Overview
On July 31, 2021, about 1130 central daylight time, a Piper J3C-65 airplane, registration N42522, was substantially damaged when it crashed near Hartford, Wisconsin. The flight instructor was fatally injured and the pilot receiving instruction was seriously injured. The airplane was operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight.
Accident Sequence
The pilot receiving instruction reported that they had performed about 10 takeoffs and landings on runway 27 at Hartford Municipal Airport (HXF) prior to the accident. On the accident takeoff, when the airplane reached an altitude of 400 to 500 feet above ground level, the instructor said, “engine failure, turn around for 09.” The instructor did not specify whether the engine failure was actual or simulated. Both pilots were on the controls and initiated a turn toward runway 9. The airplane then entered a “graveyard spin.” The student pilot recalled approximately 1 to 2 seconds of the spin and had no further memory of the accident.
The airplane impacted a bean field about 1,100 feet west of the departure end of runway 27. Evidence from the airframe damage indicated that the airplane impacted in a left-wing low, nose low attitude. The airplane came to rest about 35 feet west of the initial impact point.
Postaccident Examination
A postaccident examination confirmed flight control system continuity from the cockpit controls to all control surfaces; no separations were found in any control cables. The left-wing spars were broken at the wing root, but the remainder of the wing was largely intact. Both left lift struts were bent and remained attached at the fuselage and wing. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage with minor damage, and both right lift struts were bent and remained attached. The forward lower fuselage at the firewall was pushed rearward. The engine remained attached to the fuselage.
One propeller blade was bent aft and under the engine, and the crankshaft was partially separated just aft of the propeller flange. Engine internal continuity was confirmed, and both magnetos produced spark on all spark plug leads. All spark plugs were examined and found normal.
The front of the cabin area was crushed rearward and upward at the firewall, with deformation limited to the area where the front pilot’s feet would have been. The top of the instrument panel was bent forward, consistent with the front pilot impacting it during the accident.
Occupant Injuries and Survival Factors
The flight instructor, seated in the front seat, suffered fatal injuries attributed to blunt force trauma to the head by the medical examiner. The student pilot in the rear seat sustained serious injuries including head and torso trauma, loss of consciousness, lumbar and rib fractures, and broken ulna and radius.
The airplane was originally manufactured with lap seat belts only; no shoulder harnesses had been retrofitted. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) survival factors specialist conducted a study using anthropometric data, photographic evidence, manufacturer drawings, and scene measurements to determine occupant trajectories with and without shoulder harnesses. The study showed that both occupants, when restrained only by lap belts, were likely to impact their head and upper torso on structures inside the cabin. The addition of an upper torso restraint (shoulder harness) would likely have lessened the severity of injuries by altering body trajectories to eliminate or reduce impact forces.
Regulatory Background
Effective July 18, 1977, 14 CFR Part 23 required approved upper torso harnesses for front seats in normal aircraft certified after that date. Section 14 CFR 91.205(b)(14) required upper torso harnesses for all seats in small civil airplanes manufactured after December 12, 1986. Aircraft manufactured before those dates were not required to have upper torso restraints.
In 1981, the NTSB initiated a multi-part general aviation crashworthiness program. A subsequent report found that 20 percent of fatally injured occupants in studied accidents could have survived with upper torso harnesses and 88 percent of serious injuries could have been significantly less severe. The NTSB concluded that upper torso harness use was the most effective way of reducing fatalities and serious injuries in general aviation accidents.
In 1987, the FAA issued Technical Standard Order (TSO) C114 for torso restraint systems. In 2000, the FAA issued policy statement ACE-00-23.561-01 to facilitate retrofitting shoulder harnesses as a minor change under certain conditions. At the time of this accident, several manufacturers offered shoulder harness kits for the accident airplane under supplemental type certificates.