History of Flight
On March 26, 2023, about 0238 central daylight time, a Robinson R44 II helicopter, registration N441PD, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Port Allen, Louisiana. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 aerial observation flight. According to Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) personnel and ADS-B data, the BRPD helicopter (call sign Air 1) departed Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport (BTR) about 0226 to provide aerial support to ground units conducting a high-speed pursuit of a fleeing vehicle. Air 1 advised dispatch and ground units of their assistance and requested updates on the vehicle's movement and location. ADS-B data showed the helicopter depart BTR to the south, turned west, then overflew Highway 190 west of Baton Rouge. Unable to maintain a safe pursuit, BRPD dispatch terminated the pursuit to all units, including the helicopter, at 0235. No further communications were received from the helicopter. Around that time, the data showed the helicopter executed a shallow left deviation south of Highway 190, followed by a left turn with increasing turn rate, then a series of turns and altitude changes. The ADS-B data ended at 0238 at about 1,450 ft agl. No witnesses to the accident were identified. According to the West Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, at 1049, a family member reported that the tactical flight officer had not returned home, and his cell phone was sending a signal from a remote area. The helicopter was located at 1114.
Personnel Information
A review of the pilot’s original logbook (last entry December 23, 2018) showed 250.5 night flight hours, no simulated instrument flight hours, and 456.6 total flight hours. The pilot’s current logbook did not specify total night or simulated instrument time, so these totals could not be determined. On the day before the accident, the pilot and tactical flight officer participated in a local public relations event from 0900 to 1600, then began their normal shift scheduled from 1600 to 0400. The BRPD Air Support Unit (ASU) base quarters had a couch for rest, but BRPD policy typically did not allow rest periods while on shift. The tactical flight officer held a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter and remote pilot ratings but did not hold a current medical certificate.
Aircraft Information
On January 2, 2023, a 2,200-hour airframe inspection was completed, including installation of a new Lycoming engine, a Garmin GTN 750Xi, and other avionics upgrades. The ASU stated the GTN 750Xi upgrade was to assist pilots with traffic avoidance and weather information. The police-configuration helicopter had removable anti-torque pedals and a removable collective control installed in the left seat; the cyclic control was installed in the right seat and was not removable.
Meteorological Information
Observations from the BTR Automated Surface Observing System around the accident time identified instrument flight rules (IFR) to marginal visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. GOES-16 satellite imagery showed low and very low-level water clouds moving northward over the accident site. The National Weather Service had issued an AIRMET Sierra valid for the accident site at the accident time, forecasting IFR conditions due to mist and fog. The Graphical Forecasts for Aviation issued before the flight indicated broken to overcast clouds at the accident site with bases between 300 and 600 ft agl. The pilot did not request weather information from Leidos Flight Service or ForeFlight; it is unknown what weather information, if any, was checked. According to ASU standard operational procedures, the pilot in command was required to obtain an official weather briefing upon beginning their tour of duty and/or as required.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The main wreckage (cockpit, fuselage, and tailcone) came to rest inverted next to an irrigation ditch at the edge of a sugar cane field. The main rotor transmission, mast, and sections of the main rotor blades came to rest in a wooded wetland about 250 ft east of the main wreckage. Fragmented Plexiglass, cockpit structure, and instrument components were scattered between the main rotor assembly and main wreckage. Most of the helicopter was accounted for except for the outboard 5 ft of one main rotor blade, which exhibited a pattern of scores on the lower surface consistent with contact with other helicopter structure. The emergency locator transmitter was found separated from its mount with a severed antenna wire. Examination revealed impact signatures consistent with main rotor blade contact to the cabin structure above the FLIR gimbal, windshield bow, and left seat passenger door frame. Both elastomeric teeter stops were split horizontally. One blade spindle appeared undamaged; the other was torn open at the coning bolt. The main rotor gearbox rotated freely when manually rotated; the tail rotor gearbox was intact and free to rotate. Flight control continuity could not be established due to breaks, but all fractures exhibited overload characteristics. The pilot’s throttle twist grip was found in the full ON position, and the collective was near the full UP position. The engine cooling fan inlet exhibited rotational scoring. Postaccident examination revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Office of the Coroner, Parish of West Baton Rouge. The cause of death was multiple blunt force traumatic injuries, and the manner of death was an accident. Toxicology testing detected ethanol at 0.012 g/dL along with n-propanol in blood; ethanol and n-propanol were not detected in vitreous fluid. Pramoxine was detected in cavity blood and liver tissue. Ethanol is the intoxicating alcohol in alcoholic beverages; FAA regulations prohibit flying with a blood ethanol level of 0.04 g/dL or greater. However, ethanol can be produced postmortem by microbes. N-propanol is also a postmortem microbial production indicator. Pramoxine is a topical anesthetic not generally considered impairing.
Organizational and Management Information
According to ASU standard operational procedures, missions are classified as routine, priority, or emergency, each with minimum weather criteria. The ASU Commander stated the accident mission (vehicular pursuit) was a priority mission, requiring at night 3 statute miles visibility and a cloud ceiling of 1,500 ft agl. The SOPs also required the pilot in command to complete a risk assessment using the ASU’s Risk Assessment matrix. The ASU Commander reported the accident pilot did not complete a risk assessment before the flight. The ASU did not have a formal instrument training program but aimed to have all pilots obtain an instrument rating; training was typically conducted over water with foggles. Night vision goggles (NVG) were available but no formal program existed; the unit was considering developing a NVG program. The accident helicopter was not equipped with NVG modifications, and no NVG goggles were found in the wreckage.