4 fatalities

29 Dec 2022: BELL 407 (N595RL) — Rotorcraft Leasing Company, LLC — Galliano, LA

Galliano, LA, United States

On 29 Dec 2022, a BELL 407 (registration N595RL) operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company, LLC was involved in an aviation accident near Galliano, LA. 4 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s failure to ensure the helicopter was clear of obstacles before takeoff from the helideck, which resulted in the helicopter’s right landing skid pivoting about a helideck perimeter light during takeoff and a dynamic rollover. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 15 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On December 29, 2022, a Bell 407 helicopter (N595RL) was substantially damaged during takeoff from an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries.

History of Flight

On December 29, 2022, about 0832 central standard time, a Bell 407 helicopter, registration N595RL, operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company LLC (RLC) as a Title 14 CFR Part 135 flight, was substantially damaged during takeoff from the West Delta 106 (WD-106) offshore production platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries.

According to FAA ADS-B data and cockpit recorder data, the helicopter departed RLC's base at South Lafourche Leonard Miller Jr. Airport (GAO) in Galliano, Louisiana, at 0748 for a visual flight rules (VFR) passenger flight to WD-106. The direct flight path was 51.3 nautical miles southeast of GAO. The 38-minute flight was uneventful. At about 0826, the helicopter landed on the helideck on a magnetic heading of about 145°, and engine power reduced to idle. Four passengers exited from the left side, retrieved their baggage and a 70-lb box, and went below the helideck. Three platform workers then boarded for the return flight. The pilot remained in the helicopter, and no mechanical abnormalities were observed.

At about 0831, the helicopter was on the helideck with the aiming circle visible through the pilot-side chin bubble, intersecting the lower instrument panel. The helideck's south perimeter light was visible through the lower pilot-side windshield.

At 0832:18, the pilot began to advance the engine throttle for takeoff. About 20 seconds later, engine and main rotor speed reached 100%, and all instruments were normal. At 0832:46, the helicopter began to move, consistent with getting light on the skids, and engine torque increased. Five seconds later, the south light disappeared as the helicopter's nose moved right with increasing right roll. Engine torque was at 50-60%.

Between 0832:51 and the end of recorded data at 0832:53, the helicopter continued to roll right while torque increased to about 75%. The camera view was obscured, but parametric data indicated the helicopter was about 2 ft above the helideck, rolled right about 32°, with a right roll rate of 68°/s when recording stopped.

A passenger's mobile phone video showed the helicopter ascending with no apparent drift, then about 1.5 seconds after ascent began, the left skid appeared as the helicopter entered a right roll. Fragments of main rotor blade material were visible in the final moments.

No eyewitnesses saw the departure, but individuals in the galley heard the engine run, increase for takeoff, then the sound of items hitting the platform. One individual stated that within seconds bubbles rose from the water and the helicopter was floating upside down. Three employees manned a survival craft and were lowered to the water but did not reach the helicopter before it sank due to debris concerns.

Personnel Information

The pilot was hired by RLC on September 12, 2022. He reported total flight experience of 1,512 hours in helicopters (1,188 as PIC) and had worked for five previous operators. He completed RLC initial ground and flight training on September 28, 2022, and was assigned as VFR PIC in the Bell 407. Training included initial pilot testing, instrument proficiency check, and line check. Grade slips evaluated him as satisfactory in tasks including "Dynamic Rollover (Oral)" and "Pinnacles or Platform." His total flight experience at the time of the accident was 1,667.8 hours (1,343.8 as PIC), including 155.8 hours with RLC. He had operated to and from WD-106 23 times.

Aircraft Information

According to the RLC Director of Training, the helicopter was loaded in accordance with the General Operations Manual (GOM), considering weights of pilot, passengers, baggage, and fuel.

Wreckage and Impact Information

Examination of the WD-106 platform revealed composite debris scattered across multiple levels, consistent with main rotor blade internal materials. A majority of one main rotor blade (serial A-1532) was found on the cellar deck, two levels below the helideck, resting against a metal handrail that exhibited a downward bend. Three pieces of lead weight, consistent with blade weights, were also found. Multiple pieces of dark tinted acrylic, consistent with cabin roof windows, were found with red color transfer matching the stairwell paint. The helicopter's upper hydraulic servo cover also exhibited red transfer. Sections of the tail rotor were found on the main deck below the helideck; no specific platform contact point was identified.

