History of Flight
On June 27, 2019, about 2233 eastern daylight time, a Beech E-55, N664AR, was destroyed when it impacted a residence and terrain in Hope Mills, North Carolina, during approach to Fayetteville Regional Airport (FAY). The private pilot and one person in the residence were fatally injured, and a second person in the residence was seriously injured. The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed FAY about 2229.
At 2227:36, the flight was cleared for takeoff from runway 4. At 2229:27, the pilot reported a problem to air traffic control but did not specify it; he stated he wanted to turn around and land. The controller offered runway 28 or 4. The pilot said runway 4 was “alright” but that there was an “awful lot of control wheel weight.” At 2229:44, the flight was cleared to land on runway 4. At 2230:52, the pilot stated, “it's really wanting to pitch down bad for some reason.” No further communications were received. At 2232:02, the controller asked if the pilot could make the turn, and at 2233:18, emergency procedures were initiated. The wreckage was located about 2 miles southwest of the approach end of runway 4. A witness reported seeing the airplane veer sharply, followed by a steep descent at about a 45° angle just prior to impact.
The pilot's brother, who was not a certificated pilot, flew with the pilot on June 21, 2019. They flew uneventfully from FAY to Claxton-Evans County Airport (CWV), Georgia, and returned, with the airplane completely fueled at CWV. The pilot used the autopilot often without anomalies. A friend pilot flew with the pilot 3 days before the accident; during engine startup, the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) fail amber caution light illuminated. The pilot said the light usually extinguished, and they departed but the autopilot would not engage. The light extinguished after 12 to 15 minutes, and the autopilot was engaged. After returning, the pilot reported the light remained extinguished during the return flight, but after landing and cycling avionics, the light illuminated for 3 minutes before shutdown. The pilot planned to take the airplane to an avionics maintenance facility.
A maintenance technician reported that the accident airplane was at their facility for the AHRS fail light. The pilot visited about 1800 on the accident evening to check on the repair, was told it was not completed and that only the autopilot would not engage, and then took the airplane for the accident flight.
Aircraft and Systems Information
The airplane was equipped with a Century III autopilot system and an Aspen Avionics Evolution Flight Display EFD1000 EFIS with an AHRS. FAA Airworthiness Directive 2018-SW-100-AD, effective February 7, 2019, was applicable to certain Aspen displays due to reports of display resets. The AD required disabling the ADS-B In function before the next flight at night or within 25 hours. No entries indicating compliance were found in the airframe logbook, but due to EFIS damage, the current software version could not be determined.
Emergency procedures for unscheduled electric elevator trim in the pilot operating handbook included turning off the autopilot master switch, pulling the autopilot and trim circuit breakers, turning off the radio master switch, turning off the electrical master switch, pushing the GA switch, or pushing the TEST EACH FLT switch.
Wreckage and Impact
A debris path began with freshly cut treetops, descending at about a 35° angle, and extended about 50 ft on a magnetic heading of 270° to the back of a residence. Sections of the right wing, left horizontal stabilizer, and right engine came to rest inside the residence, and the main wreckage came to rest upright in the front yard, oriented about 180°. The left engine remained attached to the left wing; the left propeller separated with one blade exhibiting s-bending, chordwise scratching, and leading edge gouges, and the other showing chordwise scratching and tip curling. The right engine separated from the right wing and was recovered from a crater beneath the residence; the right propeller separated and was not recovered.
The outboard left wing separated, the aileron remained attached; the left wing was crushed and its fuel tank breached. The right wing separated and fragmented; the right flap and aileron separated. The vertical stabilizer separated but the rudder attached; the right horizontal stabilizer and elevator remained attached; the left horizontal stabilizer separated with the left elevator attached. The cockpit area was crushed, with no readable instruments except a fuel gauge. Landing gear and flaps were retracted. Aileron trim actuator corresponded to a full-down tab on the left aileron; rudder trim actuator corresponded to 5° nose-left trim; both elevator trim actuators corresponded to 10° tab-up, full nose-down trim. Flight control continuity was confirmed from all surfaces to the yoke. Fuel selectors were on.
Both engines were examined. Left engine spark plugs were intact and gray; crankshaft rotation confirmed continuity and compression; the left magneto produced spark. No preimpact anomalies were found in the fuel system. The right engine had more impact damage, with a bent crankshaft; borescope examination showed no preimpact anomalies; one recovered magneto was fragmented. Fuel system components were intact.
Tests and Research
Examination of the pitch, roll, and trim servos at the manufacturer's facility revealed that the roll and trim servos operated within design parameters. The pitch servo did not: when power was applied, the solenoid engaged but would not disengage without manually spinning or bumping the clutch. The electrical cable connection was sensitive and resulted in intermittent motor operation, likely due to split pins in the connector. The clutch breakaway force was 45 lbs, compared to the specified 13±2 lbs. The cotter pin securing the castle nut appeared new, and the castle nut did not align with the factory’s orange torque strip; the strips were about 3/4 of a turn off. The overtightened clutch increased the force required to override the pitch servo.
Toxicology testing on the pilot detected ethanol in muscle and kidney, which can be produced after death by microbial activity. An autopsy attributed the cause of death to multiple traumatic injuries.