History of Flight
On December 10, 2015, at 1153 central standard time, a Piper PA46-500TP airplane, registration N145JR, impacted power lines and terrain near Council Bluffs, Iowa. The pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Airsea Charters Inc. and operated by the pilot under 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the departure airport, and the flight operated under an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from Eppley Airfield (OMA), Omaha, Nebraska, about 1150, destined for Perry Stokes Airport (TAD), Trinidad, Colorado.
At 1150, the OMA tower controller cleared the pilot for takeoff and instructed him to fly a 320-degree heading. At 1152:12, the pilot stated he needed to return to Eppley. The controller instructed the pilot to enter a right downwind for runway 32R. When asked if he required any assistance, the pilot replied, "negative." The pilot reported that the AHRS had a "miscommunication." (In context, AHRS likely referred to the attitude and heading reference system.) At 1153, the controller inquired if the pilot could accept a short approach; the pilot accepted and was cleared to land. The controller indicated another airplane was on a 4-mile final for the runway at that time. No further communications were received.
ATC radar data showed the airplane entering a right turn after takeoff. When the pilot requested to return, the airplane was about 1.75 miles north of the airport at 2,000 ft msl, on a southeast course. It paralleled the runway on a downwind leg. About 20 seconds after the request, the airplane began descending and entered a right turn that continued until the final radar data point at 1153:36, altitude 1,100 ft msl, about 400 ft northeast of the accident site.
A witness reported observing the airplane from Highway 29. The landing gear was extended as the airplane flew southbound at low altitude east of the highway. The airplane then made a sharp turn west, struck power lines along the east side of the highway, and came to rest inverted in the center median of the divided highway about 3/4 mile east of the airport.
Personnel Information
Within the preceding year, the pilot had logged 296.7 hours in airplanes and 20.0 hours in a flight simulator/training device, including 280.7 hours in the accident airplane. All logged flight time within 90 days of the accident was in the accident airplane. The pilot had completed the FAA Wings Program, Advanced Level – Phase 2, meeting flight review requirements.
Aircraft Information
The current owner purchased the airplane in January 2011, and the accident pilot signed the registration application. In January 2013, the airplane was involved in a nose landing gear collapse and runway excursion during landing. Maintenance records noted that the engine was removed, disassembled, inspected, and repaired, then reinstalled in August 2013 with an overhauled propeller assembly.
Most recent maintenance was completed on December 8, 2015, at 1,047.2 hours. Three discrepancies were noted: loss of airspeed indication at altitude, propeller deice inoperative, and air noise at the cabin door near the retract cable. The propeller heat control module was replaced, sealant applied to the cabin door, and moisture drains checked (no water observed). No further action was documented for the airspeed discrepancy. The airplane was returned to service.
The pilot's wife reported that about one week before the accident, on a return flight from Steamboat, Colorado, the airplane "started to act erratically" about one hour into the flight. The pilot turned off the autopilot and descended; the rest of the flight was uneventful. The pilot told her that an inconsistency in instrument indications needed checking after landing.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was in the center median of Interstate 29, about 3/4 mile east of OMA runway 32R threshold. The airplane struck power lines and a support arm about 75 ft above ground level, located about 520 ft northeast of the site. The main wreckage (fuselage, inboard two-thirds of right wing, empennage, engine) came to rest inverted. The left wing separated at the root and was about 15 ft west; the propeller separated and was about 30 ft north; the right wingtip and fragments were near the power lines.
Post-accident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies consistent with pre-impact failure or malfunction.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy attributed the pilot's death to blunt force injuries. The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology report detected: chlorpheniramine in urine and blood (cavity), dextromethorphan in urine, dextrorphan in urine and blood, diphenhydramine in urine and blood, and doxylamine in urine and blood. Chlorpheniramine, diphenhydramine, and doxylamine are sedating antihistamines; dextromethorphan is a cough suppressant considered not impairing in normal doses.
Tests and Research
Examination of the data acquisition unit found no engine exceedance events or trend monitoring entries for the accident flight; trend data are not recorded until stabilized cruise at or above 15,000 ft.
Annunciator panel light bulb filaments: left and right L Fuel Pump advisory filaments were stretched; Fuel Pressure caution right filament showed minor stretching; left filament intact. Stretched filaments indicate illumination at impact. According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook, with electric fuel boost pumps in AUTO mode, they activate when fuel pressure drops below 9 psig and remain on until pressure exceeds 12 psig.
The standby airspeed indicator had a separated link arm from the pin on the rocking shaft. Re-attached and tested, indications were within limits except at 160 knots during decreasing airspeed, reading 164 knots (limit 163).
Examination of the AHRS units, air data computers, and magnetometers revealed no anomalies, but testing was limited by the test bench. Each unit appeared functional and provided valid information individually. The test bench did not support simultaneous testing, so evaluation of potential miscompare annunciations was not possible.