched; all three fuel tanks were breached. The fuselage tank (forward of engine) showed fuel staining; main wing tanks showed no staining. The fuel strainer and carburetor float bowl were devoid of fuel. The fuel valve was selected to the main tanks.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Division of Forensic Sciences, Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Toxicological testing was conducted at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory.

Tests and Research

The VariEze Owner's Manual described the fuel system: two wing tanks and a fuselage tank, all with visual sight gauges, and a three-way fuel selector on the pilot's right console (left for wing, up for fuselage, right for shutoff). The selector handle was designed to interfere with the pilot's wrist when fuselage fuel was selected as a reminder not to take off on fuselage fuel. The fuselage tank held about 2 gallons; the wings held about 24 gallons total. The manual cautioned that during a long descent with less than one gallon per wing tank, fuel starvation could occur, which could be regained by selecting fuselage fuel or reducing descent angle. It also advised selecting fuselage fuel for all descents and landings with less than two gallons per wing tank. The Emergency Procedures section noted that if engine failure occurs with less than one gallon in one or both tanks, or during a long sustained steep descent with low fuel, the most probable cause is fuel starvation.

Contributing factors

Fluid managementPilot