History of Flight
On July 8, 2017, about 1647 Pacific daylight time, a Quicksilver MXL-II Sport experimental light sport airplane, N2812, sustained unknown damage when it ditched in the Pacific Ocean near Point Mugu, California. The two pilots on board escaped from the airplane before it sank. One pilot successfully swam to shore, but the other pilot died during his attempted swim to shore. The airplane was owned by Sky Knights Flight Club (SKFC) and operated by the pilots under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight that departed from Camarillo Airport (CMA), Camarillo, California, about 1630.
According to the surviving pilot, he and the other pilot were both members of SKFC. Each was qualified to operate the airplane on his own. On the day of the accident, five persons planned to fly three SKFC airplanes in loose formation south to the shoreline and then southeast. The accident airplane had side-by-side seats and dual controls. The surviving sport pilot took the left seat; the other pilot, a private pilot and certificated flight instructor for light sport aircraft, took the right seat. It was not an instructional flight. They departed CMA via the "southeast pattern" with about 10 gallons of fuel. The sport pilot was flying. About 15 minutes later, they reached the shoreline about 7 miles south of CMA. The three airplanes turned left, putting the shoreline off their left sides.
Shortly after passing "Mugu Rock," the sport pilot felt a "skip" in the engine at about 300 ft altitude. The skip repeated. They decided to reverse course and return to CMA, advising the other airplanes. While climbing, the throttle rpm only reached about 5,900 instead of the desired 6,200–6,300. The private pilot also could not increase rpm. The rpm slowly decreased. The airplane could not climb and then could not maintain altitude. Due to different experience levels, they agreed the private pilot should take control. The rpm continued to decrease over 4–5 minutes. Forced landing was necessary, but the rocky coast, hilly terrain, and crowded highway left only the option to ditch in water.
The airplane touched down slowly and under control, initially afloat. Both occupants escaped and stayed with it until it sank. They swam to shore about 200 ft away. The sport pilot was ahead; he kept verbal contact. The private pilot said he was "getting tired." The sport pilot reached shore, turned to see the private pilot face down and not moving. A bystander pulled him to shore. Resuscitation efforts by the sport pilot and later paramedics were unsuccessful. The other two airplanes returned safely to CMA. The accident airplane was found washed ashore the next morning with substantial damage from wave action and rocky coast.
Personnel Information
The left-seat pilot held a sport pilot certificate issued May 2012. He did not hold an FAA medical certificate. Despite requests, his flight experience was not obtained. The right-seat pilot held a private pilot certificate and a flight instructor certificate with a sport rating. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate, issued April 2008, had expired. His logbook showed about 377 total hours, 64 in light sport aircraft, and 34 hours as a flight instructor as of April 1, 2017.
Aircraft Information
The Quicksilver MXL-II Sport was a high-wing ultralight-like design with conventional controls, uncovered aluminum and steel tube framework, side-by-side seats, tricycle landing gear, and a Rotax 582 model 99-series engine mounted atop in pusher configuration. No whole-airplane emergency parachute was installed. The build year was conflicting (2001, 2007, or 2008). SKFC purchased the airplane in April 2013. In June 2013, it experienced a non-fatal engine power loss due to a mechanically deficient muffler (NTSB accident WPR13LA318).
Maintenance records showed the most recent annual condition inspection in January 2017. At that time, airframe total time was about 3,111 hours; engine time since major overhaul was about 349 hours. The engine, serial 4655502, was installed in August 2015 with 0 hours since overhaul. At the accident, total time since overhaul was 427.9 hours. The Rotax Maintenance Manual specifies a 300-hour overhaul interval. The 2015 and a 2013 overhaul were done by a facility in Naples, Florida. SKFC adopted a 450-hour overhaul interval recommended by that facility, which was not a Rotax-approved service facility.
Meteorological Information
The 1656 automated observation from Point Mugu Naval Air Station (3 miles northwest) included winds from 260° at 8 knots, visibility 9 miles, few clouds at 6,500 ft, temperature 25°C, dew point 17°C, altimeter 29.81 inches Hg. Relative humidity was about 60%. The temperature/dew point intersection on an FAA carburetor ice chart was in the region "Serious Icing at Glide Power" and on another chart in "carburetor icing possible."
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane was recovered and examined at the SKFC hangar. Ocean immersion and wave action obscured or destroyed significant evidence. No preimpact mechanical malfunction was noted. The airframe was a mass of fractured tubing. The engine could not be rotated; no catastrophic failure was externally evident. Engine controls were damaged; the throttle control cable had pulled from its connection. The carburetor pistons were stuck in the wide open throttle position. Fuel system components were damaged. The exhaust system showed no cracks or obstructions. Both spark plugs had electrode gaps larger than specification; reasons could not be determined.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy on the private pilot determined cause of death as drowning. Toxicology detected chlorpheniramine, diphenhydramine (sedating antihistamines), and loratadine (non-sedating). Chlorpheniramine and diphenhydramine may impair mental/physical ability. FAA recommends waiting 5 days after chlorpheniramine and 60 hours after diphenhydramine before flying. Loratadine is generally acceptable if no adverse effects.
Additional Information
The airplane's glide ratio was about 5:1. At 300 ft, maximum glide distance was about 1,500 ft. SKFC had no requirements for safety equipment such as personal flotation devices (PFDs) or helmets. Neither occupant wore a PFD; no PFDs were carried. The engine-driven fuel pump was mounted above the fuel tank top, contrary to Rotax installation manual recommendation. The electric fuel pump was plumbed in series, also contrary to manual (parallel recommended to avoid excessive pressure).