History of Flight
On October 16, 2011, at 2010 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR22, registration N438CP, operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged when it impacted a hazard beacon tower during approach to Danbury Municipal Airport (DXR), Danbury, Connecticut. The certificated private pilot was fatally injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The flight originated from Easton Airport (ESN), Easton, Maryland, about 1845.
According to radar and communication data, at 1944 the airplane was at 5,000 feet and in radio contact with New York Approach. At 2000, the pilot was given the current altimeter setting and cleared direct to DXR. At 2003, the pilot reported DXR in sight and was cleared for a visual approach. At 2004, the controller instructed the pilot to contact DXR tower. The tower controller then instructed the pilot to report a midfield right downwind for runway 26. At 2007, the tower cleared the flight to land, which the pilot acknowledged. No further communication was received.
Runway 26 was 4,422 feet long, 150 feet wide, with asphalt and a 734-foot displaced threshold. It was equipped with medium intensity runway lights and runway end identifier lights but no visual approach slope indicator.
Radar data showed the airplane flew a 45-degree entry to the right downwind leg at 2008, turned onto a base leg for runway 26 at 2009, and while on final approach at 2010, struck an approximate 100-foot-tall hazard beacon tower. The airplane then impacted trees and came to rest inverted against a residence. The tower was located in a residential area about 3/4 mile from the runway threshold. Its top was 750 feet msl, 292 feet above airport elevation. Two light bulbs at the top provided flashing red illumination. The impact dislodged a section of the glass and metal enclosure. The purpose of the beacon was to alert pilots of higher terrain. A witness confirmed the beacon lights were operating when the airplane struck the tower.
Personnel Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on September 27, 2010, reporting 2,300 total flight hours. He owned and operated the accident airplane, purchased new on September 30, 2008. Review of his most recent logbook showed approximately 2,606 total hours; 195 hours in the accident airplane over the previous 2 years. He flew about 57 hours and 6 hours in the 90-day and 30-day periods preceding the accident, respectively, all in the accident airplane. He accumulated about 8 hours of night flight in the 90-day period. His most recent flight review was completed on November 7, 2010. No previous trips to DXR were noted in the logbook.
Aircraft Information
The four-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear airplane (serial number SR22-3258) was manufactured in 2008. It was powered by a Teledyne Continental Motors IO-550-N, 310-horsepower engine and equipped with a Hartzell propeller. Maintenance logbooks showed the most recent annual inspection was completed on October 8, 2010, at 278.8 total hours. The Hobbs meter indicated 466.5 total hours at the time of the accident.
Meteorological Information
Recorded weather at DXR at 2022: wind from 200 degrees at 8 knots; visibility 10 miles; scattered clouds at 9,000 feet; overcast ceiling at 11,000 feet; temperature 16°C; dew point 5°C; altimeter 29.75 inHg. The pilot did not obtain a weather briefing for the flight but filed an IFR flight plan via DUATS.
Wreckage and Impact Information
A debris path approximately 400 feet long extended on a 260-degree magnetic course from the tower to the main wreckage. The right outboard wing and right aileron were near the tower base. About 300 feet along the path, the right inboard wing section was suspended in a 60-foot-tall tree. One separated composite propeller blade, exhibiting s-bending and leading edge damage, was about 50 feet north of that tree. The airplane came to rest inverted against a residence, oriented about 230 degrees magnetic. The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) had discharged, consistent with impact forces.
The left wing section had separated and was under the main wreckage; left flap remained attached, left aileron separated and was found in the driveway. The roll trim motor was in a mid-range position. The rear fuselage partially separated, vertical stabilizer and rudder separated, horizontal stabilizer separated, left elevator separated, right elevator separated. The elevator pitch trim motor was near neutral.
The cockpit remained partially intact; rescue personnel cut the front left seatbelt and shoulder harness. The fuel selector was positioned to the right main fuel tank. The flap actuator jackshaft was in full flap extension. Elevator and rudder cable continuity was confirmed; aileron cable continuity was confirmed. The propeller hub remained attached; one blade root remained; the third blade was not recovered. Top spark plugs had intact, light gray electrodes with some oil-soaking. Recovered fuel from the engine-driven pump was clear and consistent with 100LL avgas. Hand-rotation confirmed camshaft and crankshaft continuity and thumb compression on all cylinders. Magnetos produced spark to all top leads.
The remote data module (RDM) and two flash memory cards were retained. The cards contained database information only. The RDM contained 145 hours of data including the accident flight. GPS data was consistent with radar until radar contact was lost below 1,400 feet msl on base leg; GPS recorded until impact. At 2010:15, GPS altitude was 1,211 feet; at 2010:40, altitude was 747 feet, groundspeed 75 knots, when it struck the tower. No prior flights to DXR were recorded in the RDM. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions were found in engine and control parameters.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy was performed on October 18, 2011. Toxicological testing detected Naproxen in urine.
Additional Information
According to the airplane manufacturer, the avionics system had terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) B and synthetic vision system (SVS) software enabled. The installed software version did not record TAWS B or SVS warnings. The obstacle database did not include towers less than 200 feet above ground level. TAWS B would have provided a routine aural alert when descending below 500 feet in an airport environment. The terrain database used by SVS had sufficient resolution to depict the hill at the base of the tower on the primary flight display.