History of Flight
On May 9, 2014, at 2031 eastern daylight time, a Navion G, registration N2473T, was substantially damaged when it struck trees and terrain near Hamilton Township, New Jersey, following a loss of engine power. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was initially filed. The flight, conducted under 14 CFR Part 91, originated from St. Mary's Airport (2W6), Maryland, with Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), New Jersey, as its intended destination. The pilot, a commercial pilot, and three passengers were on board. One passenger in the right front seat was fatally injured, the pilot and another passenger were seriously injured, and a third passenger sustained minor injuries. The pilot had checked weather via the internet and coordinated with ACY tower prior to departure, aware of potential low visibility. An alternate plan to divert to Millville, New Jersey, or return home was considered. The pilot flew an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 13 at ACY but executed a missed approach due to low visibility. A second approach was offered and accepted; during that approach, the controller reported 200-foot overcast and ¼-mile visibility in fog. The pilot then requested vectors to Millville and was instructed to climb to 2,000 feet. Upon adding full power, the engine stopped. The pilot perceived either a fuel or an electrical issue. He moved the fuel selector through various positions and checked ignition, throttle, and mixture. A "mayday" call was made to the tower, and the pilot warned passengers to brace. The airplane struck tree tops, and the pilot released the controls and braced for impact. Radio transmissions indicated that the pilot reported engine problems and an eventual engine failure before radar contact was lost at 500 feet.
Personnel Information
The 45-year-old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings, as well as a flight instructor certificate. He reported 5,500 total flight hours, with 100 hours in the accident make and model. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 23, 2014.
Aircraft Information
The Navion G was powered by a Teledyne Continental Motors IO-520-series engine driving a three-bladed metal propeller. The latest annual inspection was completed on March 1, 2014, at 2,323 airframe hours; at the time of the accident, total airframe time was 2,339 hours, and engine time since factory rebuild was 92 hours. The fuel system provided 108 gallons of usable fuel through two center wing tanks (connected to a sump) and two wing tip tanks. The floor-mounted fuel selector had positions: OFF (6 o'clock), LEFT TIP (9 o'clock), MAIN (12 o'clock), and RIGHT TIP (3 o'clock); moving to OFF required lifting a knob on the selector handle. Tip tank fuel was drawn through a finger strainer assembly. The pilot reported inaccurate fuel gauges and used a calibrated stick to check fuel levels before the flight: each tip tank contained 10 gallons, and the main tanks held slightly over 15 gallons total. He ran the engine for three minutes on each tip tank on the ground to verify feed. The pilot typically took off and landed on main tanks and used tip tanks in transit. During the accident flight, he used the left tip tank for 22 minutes 40 seconds, switched to main for the first approach, then to the right tip tank after the missed approach, and back to main about one minute before the engine quit. The boost pump was used for start and could be used during approach and takeoff. The pilot noted that running a tip tank dry in cruise was normal, with engine return to power within 5-10 seconds after selecting main; however, on a recent flight, the engine took slightly longer to restart. The airplane was equipped only with lap belts; no shoulder harnesses were installed for any seats. The manufacturer had received FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval for shoulder harness installation in 2003, but they were not retrofitted.
Meteorological Information
Weather recorded at Atlantic City International Airport at 2035 reported calm winds, fog, ½-mile visibility, an indefinite ceiling at 200 feet, and an altimeter setting of 30.03 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was located in a flat, wooded area at approximately 39°28.26'N, 074°39.03'W, at an elevation of about 70 feet. Pine tree tops were cut in a descending path, with an estimated descent angle of 20 to 30 degrees and a heading of about 140 degrees magnetic over approximately 200 feet. The tree cuts stopped about 60 feet above the ground. The airplane came to rest on its left side, nose down approximately 45 degrees. The fuselage was mostly intact, but both wings were separated near their roots, and the empennage was separated. All flight controls were present and continuity to the cockpit was confirmed. The propeller showed no evidence of rotation under power. The left fuel tip tank was compromised and contained no fuel; no fuel odor was detected in the soil. The right tip tank contained about 5 gallons, and the main tanks held about 15 gallons; approximately 10 gallons were drained, with additional fuel remaining. The fuel selector was found in the MAIN position. Finger strainers: the left tip tank strainer had a small amount of debris; the right strainer had none. The engine could not be run at the initial facility due to impact damage and was shipped to the manufacturer for testing. After repairs (replacement of left front mount, throttle body, Wye pipe, and oil drain plug), the engine was started and run at various RPMs—1,200, 1,600, 2,450, and full throttle—for stabilization periods, and rapidly accelerated from idle to full throttle six times, with no anomalies observed. The engine monitor data showed fuel flow dropped to zero at 20:30:06, with subsequent short spikes (2-3 seconds) of up to 4 gallons per hour, consistent with fuel selector movements. The pilot later stated that after power loss, he used feel alone to move the selector, though he had visually checked it beforehand.
Additional Information
The pilot reported after the accident that the fuel selector position prior to power loss was checked visually with a light provided by the pilot-rated passenger. After the engine failure, he relied on feel. He was uncertain whether he secured the fuel selector after the crash. The NTSB safety study on general aviation shoulder harness use was referenced in the source, noting that retrofitting older aircraft was not required by regulations; the accident aircraft lacked shoulder harnesses, which were not mandatory at manufacture.