History of Flight
On February 19, 2015, about 1835 Atlantic standard time, an experimental, amateur-built Rans S-6ES Coyote II, registration N5196W, ditched in the waters of the Mona Passage after a partial loss of engine power near Rincon, Puerto Rico. The private pilot sustained minor injuries, and the passenger was fatally injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight operating under 14 CFR Part 91, which had departed Eugenio Maria de Hostos Airport (TJMZ), Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, about 1815.
The pilot arrived at TJMZ around 1600 to purchase the airplane. After a short test flight of 15–20 minutes, he paid the owner. He then received a phone call from his brother-in-law and invited him for a short flight. The pilot left the airport about 1802, purchased premium automobile gasoline at a local gas station, and refueled the airplane. Around 1815, he and his brother-in-law boarded and taxied for takeoff. The pilot verified the gasoline valve was on and conducted a magneto check. After takeoff, they climbed to about 1,000 ft above sea level.
About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot noticed the engine was not producing enough power to sustain flight; it never lost power completely but would not produce full power. He began troubleshooting while flying a course parallel to the shoreline over shallow water near Rincon. Seeing people and sharp rocks along the shoreline, he decided not to land on the beach but to ditch in the water. He maneuvered to 4–6 ft above the water, set flaps to 20°, stalled the airplane, and touched down on the water. Upon touchdown, the airplane decelerated and sank but did not nose over. The pilot released his seatbelt and egressed after about 5 seconds, swimming to the surface.
When the pilot reached the surface, he did not see his passenger. He swam back down, released the passenger's seatbelt, and swam him to the surface, but the passenger was not breathing. A person on a boogie board reached them; they placed the passenger on the board and paddled to the beach. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed but was unsuccessful.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an FAA private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on September 8, 2014. He reported about 609 total flight hours.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was a kit-built, two-seat, high-wing aircraft with a welded 4130 steel tube cockpit, bolted aluminum tube rear fuselage, and Dacron-covered wings and tail. It had tricycle landing gear. Assembled from a kit by the original owner, it received an FAA special airworthiness certificate on April 18, 1994, originally powered by a Volkswagen engine. Shortly after, the engine was replaced with a Rotax 582 manufactured in November 1990.
On March 5, 2006, the airplane was involved in an accident (NTSB Case No. ATL06LA048) in Cartersville, Georgia, during an instructional flight. The NTSB determined the probable cause as loss of engine power for undetermined reasons, resulting in a forced landing, ground collision with a ditch, and nose over.
The airplane was sold on March 7, 2006, and over the next two years had several owners in the continental US. On March 8, 2008, the engine was replaced with another Rotax 582. Later that year, the airplane was shipped to Puerto Rico. On April 20, 2009, a liquid-cooled, 64-horsepower Rotax 582 Mod 99 engine with dual carburetors and dual ignition, driving a three-blade Warp Drive ground-adjustable propeller, was installed. Over the next five years it had several owners until March 5, 2014, when it was sold to the previous owner, who operated it for about 11 months and sold it to the pilot on the accident day.
The most recent condition inspection was completed on November 26, 2014, at which time the airplane had accrued 881.5 total hours and the engine 191.5 hours.
Meteorological Information
At 1750, weather at Rafael Hernandez Airport (TJBQ), Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, 11 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, was wind 310° at 9 knots, 7 miles visibility in light rain, scattered clouds at 1,000 ft, broken at 2,100 ft, overcast at 5,000 ft, temperature 23°C, dew point 22°C, altimeter 29.99 inHg.
Wreckage and Impact Information
On February 21, 2015, the wreckage was recovered from about 20 ft of water about 200 ft off the beach near Rincon and transported to the Port of Mayaguez.
Examination revealed the firewall and engine mounts were bent and broken, and the engine had been removed during recovery. Both carburetors were displaced, coolant lines cut, and all spark plugs impact-damaged. The propeller was still attached to the gearbox, all three blades attached to the hub. Surface corrosion on exposed aluminum parts was consistent with submersion in sea water.
Engine examination showed the intake air filters were the proper type but had damage and dirt/sand in the pleats. The exhaust system had a large section missing; only the exhaust Y-pipe remained. Spark plugs were impact-damaged, had non-conforming removable resistor caps, and rust-colored water droplets indicating sea water in the combustion chambers. Ignition modules and wires were of proper type but damaged.
The coolant system had a missing overflow bottle, all hoses breached, the water pump intact, and the radiator heavily damaged with no coolant remaining. The injection oil lubrication system had been disconnected, requiring the pilot to premix fuel with oil at 50:1. The rotary lubrication system and oil tank were contaminated with sea water, and the perpendicular shaft and rotary valve plate were corroded due to submersion.
Attempting to rotate the crankshaft by hand was unsuccessful; the propeller shaft would not rotate, indicating internal obstruction. The propeller was removed, and the engine was placed on a workbench. The reduction gearbox had oil contained and the gear-set and bearings appeared in good condition.
Cylinder heads were in good condition. Both PTO and MAG cylinders showed a reddish iron oxide coating on the barrel surfaces. No seizure marks or mechanical anomalies were visible. Due to the stuck crankshaft, the MAG piston could not be removed. Inspection through connecting rod holes revealed corrosion on connecting rods and crankshaft from submersion, determined to be the reason for the stuck crankshaft. No other anomalies were found.
Examination of the PTO piston through the exhaust port revealed severe corrosion and salt deposits; the piston was stuck at top dead center. It displayed reddish iron oxide but no signs of vertical scoring, metal transfer, or excessive heat. No indications of seizure, detonation, or mechanical anomalies. The MAG piston similarly had severe corrosion and salt deposits, stuck at bottom dead center, with rings stuck in ring grooves. No anomalies other than corrosion.
Fuel system examination revealed breaches in lines between the pneumatic fuel pump and carburetors and between the fuel tank and electric fuel pump. No preimpact anomalies with lines. Both fuel tanks had internal dark stains and damage. The electric fuel pump, primer plunger, and pneumatic fuel pump showed no anomalies. The fuel filter was found full of sand and debris that appeared to obstruct the mesh filter screen. The filter had a transparent housing for easy inspection and was located next to the pilot's left leg.
The engine had dual Bing 54 side-draft carburetors. Both carburetors were displaced. The PTO carburetor float bowl had severe contamination and corrosion; the main jet was completely blocked with corrosion and salt deposits; the sieve screen was crushed around the main jet tower, indicating poor installation. The top of the carburetor had a stuck piston due to corrosion. The MAG carburetor had identical issues: contamination, blocked main jet, crushed sieve screen, and stuck piston. No other anomalies were found.
Medical and Pathological Information
The Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences performed an autopsy on the passenger. The cause of death was asphyxiation by drowning. Toxicological testing of the passenger was negative for carbon monoxide. Loratadine and ranitidine were detected in blood and/or urine.
Additional Information
The Rans S-6ES Build Manual called for checking fuel filter clogs. The Rotax Operators Manual and Installation Manual emphasized frequent checks of fuel hoses, filters, and connections, noting fuel contamination as a major cause of engine failures. The Rotax Maintenance Manual required fuel filter checks every 25, 50, and 75 hours and replacement every 100 hours. It also warned about blockage from two-stroke oil detergents reacting with water. No entries related to the fuel filter were found in maintenance records. The engine, manufactured April 17, 2008, required general overhaul every 5 years or 300 hours per the Rotax Maintenance Manual; records did not indicate an overhaul since installation in 2009.