2 fatalities

1 Aug 2017: PIPER PA30 (N22HW) — Individual — Topeka, KS

Topeka, KS, United States

On 1 Aug 2017, a PIPER PA30 (registration N22HW) operated by Individual was involved in an aviation accident near Topeka, KS. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The failure of the pilot and flight instructor to maintain aircraft control while maneuvering in the traffic pattern. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 17 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On July 31, 2017, a Piper PA-30 (N22HW) crashed at Philip Billard Municipal Airport during a multiengine training flight. The private pilot and flight instructor sustained fatal injuries. No mechanical anomalies were found.

History of Flight

On July 31, 2017, about 2030 central daylight time, a Piper PA-30 airplane, registration N22HW, impacted terrain at Philip Billard Municipal Airport (TOP), Topeka, Kansas. The private pilot receiving instruction and the flight instructor sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight, which originated from TOP.

The pilot had been receiving instruction to obtain an airplane multiengine land rating. The practical test was scheduled for the next day, and the accident flight was a practice checkride.

A witness reported that the pilot and flight instructor arrived separately at the fixed base operator lobby about 1920 and discussed the flight before departing for the hangar. The witness heard a radio transmission that the airplane was taxiing to runway 18 for takeoff. He observed the airplane pass the terminal building during takeoff "very low and not climbing very fast." The airplane then turned left and appeared to conduct a normal traffic pattern. The witness did not see the accident.

Engine parameter data showed left and right engine fuel flows were approximately equivalent until about 7 minutes before the end of the recording, when the right engine fuel flow decreased from about 15 gallons per hour (gph) to about 3 gph. About 2.5 minutes before the end, the left engine fuel flow decreased to about 3 gph. About 1 minute before the end, both engine fuel flows increased to about 15 gph.

The airplane came to rest near the approach end of runway 13, west of the runway 18 threshold.

Aircraft and Wreckage Information

The airplane was a Piper PA-30. The most recent annual inspection of the airplane and engines was dated August 26, 2016, at an aircraft total time of 5,411.3 hours and a Hobbs time of 642.2 hours. The Hobbs meter at the accident site indicated 737.61 hours.

The wreckage was located between runway 13 and taxiway B on a magnetic heading about 125°. The wing flaps and landing gear were retracted. The left wing exhibited greater relative impact damage than the right wing, with leading-edge crushing consistent with a low-speed impact in a left wing-low and shallow pitch attitude.

Both propellers remained attached and displayed S-bending and leading-edge polishing consistent with torsion. The left and right wings, empennage, and control surfaces were attached and secure. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the ailerons, stabilator, and rudder to the cockpit controls. Stabilator trim and rudder trim jack screws were in neutral positions.

There was no evidence of fire or soot. An odor of aviation fuel was present, and fuel drained from the wreckage during recovery. Fuel was present in the fuel system, which was not obstructed by debris, and testing was negative for water.

The cockpit throttle, mixture, and propeller controls were in the forward position. Throttle and mixture control continuity was confirmed for both engines. Both fuel selectors were in the MAIN position.

Ignition timing for the left engine was 24° before top center (BTC) on both magnetos. The right engine left magneto timing was 24° BTC, and the right magneto timing was 25° BTC. The engine data plate specified 25° BTC. Both engines' magnetos produced sparks in correct sequence. Top spark plugs displayed features consistent with normal combustion. Both engines were rotated and confirmed drive and valve train continuity. Propeller governor screens were free of debris. Postaccident examination revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

Personnel Information

The pilot receiving instruction was 61 years old and reported 750 total hours of flight experience on his most recent FAA third-class medical certificate application, issued June 15, 2015, with a limitation for near vision glasses. The medical certificate expired for all classes on June 30, 2017. The pilot had completed the BasicMed education and certification process but, as a physician, had filled out the physician attestation and had his registered nurse sign the form.

Review of the pilot's logbook indicated the first training flight in the accident airplane with the accident flight instructor occurred on May 13, 2017. The last two flights were on July 9 and July 10, 2017, annotated as "multiengine test prep." The flight instructor entered a note on July 10 stating the pilot received required training and was prepared for the practical test.

The flight instructor was 55 years old and held a third-class medical certificate issued July 2, 2015, with a limitation for corrective lenses. He reported hypertension since 2010 and used hydrochlorothiazide and captopril, which are not considered impairing. The instructor who provided the accident flight instructor's most recent flight review stated that the accident flight instructor performed well but displayed some complacency toward reference airspeeds and that his landing approach was unstable and flown at too high an airspeed. The instructor believed he saw improvement on a later instrument proficiency check.

Medical and Pathological Information

According to autopsies performed by the Shawnee County Coroner, the cause of death for both occupants was blunt force injuries. The pilot had significant coronary artery disease with up to 80% stenosis of the left anterior descending, 50% stenosis of the left circumflex, and 20% stenosis of the right coronary arteries. No evidence of previous ischemia or scar was noted. Toxicology testing by Axis Forensic Laboratory for drugs of abuse was negative. FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory testing identified citalopram, N-desmethylcitalopram, and metoprolol in cavity blood and urine. Citalopram is an antidepressant not generally considered impairing, but the underlying depression can cause cognitive impairment. Metoprolol is a blood pressure medication not generally considered impairing.

The flight instructor's autopsy revealed no significant natural disease. Toxicology testing for drugs of abuse was negative, and FAA testing did not identify any tested-for drugs.

Additional Information

An employee of the pilot's business stated that the pilot had expressed frustration in previous weeks about his multiengine training. The pilot told her that during flight training, the flight instructor had him practice many "engine stalls," and that if you don't react quickly, you "end up in a spiral." She thought the pilot was interested in purchasing the accident airplane but did not know the arrangement between the pilot and owner.

A friend of the pilot and flight instructor stated that the pilot was probably the flight instructor's first multiengine student. The pilot had complained that the flight instructor took too many risks and made him nervous, particularly with single-engine work. The pilot was upset that the flight instructor would not sign him off for the checkride and wanted one more simulated checkride. The pilot told the friend he would take the additional training and then never fly with the instructor again.

Contributing factors

Performance/control parameters — Not attained/maintained