No fatalities

30 Dec 2014: MDS FYING LLC ZENITH ZODIAC CH 650 (N419PE) — MDS Flying LLC — Fort Pierce, FL

Fort Pierce, FL, United States

On 30 Dec 2014, a MDS FYING LLC ZENITH ZODIAC CH 650 (registration N419PE) operated by MDS Flying LLC was involved in an aviation accident near Fort Pierce, FL. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The inadequate modification of the airplane’s canopy latching mechanism, which resulted in the inadvertent opening of the canopy while on final approach to land and a subsequent loss of pitch control. This summary draws on records from NTSB.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On December 30, 2014, an experimental Zenith Zodiac CH 650 impacted terrain after the canopy opened on approach. The pilot reported elevator ineffectiveness and increasing power but could not prevent the nose-down impact.

Accident Overview

On December 30, 2014, about 1320 eastern standard time, an experimental amateur-built Zenith Zodiac CH 650, N419PE, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain while on approach to St. Lucie County International Airport (FPR), Fort Pierce, Florida. The private pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight, which originated at 1200.

Events Leading to the Accident

After conducting a preflight inspection, the pilot closed the canopy and pushed both locking handles forward until they stopped. During a runup check of the engine, he verified that both latches remained closed, then departed. On return to the departure airport, he entered the traffic pattern to perform several touch-and-go landings. After setting flaps to 10° and trimming the airplane, he turned onto final approach to runway 28 at 75 knots. At about 50 ft above ground, the cockpit canopy opened, and the airplane pitched nose down. The pilot responded by pulling on the stick and increasing engine power but found the elevator control ineffective. He noted that the canopy had opened about 3 inches. The airplane subsequently impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude.

Postaccident Examination

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors examined the airplane and found that the forward portion of the fuselage had been substantially damaged during the impact. The single-engine, two-seat, kit-built, low-wing airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate on August 15, 2014. It was powered by a Lycoming YIO-233-B2A, 115-horsepower engine with a Sensenich 2-blade propeller. The most recent condition inspection was completed on August 29, 2014, and the airframe had 14 total hours at the time of the accident.

Canopy Latch System Examination

Examination of plans and photographs of an exemplar airframe provided by the kit manufacturer showed that the airplane's canopy latch system consisted of a middle canopy lock tube behind the two cockpit seats extending to the fuselage on both sides. A locking handle (black lever at shoulder level) between the seats locked the canopy when rotated to the locked position. The middle lock tube attached via linkage to a latch assembly on the outboard aft cockpit, where a bolt on the canopy frame was engaged. The canopy could also be latched and locked from outside via a handle on the left fuselage.

On the accident airplane, both left and right latch assemblies were fitted with red handles not shown in the manufacturer's plans. Postaccident functional testing revealed that when closing the canopy, its edge repeatedly caught on the cabin frame in several locations, preventing correct seating. To fully close, the canopy had to be pulled outward toward the wing and manipulated. From inside the cockpit, it was difficult to close without outside assistance. The canopy could not be latched using the black locking lever from inside. When operating the latch by the red handle, no audible or tactile feedback (e.g., a "click") indicated engagement. When both latches were pushed fully forward, their respective bolts appeared not to have fully seated into their recesses.

Contributing factors

Passenger/crew doors — FailureAttain/maintain not possibleMaintenance/inspections