History of Flight
On March 16, 2011, at 1029 Pacific daylight time, a Beech Super King Air 200 (registration N849BM) impacted terrain after a loss of control during takeoff from Long Beach Airport in Long Beach, California. The commercial pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries, while a fifth passenger was seriously injured. The airplane, operated by Carde Equipment Sales LLC under 14 CFR Part 91, was substantially damaged. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for a cross-country flight to Salt Lake City, Utah, and the accident occurred during initial departure. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed.
According to flight planning documents, the pilot filed an IFR flight plan around 0700 for the estimated 510-nautical-mile trip, planning 1 hour 52 minutes of flight time with three people. Departure was scheduled for 0830, but was delayed due to difficulties transmitting on the radios during preflight. The pilot called the owner's Aviation Manager around 0845 for assistance. After consulting with the Director of Maintenance for West Coast Maintenance, the radio transmission problem was corrected by checking the transmission switch position on the pilot's oxygen mask. No witnesses observed the pilot performing the airplane's preflight inspection.
The pilot boarded two original passengers plus three additional passengers. At 1020, he requested taxi clearance to runway 30. A witness saw the airplane at the departure end of runway 30 performing engine run-ups. At 1027, the local controller cleared the airplane for takeoff. Several witnesses reported that the initial ground roll appeared normal. Shortly after rotation and climb, the airplane began to yaw left and level off. Witnesses described unusual sounds: one said it sounded like an engine in trouble; another likened it to a propeller feathering, going to flat pitch, or entering beta mode with full power fan noise; a third described a strange propeller noise, not engine; a fourth thought the left propeller was windmilling.
As the airplane banked left, its wings wobbled, and the fuselage fishtailed. The yaw progressed to a left skid until it appeared to be moving sideways. One witness reported that forward speed dropped and the airplane seemed to lack lift. The bank angle increased to 45 to 90 degrees, and the nose dropped to near vertical. Just before impact, a witness heard an engine power up and the nose jerk upward. Another witness noted the bank and pitch flattening just before the crash.
The director of maintenance for West Coast Aircraft Maintenance, in his office about 2,000 feet from the departure runway, heard two loud pops and saw the accident aircraft just before it impacted the ground. A fire erupted on impact, and airport fire and rescue personnel arrived within 3 to 5 minutes.
Personnel Information
The 43-year-old pilot began flight training in October 2001. He held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single- and multi-engine land ratings and an instrument rating. His most recent first-class FAA medical certificate was issued on June 18, 2010. Records indicated 2,073 total flight hours, including approximately 1,113 hours of multiengine time (463 in the accident make and model) and 665 hours in light single-engine piston aircraft. No documentation showed training in full-motion King Air simulators.
He was employed by Ameriflight from May 2005 as a second-in-command (SIC) in a Beechcraft Model 99. From October 2007, he worked for West Coast Charters as an SIC in a Beechcraft King Air 200, where most of his King Air 200 time was acquired. On October 19, 2010, Rainbow Air hired him as a pilot-in-command in a Beechcraft Model 90; he passed a Part 135 check that also satisfied his FAA flight review. He began flying the accident airplane as a contract single pilot on January 2, 2011, making about 40 flights between then and the accident.
Around mid-February 2011, he flew with the owner's Aviation Manager to Bellingham, Washington. The Aviation Manager, who was not checked out in King Air 200s, helped fuel the airplane while the pilot performed a preflight inspection. He observed the pilot drain one or more of the 12 fuel sump drains while fueling, though normal recommended procedure is to wait 20 to 30 minutes after fueling before sump draining to allow contaminants to settle.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was a twin-engine, propeller-driven, eight-seat, pressurized aircraft manufactured in 1981 by Beech Aircraft Company. Originally equipped with Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-41 engines and three-bladed Hartzell propellers, it was later modified under Supplemental Type Certificates to install PT6A-42 engines (850 shaft-horsepower each) and four-bladed Hartzell propellers. The propellers were constant-speed, full-feathering, and reversible, manufactured in June 1999. An automatic feathering system was designed for takeoff and landing; if engine torque dropped from 2,230 to about 220 ft/lbs during takeoff, the propeller blades would move toward the feathered position. This system was operationally checked before every takeoff per the Pilot's Operating Handbook.
