Casualties unknown

2014-11-17: Boeing 787-800 — w trasie (en-route), PL

w trasie (en-route), PL

On November 17, 2014, a Boeing 787-800 was involved in an aviation accident near w trasie (en-route), PL. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Operational error by the crew consisting of inadequate verification of the route entered into the FMC compared with the route specified in the operational flight plan. This summary draws on records from the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL); 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL)Primary reportUpdated 1785092869Data APIEditorial standards
Boeing 787-800
Photo: Moto "Club4AG" Miwa from USA / CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 17 November 2014, a Boeing 787-800 crew could not immediately comply with an ATC route change because the FMC lacked the waypoint TUKMI. The cause was inadequate verification of the route entered in the FMC against the operational flight plan.

Incident Overview

On 17 November 2014, a Boeing 787-800 aircraft was in cruise flight en route to waypoint GUNPA when air traffic control instructed the crew to change course to waypoint TUKMI. The crew was unable to execute the instruction immediately because the navigation database in the Flight Management Computer (FMC) did not contain the waypoint TUKMI, requiring manual entry of its coordinates. The ATC controller subsequently required the crew to file a report.

Findings

The investigation revealed the following:

  • The incident was caused by an operational error by the crew: they had not adequately verified the route entered in the FMC against the route specified in the operational flight plan.
  • Although the crew knew the aircraft had been dispatched with an outdated navigation database under a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) provision, the discrepancy between the FMC route and the flight plan went undetected.
  • The MEL dispatch was necessary because the navigation database provided by the manufacturer was too large to be loaded into the FMC.
  • The operator's operational services had requested approval from the Polish Civil Aviation Authority (ULC) to fly for up to two months using printed documentation (Operational Instruction part C) when an updated navigation database was unavailable.
  • The navigation database was updated within the validity period of the MEL dispatch.
  • Analysis of the crew's personal flight schedules showed no errors or signs of fatigue that could have influenced the event.

Cause

The probable cause of the incident was an operational error by the crew, consisting of inadequate verification of the route entered into the FMC compared with the route specified in the operational flight plan.

Safety Measures

The findings from the incident investigation will be used as instructional material during periodic pilot training. No safety recommendations were issued by the commission.

Investigation report by the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL). Original record: https://pkbwl.gov.pl/raporty/2014-2064/. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Panstwowa Komisja Badania Wypadkow Lotniczych (PKBWL), Poland.