History of Flight
On May 7, 2015, at 1604 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, registration N962DA, struck the Spokane River following an attempted landing at Felts Field Airport, Spokane, Washington. The airplane was owned by Flying Colors Aviation LLC and operated under Part 91. The commercial pilot and a pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries; the airplane was destroyed. The local flight departed Felts Field at 1553 under visual meteorological conditions with no flight plan. The flight was a post-maintenance test flight following an annual inspection performed by Rocket Engineering, where both occupants were employed. The planned flight time was about 40 minutes.
Audio and radar data from the FAA captured the sequence. Multiple witnesses and air traffic control personnel observed the accident. The pilot requested departure from Runway 4L. After takeoff, the airplane began a climbing right turn. About 1.5 miles into the flight, the turn became more aggressive, reaching 1,000 ft agl. Labored breathing was heard on the frequency; the controller asked if everything was okay, and the pilot replied, "That's negative." The airplane then executed nearly two spiraling turns with a 700-ft radius, descending about 700 ft. Tower personnel reported a 90-degree right bank, but the airplane appeared to recover.
The airplane climbed meanderingly eastward. The pilot stated, "We are trying to get under control here, be back with you." Reaching about 5,600 ft msl (4,000 ft agl) near Newman Lake, the pilot reported, "things seem to be stabilizing." He planned to stay in the area to assess the situation. The airplane turned left and was approved for a straight-in landing to Runway 22R. The controller asked the nature of the emergency, and the pilot responded, "We have a control emergency there, a hard right aileron." On final approach, the airplane maintained a 20-degree right-wing-low attitude. As it crossed taxiway D, the engine sound changed, suggesting a go-around attempt, and the airplane rolled sharply right before colliding with the river north of the airport.
Personnel Information
The pilot in command, seated in the left front seat, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine land, multiengine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument airplane and helicopter, as well as a flight instructor certificate. He held an FAA second-class medical certificate issued May 17, 2013, with a near-vision glasses limitation. He was 64 years old and had accumulated about 5,800 hours total pilot-in-command time, 950 of which were in the accident make and model. He had flown about 20 hours in that make and model in the preceding 30 days. He was a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel with 20 years of active service as a test pilot, instructor, and search and rescue pilot. At Rocket Engineering, he served as an engineer and primary liaison with the FAA's Flight Standards and Certification divisions.
The pilot-rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, issued in 2010, and had about 122 hours of pilot-in-command experience. He was employed at Rocket Engineering as a customer service and sales representative.
Aircraft Information
The six-seat, low-wing, pressurized airplane was originally manufactured by Piper in 1996 as a PA-46-350P, equipped with a Lycoming TIO-540-AE2A engine. In 2007, it was modified under a JetProp LLC supplemental type certificate, installing a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-35 turboprop engine. The airplane was brought to Rocket Engineering on April 17 for an annual inspection. During the maintenance, the four aileron cables in the wings and an aft elevator cable were replaced. The mechanic who performed the work stated that the aileron and elevator cables were replaced over the three days leading up to the accident.
Separately, an avionics upgrade was performed by another maintenance facility while the airplane was at Rocket Engineering. The upgrade required removal of the aft headliner and right-side seats for cable runs.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The river was about 25 ft deep. All major airframe components sank within minutes. Recovery by a diving team took two days. The fuselage sustained crush damage and fragmentation. The engine remained attached to the firewall. Both wings separated at their roots; the right wing broke into two sections. The horizontal stabilizer detached from the tailcone.
Medical and Pathological Information
Autopsies attributed both deaths to multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicology tests on both occupants were negative for ingested ethanol. The pilot had Acetaminophen and Ranitidine in his system; the passenger had Dextromethorphan, Dextrorphan, Famotidine, and Salicylate. None were considered hazardous to flight safety by CAMI.
Control System Examination
The aileron control system was examined. In the right wing, a cable identified as the drive cable (part number 5038) was found routed through the balance cable path from the pressure vessel seal outward. No cable was attached to the drive section of the right aileron sector wheel. A cable identified as the right balance cable (part number 5036) was routed through the drive cable pressure vessel seal and connected to the left wing balance cable. This misrouting would cause both ailerons to deflect in the same direction when the control wheel was moved, rather than opposite directions. The extent of deflection could not be determined post-accident.
The rudder trim wheel was found in the full left position. No other flight control anomalies were noted.
Maintenance Procedures
The installing mechanic, an A&P with IA, reported replacing the cables one at a time to avoid misrouting. He checked aileron operation from inside and outside, confirming smooth and full deflection, and used a protractor for angular measurements. He asked another mechanic to check his work, but the second mechanic only assisted with reattaching ailerons and safety wire, not verifying correct operation.
The Piper Maintenance Manual included a caution to verify correct aileron movement: right aileron up with right control wheel, left aileron down, and vice versa.
The preflight checklist in the Pilot Operating Handbook includes a check of primary flight controls. The mechanic stated the pilot performed the preflight while seats were being reinstalled.
Additional Information
Rocket Engineering had no formal procedure requiring independent inspection of work performed after an annual inspection. Unlike Part 121/135, Part 91 does not require a separate inspector for maintenance tasks.