History of Flight
On November 19, 2012, about 0830 central standard time, an experimental, light sport Quicksilver GT400 airplane, N4031Q, impacted terrain near Oak Grove, Louisiana. The private rated pilot, sole occupant, was fatally injured and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was operated as a personal flight under 14 CFR Part 91 in day visual meteorological conditions without a flight plan.
According to family members, the pilot recently purchased the airplane and this was his first flight in it. He departed about one hour before the accident with plans to fly locally. A witness living near the airport reported seeing the airplane heading north toward the runway. After losing sight, the witness heard the engine stop followed by a "crunch" sound.
Personnel Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land. His logbook was not recovered, but he reported 1,006 total hours on an FAA medical application dated October 31, 2005. Review of medical records revealed that his application for a medical certificate was denied due to coronary disease and medications.
Aircraft Information
The Quicksilver GT400 was a kit-built airplane constructed from aluminum tubing, fiberglass, and covered with polyester fabric. It was configured as a single-seat aircraft with fixed tricycle landing gear. Certified in the Experimental – Amateur Built category, it was originally equipped with a Rotax 447 engine but at the time of the accident had a Rotax 503 engine. According to the previous owner, the airframe had accrued 69 total hours.
Meteorological Information
At 0835, the automated weather station at Arcadia-Bienville Parish Airport (5F0), about 10 miles northwest of Oak Grove, reported wind calm, temperature 50°F, dew point 42°F, visibility 10 miles, clear sky, and an altimeter setting of 30.34 inches of mercury.
Communications & Radar Information
The pilot was not in contact with air traffic control, and no distress call was reported.
Wreckage and Impact Information
An FAA inspector examined the wreckage on site. The airplane was equipped with a ballistic safety parachute, but the safety pin was still installed in the firing handle with the "remove before flight" tag attached. The main battery power switch was in the off position.
A tree located aft of the airplane had a broken limb at the edge of a tree line, consistent with a near-vertical descent. Damage to the aircraft and ground scars indicated a left wing ground impact, a roll to the left, and the fuselage coming to rest on its left side. The tail section was at an approximate 35-degree angle from the fuselage.
The fuel tank was about half full; only residual fuel was found in the fuel lines and carburetor float bowls. The in-line fuel filter contained no fuel and appeared dirty with unidentified contaminants. The transparent fuel lines were in a degraded condition.
On-site engine examination did not identify operational problems, but the ignition switch produced a shock when turned to the "start" position. The switch was removed for laboratory analysis.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy conducted by the West Carroll Parish Coroner's Office determined the cause of death as multiple injuries. The FAA Toxicology Accident Research Laboratory tested the pilot and found negative results for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and ethanol. Diphenhydramine (a sedating antihistamine and sleep aid) and Sotalol (a prescription antiarrhythmic beta blocker) were detected in muscle and blood.
Test and Research
The ignition switch was an ACS Model A-510-2, subject to a 1993 Airworthiness Directive requiring periodic inspection and lubrication with Mobil grease 33. Examination prior to disassembly showed electrical continuity when turned. After disassembly, a sample of the grease inside was identified as a graphite thickened lubricant.
Further examination revealed an automotive fuel pump (Mr. Gasket model 42s) installed outside the fuel tank and in series with the engine's fuel pump. The Rotax 503 manual states that an electric pump should be connected in parallel to avoid excessive pressure. The engine fuel pump was a Mikuni pump typically used on two-stroke engines; a Rotax technician noted this style lacks bleed holes and may hydro-lock. The in-line fuel filter was a paper type, while the Rotax manual specifies a 0.15 mm mesh filter and states "Do not use paper filters." Spark plugs appeared new but were gapped at 0.030 inches; the recommended gap is 0.018–0.023 inches. A post-crash engine run was conducted; the engine started and produced power.