History of Flight
On September 28, 2017, at about 1122 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built gyroplane, N152AH, impacted terrain near Umatilla, Florida. The pilot, who held a private pilot certificate, was fatally injured and the gyroplane was destroyed. The flight was conducted under Part 91 personal rules, originating from Bob White Field Airport (X61), Zellwood, Florida, about 1 hour 22 minutes earlier. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.
A witness told an FAA inspector that he observed the gyroplane flying north-northwest at about 50-60 ft above ground level. He heard the engine running, then two "bangs" or "pops." He then saw a large main rotor blade separate immediately after the engine stopped. The gyroplane descended, and the witness lost sight before hearing the impact. He drove to the site and informed the property owner.
Personnel Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. He received a solo endorsement for the accident gyroplane on August 30, 2017. He was operating under Basic Med, with a physical exam on July 10, 2017. His logbook showed about 3,140 total hours, with a gap from May 2013 to July 2017. From July 8 to August 31, 2017, he logged 11 dual flights (about 20 hours) in the gyroplane. From August 31 to September 24, 2017, he logged six solo flights totaling about 3 hours.
The flight instructor who provided the dual training noted that the gyroplane lacked a horizontal stabilizer and had a standard pitch trim configuration. Training included simulated engine-out maneuvers at reduced power (2,800-3,000 rpm) to mimic drag, but the engine was never secured. The instructor endorsed the pilot for solo.
Aircraft Information
The gyroplane was a two-place RAF 2000 model, kit serial number H2-97-8-279, manufactured in 2008. It was equipped with a Subaru 2.2L engine driving a composite three-bladed propeller. The builder/previous owner reported a high thrust line. The most recent condition inspection was completed June 20, 2017; total time at inspection was not recorded. The previous owner indicated about 218 hours when sold to the pilot on July 5, 2017.
An August 26, 2017 engine logbook entry noted that the pilot secured coil wires with silicone and changed spark plugs. The preflight checklist emphasized checking electrical wires, especially the coil wire.
Meteorological Information
At 1053, Leesburg International Airport (LEE), about 10 nm west-southwest of the accident site, reported variable wind at 3 knots, 8 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 32°C, dew point 22°C, altimeter 29.95 inHg.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The gyroplane crashed in a wooded area on private property. Debris (propeller pieces, foam, fiberglass, vertical stabilizer and rudder components) was found along the flight path south of the main wreckage. A 12-ft section of main rotor blade was also found south of the main wreckage. The main wreckage was upright, resting on its right side at the base of a pine tree, oriented on a magnetic heading of 080°. The horizontal stabilizer and tailwheel were missing. The longitudinal structural member near the electric fuel pumps was fractured due to overload. Rudder flight controls were also fractured.
Examination of the separated main rotor blade showed chordwise black marks on the bottom about 16 inches outboard from the fracture. The spar at the blade root was fractured and displaced upward. NTSB Materials Laboratory analysis indicated overstress separation with no pre-existing fatigue or corrosion. The adjacent spar and skin were deformed, consistent with nearly 90° upward blade bending. The other main rotor blade was also deformed upward about 90°, with chordwise black marks near blade retention straps.
The upper left side of the rudder had a smooth cut at about 20° down from the forward edge, and the upper vertical stabilizer had a smooth cut at about 50°, consistent with main rotor blade contact.
Flight control continuity was confirmed from the pilot's control to the upper swashplate. The engine remained attached; all propeller blades were shattered. Hand rotation showed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Roughness was noted but not attributed to the propeller gearbox. Engine disassembly was not performed. Spark plugs were within specification, light gray. The ignition timing was not determined. Air induction, exhaust, fuel metering, and cooling systems showed no preimpact failure.
Examination of the coil of the crank-triggered ignition system, mounted on the top aft of the engine, revealed that Nos. 2 and 4 spark plug wires were connected, but Nos. 1 and 3 were separated. The Nos. 1 and 3 wires were secured by plastic ties to the prerotator cable housing, which was displaced. White sealant was present at the coil base and on wires. The female connector from the coil was not secured; the male connector was separated, with dirt inside terminals. The female connector had a slight material displacement on the lock tab and white sealant. The male connector was secured by plastic wraps with no displacement. The locking tab and opposite connector were not fractured. When properly secured, the connectors could not be pulled apart. No secondary locking device existed.
A recovered cell phone had no videos or pictures for the accident flight. The Avare app was active but tracks were disabled, so no flight data was available.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy listed the cause of death as "multiple blunt force injuries due to gyrocopter crash." Toxicology by FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected no ethanol, but an unquantified amount of diphenhydramine in liver and muscle. NMS Labs testing showed ethanol levels increased over multiple analyses, attributed to specimen and container type, and no other toxicological findings of significance. Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine with a warning about impaired ability for hazardous tasks.
Additional Information
A designated pilot examiner with extensive gyroplane experience noted that a pilot's normal tendency after an engine power loss would be to push forward on the control stick. The gyroplane kit manufacturer's representative stated that main rotor contact with the vertical stabilizer can occur if the rotor blades are unloaded in flight or due to excessive control pitch inputs.
The accident pilot's flight instructor reported that the pilot performed well during power changes and showed little tendency for pilot-induced oscillation.