History of Flight
On March 7, 2011, about 1345 eastern standard time, a Diamond DA-40, Canadian registration CGPDO, was substantially damaged when it impacted a wooded area near Allagash, Maine. The certificated commercial pilot received serious injuries and the private pilot-rated passenger received fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight from Halifax International Airport (CYHZ), Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, to Quebec Jean Lesage International Airport (CYQB), Quebec, Canada. The personal flight was conducted under Part 6 Canadian Aviation Regulation 640.
The pilot-in-command (PIC) stated that on the morning of the accident, he reviewed the weather with the pilot-rated passenger (PRP). They concluded that an en route area of low pressure prevented the flight to their final destination, Toronto Buttonville (CYKZ). The PIC decided to wait until noon to re-evaluate. By noon, he determined the low pressure area was moving into the Halifax area the following day. The pilots decided to depart Halifax for Saint John, New Brunswick (CYSJ) to wait out the frontal passage weather.
The pilot called London International Airport Flight Service Station to file his flight plan. He declined a weather briefing or NOTAMs. The flight departed IFR and reached a cruising altitude of 6,000 feet. The weather in Halifax at departure was rainy with crosswinds. They received a clearance direct to Saint John VOR.
During the flight, they monitored weather radar which showed mostly rain. As they approached Saint John VOR, the PRP questioned continuing to CYQB, as METARs and TAFs looked good. The PIC reviewed current reports; low ceilings and poor visibility in snow were reported. The weather at CYQB appeared better, so they re-filed to CYQB at 6,000 feet with St. Georges, Quebec as alternate. While overflying Saint John VOR, they observed temperature +6°C. The multi-function display showed a freezing level at 6,000 feet ahead, and further ahead at 4,000 feet.
The PRP noted ice formation on the left wing; the PIC saw similar on the right wing, describing accumulation no higher than a nickel. The PIC asked for outside air temperature, which then indicated +1°C. They discussed the situation and decided to descend. The PIC requested a lower altitude; Montreal ATC authorized 5,200 feet. The PIC advised ATC they were experiencing icing and needed lower altitude. During descent, the PIC recalled experiencing the most ice he had ever seen; the canopy completely froze over, and the front of the canopy and wings were covered in ice. He described ice as large as a house brick on the leading edge, extending back 1 foot, about 1 or 2 inches thick on the wing.
After leveling at 4,000 feet, airspeed immediately decreased. Full power was applied; the PIC asked the PRP to call if airspeed dropped below 80 knots. Airspeed was observed at 84 knots with buffeting in straight and level flight. Ice continued accumulating; the PIC told the PRP to look for a landing spot. The airplane continued buffeting; the pilot estimated they were about 1,000 feet agl. The next thing the PIC remembered was waking up in the airplane next to the passenger, with no recollection of how long he was unconscious. His feet were in the snow, the canopy was missing, and the engine and panel were missing. He knew right away that the PRP was deceased.
Personnel Information
The pilot, age 31, held a Canadian flight instructors pilot certificate for airplane single-engine and multi-engine land, and a first class Canadian airman medical certificate issued September 15, 2010, with no limitations. His logbook was not recovered. According to Canadian authorities, he reported a total of 3,000 hours flight time, with more than 1,500 hours on the DA40. He flew approximately 20 hours in the 90 days prior to the accident. He also held an FAA commercial multi-engine certificate and an instrument rating.
The PRP was the aircraft owner. He held a Canadian private pilot license with a visual flight rules over the top rating. He had approximately 400 hours total flight time. According to Canadian authorities, the flight was performed as a crew; workload was divided similar to professional pilot duties. The PRP managed radio calls and monitored outside temperature for most of the flight.
Aircraft Information
The three-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear airplane, serial number 40.915, was manufactured in 2008. It was powered by a Lycoming IO-360-M1A, 180-horsepower engine and equipped with a MT-Propeller model D-94315, variable pitch wooden propeller. Maintenance records showed an annual inspection completed on January 21, 2011, at a Hobbs reading of 302 hours and an airframe total time of 299.7 hours.
Meteorological Information
The closest unofficial surface observing station was Clayton Lake, Maine, 17 miles east southeast of the accident site; reported winds from 010° at 7 knots gusting to 14 knots, temperature and dew point -7°C, altimeter 29.75 inHg. The closest official station with ceiling and weather was Frenchville, Maine, 72 miles east northeast; winds from 020° at 18 knots gusting to 30 knots, 1 mile visibility, moderate freezing precipitation, broken ceiling at 900 feet AGL, temperature -7°C, dew point -9°C, altimeter 29.77 inHg.
The Terminal Aerodrome Forecast for CYQB and the closest reporting site expected wind from 050° at 6 knots, visibility 1 mile in light snow, vertical visibility 1,000 feet, with temporary conditions between 1300 and 1600 EST of visibility 3 miles in light snow, overcast ceiling 2,500 feet.
The National Weather Service Area Forecast Discussion at 1249 EST discussed a band of freezing rain stationary across north central Maine due to a wedge of warm air aloft, expected to diminish into the afternoon. Snow continued across northwest Maine.
Two pilot reports before the accident time indicated moderate icing conditions across New Hampshire and Maine; both aircraft had deicing/anti-icing capability.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Wreckage debris and broken tree limbs were scattered about 300 feet along an approximate 200-degree magnetic heading from a broken tree. The airplane came to rest in approximately 6 feet of snow. The nose and engine were broken from the fuselage and buried in snow. The cockpit was exposed; the canopy was broken away and located along the debris path. The right wing was attached to the fuselage and fragmented. The empennage was broken away and buried in snow. The left wing was broken at the wing root and fragmented.
Examination of the recovered airframe and flight control system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction. The engine was separated from the fuselage with the firewall and engine mount attached. The propeller remained attached; the spinner was crushed. All three wooden blades were shattered mid-span. The engine could not be run due to external damage. During examination, the crankshaft was rotated by hand; valve train continuity and cylinder compression were confirmed. The sound of magneto impulse couplers engaging was heard. Spark plug ignition leads were damaged; spark could not be obtained. Spark plugs exhibited normal wear. Examination of engine and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy was performed on the PRP on March 9, 2011, by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Augusta, Maine. The autopsy findings included multiple blunt force injuries; the report listed specific injuries. The cause of death was reported as two of the listed injuries. Forensic toxicology by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory stated no ethanol was detected in the liver or muscle, and no drugs were detected in the liver.
Additional Information
According to NAV Canada, the flight transitioned through Nashua Center (ZBW) as an overflight, westbound at 6,000 feet. An AIRMET had been issued two hours earlier for light to moderate icing below 14,000 feet. The aircraft was issued vectors around mountainous terrain per the pilot's request to stay low due to potential icing. Lost communication procedures were issued, which was standard for the area and altitude. The pilot switched to Montreal Center on his own in accordance with those procedures. The pilot returned on ZBW frequency but the controller was unable to make contact. Montreal Center was issuing vectors when radar and radio contact were lost. ZBW attempted to reach the pilot through other aircraft but failed. A search and rescue was initiated within thirty minutes.