What happened
On May 26, 2017, at approximately 15:00 LMT, a tandem parachute jump ended in a fatal accident near Przasnysz, Poland. The flight began at Przasnysz-Sierakowo airport [EPPZ], where a Cessna TU-206T (registration SP-ASH) transported three tandem teams for commercial jumps.
After the first two teams landed safely, the third team, consisting of a pilot and a passenger, deployed from an altitude of 3,500–4,000 m AGL. The descent of this final team was not observed by others on the ground. Upon realizing the team had not landed, a search was initiated, leading to the discovery of the two individuals on a private field near ul. Żwirki i Wigury. Both the pilot and the passenger sustained fatal injuries due to extensive multi-organ trauma and crushing fractures.
The investigation
The PKBWL investigation examined the tandem parachute system, an Advance Tandem setup with no registration marks. The investigation focused on the deployment sequence and the physical condition of the equipment. Investigators analyzed the main canopy container, the reserve parachute, and the automatic activation device (AAD).
Key findings included the discovery of a non-standard, improvised component used in place of the manufacturer-specified closing pin (RSE005) for the main canopy container flaps. The investigation also noted that the passenger's harness was a different model (Sigma) than the one intended for the Advance Tandem system. Physical evidence showed that the pilot chute of the reserve canopy had become entangled with the drogue chute's deployment strap.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was the use of an unauthorized, improvised replacement part for the main canopy container closing pin.
- This improvised element, consisting of a thin cord within a plastic sleeve, failed or became lodged, which interfered with the drogue chute deployment.
- The malfunction caused the drogue chute to partially fail and increased the vertical descent rate of the tandem pair, creating an aerodynamic wake that hindered the proper deployment of the reserve parachute's pilot chute.
- The passenger harness used was not the specific model designed for the Advance Tandem system.
Safety action
- The PKBWL recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority (ULC) intensify oversight of parachute training, maintenance, and equipment repair organizations.
- It was recommended that rigger training include specific instruction on recognizing non-original or incorrect components.
- The commission advised that all spare parts must be replaced exclusively with original manufacturer-specified components.
- It was suggested that jump organizers implement independent checks of tandem equipment on the "check line" prior to loading aircraft.