2 fatalities

31 Mar 2018: AMES ANGIER M LNC2 NO SERIES (N4ZQ) — Atlantic Ocean, AO

Atlantic Ocean, AO, United States

On 31 Mar 2018, an AMES ANGIER M LNC2 NO SERIES (registration N4ZQ) was involved in an aviation accident near Atlantic Ocean, AO. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's spatial disorientation after entering instrument meteorological conditions and encountering moderate-to-heavy precipitation, which resulted in a loss of airplane control. This summary draws on records from NTSB.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On March 31, 2018, an experimental Lancair LNC2 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off Stuart, Florida, while on an IFR flight from the Bahamas to Fort Pierce. The private pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. Radar contact was lost as the aircraft encountered moderate to heavy precipitation.

History of Flight

On March 31, 2018, about 1120 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Lancair LNC2, registration N4ZQ, was destroyed when it impacted the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Stuart, Florida. The private pilot and the passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under Part 91 as a personal flight. An IFR flight plan was filed, and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed Stella Maris Airport, Long Island, Bahamas, about 0940, destined for Treasure Coast International Airport, Fort Pierce, Florida.

According to FAA air traffic control and radar data, a radar target identified as the accident airplane was at 8,000 ft msl until 1111. At that time, the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 4,000 ft msl. At 1112:37, the controller advised areas of "moderate to heavy precipitation eleven to one o'clock three miles area's one five miles in diameter." The pilot acknowledged. At 1113:34, the pilot reported 5,100 ft msl and continued descent to 4,000 ft msl on a 305° course. About 1115, the airplane began a left turn; the controller asked if the pilot was deviating. The pilot responded, "negative, but we could use 10 degrees left." The controller instructed the airplane to proceed direct to WADAS waypoint, the initial approach fix for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 32 approach into FPR. The pilot acknowledged at 1116:05—the last transmission—and continued the turn. About 1116, the airplane had turned about 90° and then maintained a 210° heading. Radar contact was lost at 1117. An ALNOT was issued; the US Coast Guard located debris about 10 miles north of the last radar-observed location.

According to a pilot flying another airplane from MYLS to FPR, the accident pilot topped off the fuel before departure. Both planned to fly at 8,000 ft msl; the accident pilot departed about 45 minutes later. They spoke twice during the flights about airspeed and distance from FPR. When the other pilot was about 50 miles from a filed waypoint, he noted precipitation buildup and requested diversion. He deviated south of the weather, entered IMC west and south of the waypoint, remained in IMC until descending to land, broke out at about 1,500 ft msl, and performed a visual landing at FPR.

Personnel Information

The accident pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument ratings. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued January 30, 2017, at which time he reported 1,325 total flight hours, with 56 hours in the previous 6 months. Logbooks were not available. In July 2014, he reported 1,100 total hours to the Lancair Owners and Builders Organization, including 100 hours of instrument flight time (73 actual). According to LOBO records, his instrument flight time had not changed since 2014.

Aircraft Information

The pilot built the airplane in 2012. It was equipped with a Lycoming IO-360-B-1F 180-hp engine. According to LOBO records, the airplane had accumulated about 350 flight hours. Maintenance logbooks were not located.

Meteorological Information

The closest WSR-88D radar was at Melbourne, Florida, 65 miles north-northwest of the accident site and 72 miles north-northwest of the last radar target. Reflectivity values between 30 and 45 dBZ were present in the area of the last radar-observed position between 1115 and 1121, corresponding to moderate-to-heavy precipitation. The bands moved from northeast to southwest between 1100 and 1135. No lightning strikes were detected near the accident location at the time.

Visible and infrared imagery from GOES-16 indicated abundant cloud cover above the accident site at the accident time, with low-level clouds moving from northeast to southwest and mid- and high-level clouds moving from southwest to northeast. Lower brightness temperature bands, indicating higher cloud tops, oriented southwest to northeast, were around the accident site and across Florida.

A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh model sounding for the accident site at 1100 indicated the possibility of clouds between 1,500 ft and 4,500 ft.

A search of two official weather briefing sources—Leidos and DUATS—determined that the accident pilot did not request a weather briefing through either service before the flight. A search of ForeFlight data revealed he requested a briefing at 0903 on March 30, 2018, the day before the accident. That briefing contained standard weather valid for March 30 at 0900; only the winds aloft forecast would also be valid for 0900 on March 31. The pilot did not request a briefing or weather information via ForeFlight on the day of the accident. It is unknown if he checked or received additional weather information before or during the flight.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The debris located by the US Coast Guard included separated sections of the vertical stabilizer, rudder, fuselage, and wings. No other parts were recovered.

Medical and Pathological Information

The St. Lucie County Medical Examiner performed an autopsy of the pilot, which indicated he died as a result of multiple injuries. Toxicology testing identified ethanol (10 mg/dl, mg/hg) in the pilot's muscle tissue. No tested drugs were identified.

Additional Information

The Airplane Flying Handbook states that pilots must rely on flight instruments rather than natural senses, as the vestibular sense can cause spatial disorientation. FAA Advisory Circular 60-4A notes that during low visibility, supporting senses may conflict with sight, making pilots vulnerable to disorientation; over water flights, night, and low visibility conditions can obscure natural horizon references, and use of flight instruments is essential.

Contributing factors

CopilotEffect on operation