History of Flight
On March 6, 2021, at about 1217 central standard time, a Beech 35 airplane, registration N3394V, sustained substantial damage in an accident near Palestine, Texas. The private pilot was fatally injured, and the private copilot sustained serious injuries. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight.
The copilot had recently purchased the airplane. The pilot traveled from out of state to assist the copilot in flying the airplane from Chambers County Airport (T00), Anahuac, Texas, to the copilot's hangar at Airpark East Airport (1F7), Dallas, Texas, a distance of about 200 nautical miles. The day before the accident, a mechanic performed a pre-buy/annual inspection, noting no issues in the maintenance records. The copilot reported that the generator was inoperative and that the placard on the fuel selector was present. The airplane was topped off with 100 low-lead fuel. According to the copilot, the left fuel tank held 17 gallons, the right fuel tank 17 gallons, and the auxiliary fuel tank in the baggage compartment 20 gallons, for a total of 54 gallons.
On the accident day, the pilot and copilot performed traffic pattern maneuvers; no issues were noted except for the inoperative generator. They then departed for 1F7 with the landing gear extended. Both pilots flew the airplane during the flight. The copilot reported that the fuel gauges worked normally and that the engine was run rich to keep cylinders cool, with carburetor heat off. About 43 minutes into the flight, the left fuel tank was depleted, and the crew switched to the right tank with no issues. The pilot, concerned about maximizing fuel capacity, suggested using the auxiliary tank. The copilot switched to the auxiliary tank, and a total loss of engine power occurred.
The copilot then moved the fuel selector to its opposite position, but the engine did not regain power. Switching back to the right tank produced no change. The crew initiated the emergency restart procedure five or six times, using the hand fuel pump, without success. The pilot transferred control to the copilot for the forced landing. The copilot maneuvered through tree canopies, and the airplane came to rest upright on a grass field on a ranch. The copilot egressed and contacted first responders via cell phone.
Examination of the copilot's cell phone revealed that at 1203, the copilot sent a text to the previous owner asking about the fuel selector position for the auxiliary tank. Starting at 1213, the copilot received three text messages from the mechanic describing the three fuel selector positions.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was equipped with an optional fuel system consisting of two 20-gallon wing tanks and a 20-gallon auxiliary tank in the baggage compartment, providing 19 gallons of usable auxiliary fuel. The Pilot's Operating Handbook limitations stated to "feel for detent position" when operating the fuel selector and included a placard diagram showing four positions: right main (3 o'clock), off (6 o'clock), left (9 o'clock), and auxiliary (12 o'clock).
Maintenance records showed the most recent work before the pre-buy inspection was an annual inspection in August 2012; prior annuals were in October 2010 and April 1994. The mechanic who performed the pre-buy inspection noted no issues and classified the airplane as "complete."
Raytheon Aircraft Company issued Service Bulletin 2760 in May 1998, applicable to the accident airplane, to add placards to the fuel selector due to reports of engine stoppage from incorrect positioning between detents. The maintenance records did not reference this mandatory bulletin; compliance is not required for Part 91 operations. The FAA issued Airworthiness Directive 99-05-13 in April 1999, requiring a placard warning of no-flow conditions between detents, but it was withdrawn in July 2000. No record of compliance was found.
Meteorological Information
According to FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-34, the airplane was likely operating in conditions conducive to serious carburetor icing at glide power. Density altitude at the accident site was estimated at 194 feet above mean sea level.
Wreckage and Impact
Postaccident examination revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The fuel selector handle was found between the OFF and LEFT positions, pulled up about 1/4 inch (hand pump position). In that position, air could not pass through any ports. The fuel selector placard was not observed. During follow-up examination, the valve functioned properly when rotated through each position, but detents were not felt as the handle was turned.
Neither wing tank contained observable fuel on scene. The auxiliary tank was empty and not breached. No fuel spillage or smell was noted. The right wing bladder was intact; the left bladder was punctured by a fracture in the inboard wing rib, producing a steady water stream during leak test. Fuel lines appeared intact. Fuel caps were dry and brittle; filler opening seats were corroded. The left fuel vent was obstructed at the tube bend of the outboard vent tube at the anti-siphon wye; the inboard portion contained fuel.
Additional Information
The Textron Aviation Pilot Safety and Warning Supplements (September 2018) emphasized thorough familiarity with fuel systems and tank switching procedures. The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook highlighted checking fuel tank vents during preflight to prevent fuel starvation. The NTSB Safety Alert 021 encouraged pilots to heed indications of mechanical problems.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy attributed the pilot's death to blunt force injuries, manner accidental. Toxicology detected atropine (used in resuscitation) in heart blood; no impairing drugs or alcohol were found. The pilot had 95% stenosis of the left anterior descending coronary artery but no other significant natural disease.