The helideck's center blue light assembly on the northwest elevation was damaged: the blue glass globe fragmented and the protective guard deformed and bent toward the stairwell. The amber light on the west corner separated from its mount and was not recovered. Other perimeter lights were undamaged. The red paint around the stairwell had scratches and gouges, and safety skirting on the northwest and southwest sides was damaged. Multiple impact marks were on the helideck metal frame.

Two areas of gouges in the helideck paint were found: a row of nine irregularly spaced inline gouges inside the aiming circle adjacent to the "W" logo, and a group of five irregularly spaced gouges in the black paint of the aiming circle near the northeast side and the damaged center light.

An exemplar Bell 407 was used to determine the accident helicopter's before-takeoff position. With its camera calibrated to match the accident recorder's field of view, the exemplar was parked in the center of the aiming circle on heading 145°. When repositioned straight aft to match the accident recorder's view, the right skid extended past the helideck edge while the left skid remained on the deck. The five wear shoe mounting bolts on the right skid matched the spacing of the group of five gouges, and nine wear shoe mounting bolts matched the row of nine gouges.

Examination of the recovered wreckage found no evidence of preimpact failure of the airframe, main and tail rotor systems, or engine. Main rotor blades and hub exhibited signatures of powered impact damage, consistent with engine power delivery at blade impact. Engine control unit data confirmed normal engine function until blade impact. Flight control system had no preimpact fractures, disconnections, or restrictions. The lateral hydraulic servo actuator functioned normally during bench testing.

Additional Information

RLC General Operations Manual and Training

The RLC GOM states that helidecks smaller than rotor diameter (35 ft for Bell 407) are restricted category. The WD-106 helideck was 24 ft by 24 ft, thus restricted. The GOM references HSAC Recommended Practice 93-3, requiring skid/wheel assembly no closer than 3 ft from the edge. Pilots in command must comply.

The RLC Maneuvers Guide standard for takeoff from a platform includes: start from a stabilized hover, apply slight increase in collective, note positive rate and engine performance, apply forward cyclic to transition, and do not lose altitude after clearing the platform. The FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook describes a vertical takeoff to a hover of 2-3 ft.

According to the RLC Director of Training, company pilots are trained to land to the center of a helideck. His technique for centering uses sight picture; he stated that if the anti-torque pedals are over the aiming circle, the helicopter is centered. He instructs pilots to develop their own sight picture and encourages opening the door after landing to verify centering.

The Director of Training explained that takeoff is a multi-step process: apply power until light on skids, bias weight on heels, find equilibrium, lift straight up to a 3-5 ft hover check, then lift off or reposition. He stated lateral drift is not a concern if this process is followed.

Dynamic Rollover

The FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook describes dynamic rollover as a lateral rolling tendency when the helicopter is in contact with the surface during takeoffs or landings. Factors causing roll/pivot around a skid or wheel can lead to a critical rollover angle, beyond which recovery is impossible. The correct recovery technique is to remove thrust and lower the collective before the critical angle is reached.

Review of Previous Takeoffs and Landings

RLC provided cockpit videos of 27 flights by the accident pilot. Of these, two takeoffs showed a pause at a 3-5 ft hover check (per policy); the remaining takeoffs were continuous ascent without the hover check. All reviewed landings were into the wind except one, which showed no control difficulties. Landings were generally within the aiming circle, but precision could not be determined for helidecks without a painted aiming circle.

For comparison, videos of three other RLC pilots showed that of six takeoffs, only one did not include a hover check. All landings were flown per procedures.

Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot's autopsy, performed by the Jefferson Parish Forensic Center, listed cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries with subsequent drowning, manner of death accident. Extensive head and facial trauma was present; no significant natural disease was identified.

Toxicology testing by NMS Labs on liver tissue detected ethanol at 0.11 g/dL and caffeine. FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory testing of cavity blood detected ethanol at 0.042 g/dL, vitreous fluid at 0.029 g/dL, but not in urine. Isopropanol was detected in cavity blood at 0.004 g/dL but not in vitreous fluid or urine. N-propanol was detected in cavity blood and vitreous fluid but not urine. N-butanol was detected in cavity blood but not vitreous fluid or urine. The cavity blood specimen was unsuitable for carboxyhemoglobin testing.

Ethanol is an intoxicating alcohol that can impair judgment and psychomotor performance. FAA regulation prohibits flying with a blood ethanol level of 0.04 g/dL or greater. Postmortem ethanol can be produced by microbes, especially after extensive trauma. Isopropanol, n-propanol, and n-butanol can also arise from antemortem or postmortem sources, including decomposition.

Contributing factors

PilotLateral/bank control — Not attained/maintainedEffect on operation