History of Flight
On August 21, 2018, at about 1218 central daylight time, a Hughes Helicopters 369FF, registration N530FU, was destroyed in an accident near Granger, Texas. The flight instructor and the pilot receiving instruction sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.
Brunner Aerospace had been contracted by the US Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) to provide MD530F Emergency Refresher Training (Enhanced) for special operations pilots of the Jordanian Air Force. The accident flight was part of this training.
The flight departed Georgetown Municipal Airport (GTU) at about 1208, destined for Draughon-Miller Central Texas Regional Airport (TPL) in Temple, Texas. At 1207, the flight instructor radioed GTU tower, requesting departure to the northeast. The tower cleared the helicopter for departure.
Radar data from an FAA air route surveillance radar about 30 miles northeast of GTU showed the target departing GTU at about 1209, climbing east to 1,100 ft (about 500 ft above ground level). About 4 minutes after departure, 9 miles east of Georgetown, the target began descending. One minute later, it reached about 50 ft agl. The target continued east at groundspeeds around 90 knots, varying between 0 and 120 ft agl over unpopulated areas.
A witness near Granger reported hearing an unusually loud helicopter between 1200 and 1300. He observed a black helicopter approaching from the northwest at 30 to 40 ft agl in a nose-down attitude. As it neared his house, it rapidly climbed over power lines. He then lost sight behind trees.
Radar data at 1215:26 showed the target at 25 ft agl passing within 700 ft of the witness's house. It climbed to 125 ft agl and proceeded southeast. The last radar target, 1 mile west of the accident site, was at 1217:14 at 58 ft agl. The wreckage was found in a cotton field 4 miles east of the witness's residence and 1.5 miles west of Granger Lake.
A student pilot and flight instructor in a fixed-wing airplane returning to GTU reported hearing a series of expletives transmitted over GTU frequency between 1215 and 1220, sounding "desperate." No such transmissions were recorded by GTU tower audio.
Personnel Information
The flight instructor had military experience as an attack helicopter pilot with the US Army 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), flying the AH-6J "Little Bird," similar to the accident helicopter. After retirement, he held various aviation positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was in his second year as an instructor for Brunner Aerospace, residing in Alabama and staying in a hotel in Texas during training.
The pilot receiving instruction was a first lieutenant in the Jordanian Air Force Special Operations Command, flying an MD530F similar to the accident helicopter. This was his second year attending the training.
Aircraft Information
The accident helicopter was one of two Hughes 369FF helicopters operated by Brunner Aerospace for the training program. It was equipped with a Garmin 430 GPS/Nav/Comm and a radar altimeter. Doors had been removed for training. No discrepancies were noted in the flight logs between the last inspection and the accident.
Meteorological Information
At the time of the accident, the sun's altitude at the accident site was 64.6°, with an azimuth of 133° east of north.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The first ground contact points were five 2-ft-long excavations equally spaced over about 40 ft on a magnetic heading of 100°. The excavations contained yellow paint fragments matching main rotor blade tips. Cotton plants adjacent were sheared at a 45° angle. The debris field extended 100 ft on a heading of 080° to the main cabin.
The cabin came to rest on its left side on a heading of about 280° and was largely consumed by fire. The tailcone and tail rotor assembly separated were found about 20 ft east of the cabin.
A series of 36-ft-tall power distribution poles oriented north-south and spaced about 450 ft apart bordered the debris field to the west. The overhead line in the northwest corner, about 950 ft from the main wreckage, was severed midspan. A red belly-mounted strobe light lens was found 100 ft east. The severed line's other end, about 1,300 ft long, had been pulled from three poles to the south and was continuous to the main wreckage. The poles showed recent ground disruption and were bent toward the wreckage. Trees obscured the two poles holding the severed line when viewed from the direction of radar targets.
Although the helicopter was painted black with silver lettering, red paint layers were found under skin and fairing components, indicating a previous red paint scheme. Red transfer marks were observed on the 75-ft section of the southern overhead line from the separation point.
No evidence of a bird strike was found. Examination revealed stranded wire contact to both forward and left rear landing gear struts and one main rotor blade.
All main and tail rotor blades were near the main wreckage. Four of five main rotor blades remained attached to the hub, showing spiral and aft curl damage with chordwise abrasion and leading edge damage. The tail rotor drive shaft exhibited rotational signatures at the separation point. Similar signatures and damage were observed throughout the drivetrain.
All engine ancillary lines were intact. The engine was disassembled, showing N1 and N2 drive continuity with no internal thermal damage or failure. Drivetrain continuity through the gearbox was confirmed; all gears were intact and oil-coated with no catastrophic failure.
Medical and Pathological Information
Autopsies performed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Tarrant County, Texas, determined the cause of death for both pilots was thermal trauma. No significant natural disease was identified in the flight instructor.
Toxicology testing for the flight instructor detected tamsulosin, celecoxib, and cetirizine (0.043 µg/ml). Tamsulosin and celecoxib are not considered impairing. Cetirizine, an over-the-counter antihistamine, has a usual therapeutic range of 0.190 to 1.450 µg/ml; postmortem redistribution may have lowered the antemortem level. No carbon monoxide or ethanol was detected.
For the pilot receiving instruction, no carbon monoxide, ethanol, or screened drugs were identified.
Organizational and Management Information
Under the SATMO contract, Brunner Aerospace provided helicopters, flight instruction, training materials, and weapons for live-fire training. The program was managed by the accident flight instructor and the company's chief operating officer (COO).
The syllabus, created by Brunner Aerospace and approved by the Department of Defense, included ground and flight training. It was based on the US Army 160th SOAR Flight Training Guide. Operational areas included airspace around TPL, GTU, and Taylor (T74) airports, plus a target practice range about 50 miles east of Georgetown.
Five pilots were trained per 14-day period, totaling 25 pilots annually. This was the fourth year Brunner Aerospace provided the service. Training included standard emergency procedures and live weapon target practice.
All training occurred within airport environments or the designated firing range. The syllabus did not specify transition altitudes between airports; the COO stated typical transitions were 200 to 500 ft agl at speeds up to 90 knots. No formal transition routes existed, as the syllabus did not require low-level flight outside runways or practice areas. The COO noted that while he had low-level hog eradication experience in the area, the accident pilot, from Alabama, lacked local terrain familiarity.
The COO stated that some Jordanian pilots occasionally wanted to fly low-level, high-speed maneuvers outside the airport environment, likely from their combat experience. He considered such operations during training serious transgressions and was not aware of the accident pilot engaging in them with Brunner Aerospace.
The accident occurred on the second day of the training course, intended as a local orientation flight lasting 1.1 hours. Due to weather and miscommunication, the orientation flight was delayed to the second sortie. The first training flight for the pilot receiving instruction was that morning between 0730 and 0915, consisting of autorotation practice at TPL with the accident instructor in the accident helicopter.
Neither the SATMO contract nor the syllabus included provisions for low-level, nap-of-the-earth flights. The COO stated he was unaware of the accident pilot conducting such operations during instructional flights.