Incident Overview
On 18 April 2022, a serious incident occurred in the vicinity of Kraków Airport (EPKK) involving an Embraer ERJ190-200 (registration SP-LNF, hereinafter A/C 1) and an Airbus A320-214 (registration D-AIZJ, hereinafter A/C 2). At the time, A/C 1 was conducting an RNP approach to runway 07, while A/C 2 was taking off from the same runway in the same direction.
Sequence of Events
A/C 1 was radar-guided by the DIR KK controller to a straight-in approach to runway 07 from approximately 11.5 NM at 4,000 ft. The approach was not speed-controlled. At about 7.5 NM, the crew of A/C 1 maintained 209 kt instead of the required 160 kt. The aircraft crossed the approach line three times before stabilizing on the runway heading at approximately 3 NM from the threshold, at 2,400 ft ALT instead of the expected 1,800 ft ALT (1,000 ft AGL).
When A/C 1 was about 2.5 NM from the threshold, the TWR KK controller cleared A/C 2 for takeoff from runway 07. After A/C 2 lifted off, the TWR controller issued a landing clearance to A/C 1, which was approximately 0.5 NM from the runway threshold. Four seconds later, the A/C 1 crew deemed the approach unstable due to excessive speed (above 160 kt) and executed a go-around. Approximately 10 seconds before the go-around, A/C 2 had taken off.
After receiving the go-around call, the TWR KK controller instructed A/C 2 to continue straight ahead and A/C 1 to turn immediately left (north). At that moment, horizontal separation was 1.3 NM and vertical separation was 300 ft. Separation increased to about 1.5 NM and 400 ft as the aircraft diverged. ATC communications were then transferred to APP KK. A/C 1 later landed without further incident; A/C 2 continued to its destination.
Conclusions
The investigation determined that the landing clearance to A/C 1 was issued with insufficient separation from the departing A/C 2. The TWR KK controller had planned A/C 2's takeoff before A/C 1's landing and informed the DIR controller. The DIR controller did not apply speed control to A/C 1 before transferring communications. The TWR controller did not ensure separation between the departing and landing aircraft.
Causes and Contributing Factors
The immediate cause was the lack of a pre-emptive decision by the TWR KK controller to revoke the previously issued landing clearance for A/C 1 and to issue a go-around instruction, despite the observed high approach speed and limited ability to provide required separation. Additionally, the DIR KK controller failed to apply speed control to the approaching A/C 1.
Safety Recommendations
No safety recommendations were proposed in the report.