History of Flight
On September 5, 2022, about 0948 Pacific daylight time, a Rutan Varieze, N10EZ, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Columbia, California. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot had been performing maintenance on the accident airplane and upgrading various systems. In the weeks before the accident, he installed an Electroair electronic ignition system. The accident flight was the first flight out of maintenance.
Radar and ADS-B data indicated that the airplane departed runway 17 about 0845. It continued southeast about 8 nautical miles (nm) then returned to the airport, landing on the same runway about 0858. The recorded data then shows that around 0903 the airplane departed and continued southeast in a climb for about 35 nm. After about 18 minutes, the airplane made a 180° left turn while passing through 13,500 ft mean sea level (msl). It climbed to a peak altitude of 16,475 msl and then began a descent, maneuvering into a left traffic pattern for runway 35. The airplane made a high-speed pass over runway 35 and continued north-northeast for about 5 nm. It returned to the airport; around 0945, it passed over the center at 2,850 ft. The airplane turned right and joined the right traffic pattern for runway 17. At 0946:56, it turned onto the base leg and the airspeed decreased.
A comparison of the first flight and the accident flight revealed that the speeds were similar during the landing approach. The first flight passed near the location of the last recorded ADS-B return about 75 ft higher.
Aircraft Information
The amateur-built airplane was powered by a rear-mounted Continental O-200 reciprocating engine rated at 100 horsepower, driving a fixed-pitched two-bladed propeller. A review of FAA records revealed that several individuals had owned the airplane and the accident pilot purchased it in May 2021.
The Hobbs meter displayed 668.1 hours, equating to 11.4 hours before the last recorded maintenance; the reason for the discrepancy is unknown. The last annual inspection was completed on October 6, 2021, at a total airframe time of 676.4 hours and 701.4 hours of engine time since the last major overhaul. During that inspection, the mechanic noted that both magnetos needed replacement and were overdue for a 500-hour inspection; additionally, the carburetor had reached the maximum time-between-overhauls (exceeding 10 years).
According to the VariEze Owner’s Manual, during an engine-out emergency landing, the landing gear should be down, and the pilot should turn off electrical power and magnetos to minimize fire hazard.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was located in a sparsely populated residential neighborhood with uneven terrain, large boulders, loose rocks, and numerous trees and brush. The main wreckage, consisting of most of the airframe and engine, was about 0.5 nm north of the runway threshold. There was a northwest-southeast oriented main road 375 ft east of the accident site and numerous other streets.
The first identified point of impact was a 50-ft maple tree with several severed limbs, adjacent to which was a small portion of the outboard right-wing cuff. The second point of impact was a large 80-ft tall fir tree with severed branches about 35 ft up. The fuselage came to rest inverted, and the wings remained attached. The wreckage was consistent with the nose gear being in the down position.
Complete control continuity could not be verified due to extensive impact-related damage. The airplane sustained major crush damage to the front cockpit.
The fuel tanks were all intact with no evidence of a breach. No fuel was found in the left tank, about 2 gallons in the right tank, and about 6 ounces in the header tank. The fuel found was free of water and debris. There was evidence of seepage out of the vented cap in the header tank (blue staining). The same liquid was found when activating the accelerator pump in the carburetor, but the bowl was dry. The impact and position made it impossible to determine total fuel quantity at impact.
A Safety Board investigator performed a complete disassembly of the Continental O-200 engine. Investigators established continuity of the valve and gear train by rotating the crankshaft via the crankshaft flange; compression was detected in all cylinders. Normal lift action was observed at each rocker assembly. Clean, uncontaminated oil was observed at all four rocker-box areas. There was no evidence of valve-to-piston face contact. Pistons and rings were intact. Valves were intact and undamaged. The back of intake valves and intake pipes were sooty down through the intake manifold to the area above the carburetor butterfly valve.
The two-bladed fixed-pitch propeller remained intact and attached to the engine with no visible chordwise scratches or leading-edge damage. One blade was cracked at the tip from resting on a rock.
Ignition System
The airplane was equipped with a dual ignition system configured by the pilot in the month before the accident: one electronic ignition and one magneto. The system was configured with the Electroair routed to top spark plugs and the left magneto to bottom spark plugs. Investigators confirmed both were timed correctly. The magneto was operated by a keyed ignition and the electric ignition by a single-pole single-throw (SPST) switch. The airplane’s wiring in the front was found hanging over a boulder; it is unknown how much damage was impact-related. The key was not in the magneto ignition, and the switch was in the “off” position. The master switch was the sole toggle switch in the “on” position. The position of the electronic ignition could not be confirmed, and it was not attached in the airframe.
The magneto had two P-leads connected, both routed to the keyed ignition switch: one attached to “right” and one to “left.” This would result in the magneto not being operable in OFF, RIGHT, and LEFT positions, with only BOTH producing an operational magneto, making it impossible for the pilot to verify both ignition systems during runup.
The Electroair unit was removed. The wire from the coil pack to the bus (Bundle #3; 10 amp) was separated at the butt splice and had not been properly crimped on one side (barrel not depressed); the wire was also chafed where routed along fuel lines. The wire strand had deformed wires bent back under adjacent wires, consistent with pullout and reinsertion at an unknown time. Although evidence of a prior loose connection, the strand was consistent with a sufficiently tight connection before separation. Scraping damage on one side of the insulator had elements commonly associated with rock and soil, consistent with sliding contact with terrain sufficient to damage the insulator with some connection to wires.
The wire from the controller to the bus (Bundle #4; 3 amp) had a tighter crimp and had sliding contact marks through the crimp barrel consistent with contact despite not being secured on both sides. Two wires in the strand were cut, and several others had substantial scraping damage next to the insulator cut.
The electronic ignition switch had a tang bent and one wire not connected; the switch was broken internally; the investigation could not determine if damage occurred before or during impact.
Disassembly of the magneto revealed fine carbon dust in the housing and a worn distributor brush, both consistent with extensive wear.