On February 11, 2003, an Airbus A320-212 C-GJUP operated by Skyservice Airlines Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Windsor, Ontario, CA. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB); 2 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.
An Airbus A320-212, C-GJUP, overran Runway 25 at Windsor after the crew activated the ARCAL lighting system late during back-taxiing. No injuries were reported.
Incident Overview and Flight Details Skyservice Airlines Flight 0045, an Airbus A320-212 with registration C-GJUP and serial number 645, was operating a scheduled IFR flight. The aircraft departed Toronto/LBPIA at 1257 eastern standard time, stopped in Windsor to pick up additional passengers, and then proceeded to Cancun, Mexico. On the return leg, Flight 0045 left Cancun at 1910 and arrived in Windsor at 2243. ## Sequence of Events While back-taxiing to position on Runway 25 for departure, the aircraft was using the airport's ARCAL system because the control tower had closed during passenger deplaning. The airfield lighting went out while the aircraft was taxiing and was not reactivated until the aircraft was near the end of the runway. The captain saw the runway end lights after the ARCAL system was activated and applied heavy braking. Because the aircraft was close to the runway end and was taxiing at a speed that prevented it from stopping in time, it left the runway. The aircraft stopped at approximately 2327 eastern standard time, the engines were shut down, and the crew informed London Flight Information Centre of their position. No passengers or crew members were injured, and everyone deplaned and was bused back to the terminal. ## Crew and Operational Context The captain and first officer had not previously flown together. The captain held a valid ATPL, had more than 11,000 total flight hours and more than 6,600 hours on the Airbus A320, and was qualified for the flight. He had been awake for 17 hours and on duty for 12 hours. The first officer was a UK CAA ATPL holder flying under a crew-sharing arrangement with My Travel Airways Ltd., had more than 2,200 total hours and 450 hours on the Airbus A320, and was also qualified. He had been awake for 16 hours and on duty for 12 hours. ## Lighting and Communication Procedures Windsor is a controlled airport from 0630 to 2230 local time and uncontrolled outside those hours. When the tower is closed, pilots control runway and taxiway lighting using the ARCAL system. Windsor uses a “K” type ARCAL system, activated by pressing the VHF transmit button seven times on 124.7 MHz; the lights remain on for 15 minutes and can be reset by pressing the transmit button seven more times. The ATIS advised that the tower was closed and that vehicles on the manoeuvring area should broadcast intentions on 124.7 MHz. At 2315, the aircraft taxied via Golf and Foxtrot taxiways in preparation for departure from Runway 25. The crew requested IFR clearance from London Radio on 126.7 MHz but did not broadcast intentions on the aerodrome traffic frequency, 124.7 MHz. The captain gave a traffic advisory about crossing Runway 12, but it was not made on the ATF. While taxiing on Foxtrot, the airfield lighting extinguished and the crew continued without activating ARCAL. The first officer was unfamiliar with uncontrolled aerodrome operations and ARCAL procedures, which led the captain to assist with PNF duties. ## Runway Entry and Overrun The first officer attempted to contact London Radio several times before the flight service specialist asked the crew to standby. The specialist then relayed the IFR departure clearance, which took more than three minutes to receive and read back correctly. The captain mistakenly broadcast a traffic advisory on 126.7 MHz that the aircraft was positioning onto the runway. During back-taxi on the runway, the crew reviewed the clearance, completed the before take-off checklist, and discussed the lack of runway lighting and how to activate ARCAL. The first officer changed to 124.7 MHz and activated the ARCAL system; the runway edge and threshold end lights illuminated. The captain then saw the end of the runway and applied heavy braking. The aircraft overran the runway, ran over a lighting bar standard and damaged a main wheel tire, travelled down a gentle slope, and stopped at a large drainage ditch perpendicular to the runway. ## Recorder and Aircraft Findings The FDR and CVR were secured and sent to the TSB Engineering Branch in Ottawa. The FDR showed that ground speed increased to about 35 knots during the back-taxi and remained at that speed for about one minute before the aircraft left the runway. Three seconds after ARCAL activation, the brake pedals were deflected to a maximum of 80 degrees. Tire skidmarks were evident at the centre end of the runway, and the aircraft heading was relatively constant until braking. A review of Windsor ATF recordings showed that Staff 28, an airport ground vehicle, attempted to contact the crew while the aircraft was holding short of Runway 25. The crew did not respond. After communicating with the firehall and Staff 29, Staff 28 tried again but received no response. Moments later, Staff 28 observed the aircraft proceed onto the unlit runway and back-taxi, with no broadcast from the crew on the ATF. ## Aircraft Condition and Regulatory Guidance The aircraft was within manufacturer weight and centre of gravity limits and was properly maintained. There were no operational or mechanical defects involving the braking, hydraulic, or nose wheel steering systems, and the anti-skid system was activated and functioning properly. Skyservice’s FCOM SOPs required monitoring ground speed during taxi and provided maximum taxi speeds: 30 knots in a straight line and 10 knots for a sharp turn, with a note to monitor ground speed on the ND because it is difficult to assess. The company’s FOM included a “Briefing and Airport Notes” document for airports requiring additional information, but Windsor was not listed. Transport Canada’s AIP provided guidance for uncontrolled aerodromes, emphasizing alertness, monitoring a common frequency such as the ATF, and following reporting procedures. For IFR departures from uncontrolled aerodromes, the AIP required pilots to obtain an ATC clearance if in controlled airspace, report departure procedures and intentions before moving onto the runway or aligning for take-off, and ascertain by radio and visual observation that no other aircraft or vehicle was likely to conflict. Skyservice did not include uncontrolled airport operations in initial or recurrent ground training. ## Airport Lighting Runway edge lighting consisted of variable intensity white lights spaced at 200-foot intervals along the full length of the runway. Runway threshold end lights were variable intensity and coloured red at each runway end.
