No fatalities

2 Jun 2012: PITTMAN EDDIE G CGS HAWK ARROW II (N443EP) — John Rasmus — Monroe, VA

Monroe, VA, United States

On 2 Jun 2012, a PITTMAN EDDIE G CGS HAWK ARROW II (registration N443EP) operated by John Rasmus was involved in an aviation accident near Monroe, VA. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s improper preflight planning and inflight fuel management, which resulted in the total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the airplane’s systems. This summary draws on records from NTSB.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On June 2, 2012, an experimental amateur-built CGS Hawk Arrow II (N443EP) performed a forced landing after engine sputtering, resulting in substantial damage and minor injuries to the sole occupant.

Accident Details

On June 2, 2012, about 1310 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built CGS Hawk Arrow II, registration N443EP, operated by a private individual, was landed hard during a forced landing in a field near Monroe, Virginia. The flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight from Lancaster County-Mc Whirter Field Airport (LKR), Lancaster, South Carolina, to New Market Airport (8W2), New Market, Virginia. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane sustained substantial damage, and the commercial pilot, the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries. The flight originated from LKR about 1010.

Flight History

The airplane had been recently sold, and the accident pilot, who had not previously flown the make and model, was flying it to its new owner in Pennsylvania. The previous owner had filled the fuel tanks on May 31, providing a total fuel capacity of 22 gallons (21 in main tanks, 1 in header tank). The previous owner could not recall if he reset the on-board engine information system (EIS) after fueling; typically he reset it to reflect fuel load. The pilot was advised that cruise fuel consumption at 4,400 rpm was about 4.0 gallons per hour (gph), but that consumption increased with higher rpm. Based on that, the pilot calculated a theoretical endurance of 5.5 hours (22 gallons / 4.0 gph), planning a 3.5-hour first leg to 8W2, leaving about 2 hours of reserve.

Before departure, the previous owner offered to show the pilot the EIS functions (including fuel endurance, totalizer, and flow), but the pilot declined. The pilot later stated in the NTSB report that the EIS was not labeled, and recommended that fuel data be displayed on the main screen or a sight gauge installed. He confirmed he did not visually inspect the fuel tanks or perform weight and balance calculations before departure.

The flight departed, and the pilot reduced power to 4,600 rpm at about 500 feet above ground, climbing at that setting to 5,500 feet mean sea level (msl) in about 10 minutes. He then reduced to 4,500 rpm, later increased to 4,600 rpm to climb to 9,500 feet over 15 minutes. The pilot reported that during cruise, to maintain level flight, he had to apply full aft elevator trim, slight aft elevator stick pressure, and increase engine rpm by 200 from the intended 4,400 rpm.

About 2 hours 55 minutes into the flight, while about 18 miles north of Lynchburg, Virginia, the engine began sputtering. The pilot attempted to reach Lynchburg but found the glide ratio less than anticipated. He contacted Lynchburg Regional Airport air traffic control, reporting the engine had quit and he would execute a forced landing.

Landing and Postaccident Examination

The pilot descended toward an open field at 60–65 mph, added 30 degrees of flaps, and with full aft elevator trim, flared to land on a hilltop. However, the airplane's nose-up pitch did not increase beyond horizontal. The airplane impacted upsloping terrain about 5–7 feet below the hilltop crest. Postaccident, the pilot recommended a cockpit warning that a solo pilot cannot exceed 180 pounds with full fuel tanks, citing an excessively forward CG, and noted that solo flight requires the front seat, not the rear.

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the accident site and airplane. The airplane traveled about 40 feet after touchdown before stopping. Structural damage was noted to the bottom fuselage. The four fuel tanks showed no breach or rupture, and no residual fuel was found. About 2 cc of fuel were drained from the fuel system low point. The engine had internal continuity and good cylinder compression.

Postaccident weight and balance calculations used an aircraft empty weight of 653 pounds, the pilot's lowest reported weight of 220 pounds, full header and fuel tanks (6 and 126 pounds), and additional items in the rear seat: a backpack (30 pounds), 2 gallons of oil (14 pounds), a laptop computer (5 pounds), and miscellaneous documents (5 pounds). The weight at engine start was 1,059 pounds, with a center of gravity (CG) of 87.79 inches aft of datum. At the time of the accident, after fuel consumption, the weight was 927 pounds with a CG of 88.71 inches aft of datum.

The previous owner provided documents showing a gross weight limit of 1,150 pounds and a CG range of 88.42 to 92.34 inches aft of datum. However, the current owner of the design (CGS Aviation) reports a design gross weight of 990 pounds for the experimental amateur-built airplane.

After recovery, the new owner turned on the battery and set the EIS to page 0, which displays fuel endurance, fuel totalizer (based on fuel used), and fuel flow rate. The EIS showed endurance "0:00", fuel totalizer "7.7", and fuel flow rate "0.0". A photograph of the screen is in the NTSB public docket. The owner also checked elevator flight control cable tension and found no discrepancies.

A fuel flow chart indicates that at the maximum red-line (5,500 rpm) the engine consumes 7.8 gph, and at the pilot-reported climb and cruise setting (4,600 rpm), consumption is about 5.4 gph. A copy of the chart is in the NTSB public docket.

Contributing factors

Causes

PilotFluid management

Other contributing factors

Mountainous/hilly terrain