The owner purchased the airplane on August 12, 2009. Its last annual inspection was on August 9, 2010. At the accident time, total airframe time was 9,133 hours; left engine had 5,695 total hours (3,020 since overhaul); right engine had 5,613 total hours (3,325 since overhaul). The engine manufacturer recommends overhaul every 3,000 flight hours. The propellers were installed around August 1999; the propeller manufacturer recommends overhaul every 3,000 hours or 6 years. Logbooks were not recovered, so exact propeller time could not be determined.
The fuel system consisted of two separate systems, each feeding its respective engine via a 57-gallon nacelle tank. Each wing had main fuel cells that gravity-fed the nacelle tank, and a 79-gallon auxiliary tank that automatically fed the nacelle if fueled. Total fuel capacity per wing was 193 gallons (272 with auxiliary). An electric crossfeed valve allowed drawing fuel from the opposite wing.
Empty weight was 8,160 pounds; maximum gross takeoff weight was 12,500 pounds. Two days before the accident, the airplane was fully fueled with about 380 gallons of jet fuel (3,645 pounds at 6.7 lb/gal). Remaining useful load for people and baggage was 695 pounds. There were six adult males on board; from driver's licenses, total occupant weight was 1,115 pounds. Personal baggage weighed 230 pounds. The airplane was estimated to be approximately 653 pounds overweight at takeoff.
The Pilot's Operating Handbook lists an Air Minimum Control Speed (Vmc) of 86 knots, the lowest airspeed at which directional control is possible with one engine inoperative and the other at takeoff power. Below Vmc, the rudder cannot overcome asymmetrical yaw. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data or cockpit voice recorder; federal regulations did not require them.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The initial impact point was on an asphalt runway. A ground scar extended 425 feet on a 205-degree magnetic track across grass to where the burned fuselage rested upright at a 300-degree orientation, about 1,500 feet from the midpoint of the intended departure runway. Both propeller assemblies, the left engine, and main landing gear components were found in the debris field. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage, with its engine attached only by control cables, electrical wiring, and fuel lines. The aft fuselage and empennage separated but remained connected by wires. The T-tail stabilizer separated and was found 35 feet away. The fuselage showed compression buckling, sooting, and thermal discoloration. Rescue personnel cut holes for occupant extrication.
Flight control continuity was established to all controls. Flaps were up; landing gear down. Power levers, propeller levers, and condition levers were all full forward. The left torque gauge read about 700 ft/lbs; the right read about 1,700 ft/lbs (maximum rated takeoff torque is 2,230 ft/lbs). The airframe manufacturer noted that torque gauge readings might not be representative due to compromised wiring during impact.
All left wing main fuel tanks were breached; the left auxiliary tank appeared intact but empty. Most right wing main tanks were breached; the right auxiliary and inboard center tanks contained about 30 gallons of fluid consistent with jet fuel, with no evidence of contamination. No pre-impact airframe anomalies were identified.
Engine examination on April 19, 2011, by investigators from the Transportation Safety Board Canada, Hawker Beechcraft, and Pratt & Whitney Canada showed both engines with minimal external deformation and similar internal contact signatures, suggesting symmetrical power at impact, likely in a low to middle power range. No pre-impact anomalies were found. Propeller examination on April 20 by the FAA, Hawker Beechcraft, and Hartzell Propeller showed severe impact damage with similar blade damage, indicating both propellers were operating at similar power. Tip damage was relatively mild, possibly indicating low power or a steep nose-down attitude. No pre-impact discrepancies were noted.
Additional Information
In mid-February 2012, an FAA inspector from the Long Beach FSDO observed a West Coast Charters pilot not draining fuel sumps during a King Air 200 preflight. The pilot stated that mechanics performed that task, not pilots. Follow-up confirmed this was standard practice at West Coast Charters. The Director of Maintenance (DM) for West Coast Maintenance noted that King Air fuel systems have multiple tanks and that maintenance personnel are required to open the nacelle tank every 24 months for inspection. He stated that regular sump draining would minimize water and debris. He also suggested that during takeoff, if water was present in the bottom of the nacelle tank, it could shift aft and cover the fuel intake, then flow to fuel nozzles and extinguish the engine fire. Jet fuel would follow and could relight. He believed the two pops he heard were engine relight attempts, accompanied by grayish white smoke. He noted that water can enter fuel tanks from temperature variations, not necessarily from contaminated fuel trucks.