4 fatalities

3 Feb 2014: GULFSTREAM AM CORP COMM DIV 690 C (N840V) — Bellevue, TN

Bellevue, TN, United States

On 3 Feb 2014, a GULFSTREAM AM CORP COMM DIV 690 C (registration N840V) was involved in an aviation accident near Bellevue, TN. 4 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed with one engine inoperative, which resulted in a loss of control while on approach. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On February 3, 2014, a Gulfstream Commander 690C crashed while on approach to John C. Tune Airport, killing the pilot and three passengers. The aircraft was destroyed.

History of Flight

On February 3, 2014, about 1655 central standard time, a Gulfstream Commander 690C, registration N840V, operated by a private pilot, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near Bellevue, Tennessee, while on approach to John C. Tune Airport (JWN) in Nashville, Tennessee. The private pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight that departed Great Bend Municipal Airport (GBD) in Great Bend, Kansas. The personal flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The airplane was based at GBD. On the accident date, the pilot flew from Clarence E. Page Municipal Airport (RCE) in Oklahoma City, where it had undergone maintenance including a 150-hour periodic inspection, to GBD. The pilot and three passengers then departed for JWN about 1445 to attend a convention and trade show in the Nashville area.

The flight progressed toward Nashville, and the pilot was cleared for a GPS (RNAV) approach to runway 2 at JWN about 1628. At 1629:27, the pilot requested to climb and review the approach. The pilot was directed to maintain 3,000 feet and turn right to 020 degrees but turned to 200 degrees; the controller did not correct this. After subsequent clearances, the pilot reported executing a missed approach at 1642. About 1653, the pilot was cleared for a third GPS approach. At 1655:37, the controller terminated radar services and instructed the pilot to cancel IFR; the pilot did not respond. Radar data showed the airplane veered left and descended, turning to about 210 degrees before contact was lost. The airplane struck trees and a field adjacent to a building about 9 miles south of JWN.

Personnel Information

The pilot, age 62, held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His logbook was not located. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on February 23, 2012, at which time he reported 3,000 total flight hours, including 30 hours in the previous 6 months. Training records indicated he completed a Turbo Commander 690 recurrent course in May 2013, reporting 3,205 total hours, 1,392 multiengine hours, 436 instrument hours, 719 hours in the accident airplane, and 20 hours in the previous 12 months.

Aircraft Information

The pilot was the President of an agricultural company that purchased the airplane on August 29, 2000. The high-wing, all-metal, pressurized airplane, serial number 11727, was manufactured in 1982. It was powered by two Executive Wings Inc. supplemental type certificate modified Garrett TPE331-5-511K, 715-horsepower engines with Hartzell three-bladed constant speed propeller assemblies. The most recent inspection was a 150-hour periodic inspection performed on February 1, 2014. At the time of the accident, the airframe and both engines had about 4,460 total hours since new. The airplane had been operated for about 70 hours in the preceding 13 months.

The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems, including wing and empennage deice boots, propeller deice, heated stall warning, rudder horn and tab anti-ice, generator inlet anti-ice, electrically heated windshield, and pitot-static heaters. Engine inlet heaters used bleed air. A warning in the pilot operating handbook stated: "When icing conditions may be encountered, do not delay operation of the engine inlet heat systems. Turn the systems on before any ice accumulates. Engine inlet heat must be on if icing conditions exist or are anticipated." The airplane also had a Negative Torque Sensing (NTS) system.

Meteorological Information

A weather observation at JWN (9 miles north-northeast of the accident site, elevation 495 feet) at 1655 reported wind from 360 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 5 statute miles, overcast ceiling at 800 feet, temperature 41°F, dew point 25°F, altimeter 30.29 inches of mercury. AIRMET Sierra, valid at accident time, forecast IFR conditions with ceilings below 1,000 feet and visibilities below 3 miles. No AIRMETS for icing were valid, but the pilot received weather briefings including three pilot reports (PIREPs) of icing in the Nashville area. Surface analysis showed a frontal system and trough. Satellite data indicated abundant cloud cover with cloud-top heights about 19,500 feet. Seven PIREPs in the NAS reported icing from trace rime to light to moderate mixed icing between 2,000 and 3,500 feet. Current Icing Potential images indicated light to moderate icing likely at 2,000 to 3,000 feet. A witness reported ice on street signs and a vehicle temperature of 34°F. Recorded audio from Nashville TRACON revealed seven verbal PIREPs, six with icing information, but none were communicated to the controller handling the accident flight. TRACON personnel noted that 20 to 30 percent of the time, Lockheed Martin Flight Service was unavailable to distribute PIREPs, and they did not always consider reports from one sector valid in another.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane impacted the ground creating an 11-foot-long, 11-foot-wide, 6-foot-deep crater. Broken tree branches with 45-degree angled cuts were at about 50 feet. The impact angle was about 70 degrees, consistent with an inverted position. The aircraft was severely fragmented with debris scattered on a course of about 320 degrees for about 450 feet. A postcrash fire consumed most of the airframe. Portions of both outboard wings, nose section, empennage, and all flight control surfaces were located, but fragmentation precluded confirming control continuity. The left main landing gear was retracted; right and nose gear separated. Ice protection system switch positions could not be determined due to impact damage. Deice boots were destroyed.

Both propellers remained attached to their gearboxes, which separated from the engines. Left propeller blades all separated; two right blades remained attached. Both assemblies showed rotational scoring, with the right propeller blades exhibiting significantly more damage. Engines were impact and fire damaged; no evidence of catastrophic failure was found. Teardown examination revealed no preimpact conditions that would have prevented normal operation. The left engine showed damage indicative of not operating, with rotation consistent with a windmilling propeller at impact. The right engine showed damage indicative of operating under power. The left engine fuel control unit was extensively damaged and not functionally testable, with no preimpact malfunctions observed. Computed Tomography scans of fuel shutoff valves showed both in the closed position, but preimpact positions could not be confirmed. The left valve solenoids functioned when power was applied; the right did not. Examination of gyros indicated rotation at the time of the accident.

Additional Information

A performance study by an NTSB specialist revealed that the airplane's airspeed was nominally 150 knots during the approach before the accident and showed good acceleration after the missed approach. During the accident approach, airspeed slowed to 111 knots when a left 25-degree turn began away from the final approach course; 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, it slowed to 108 knots and descended at over 10,000 feet per minute until impact. The published stall speed for straight and level flight with flaps and gear retracted was 77 knots, but would increase to about 108 knots in a 60-degree level turn. All speeds assumed a clean wing with no ice accretion. The minimum control airspeed was 93 knots.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy of the pilot by the Office of the Medical Examiner in Nashville listed the cause of death as "multiple blunt force injuries." Toxicological testing by the FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory showed no anomalies.

Contributing factors

Causes

PilotAirspeed — Not attained/maintained

Other contributing factors

Contributed to outcomeEngine (turbine/turboprop)