History of Flight
Skyservice Airlines Inc. flight SSV5044, an Airbus A320-232 (registration C-FRAA), operated a scheduled service from Toronto Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario, to Juan Gualberto Gomez International Airport (MUVR) in Varadero, Cuba. The aircraft departed Toronto at 1823 Eastern Standard Time with 179 passengers and 7 crew members. The en route flight was uneventful.
The captain, who was the pilot flying, briefed for the VOR ILS Runway 06 approach before initiating descent 160 nautical miles from MUVR. The flight was cleared to fly direct to the eight DME final approach fix. A Boeing 737 ahead on the same approach executed a go-around without providing a reason. The crew of SSV5044 was not informed of the latest visibility report, which had decreased to 1000 meters in heavy rain about 19 minutes before their arrival.
As the aircraft intercepted the glideslope, heavier precipitation was visible on weather radar. The approach remained stable below 1000 feet above ground level, and the runway environment became visible at approximately 900 feet. The crew received landing clearance with wind reported as 060° magnetic at 12 knots. Just prior to the decision height of 200 feet, the autopilot was disconnected. At decision height, the aircraft was established on both glideslope and localizer.
Shortly after autopilot disconnection, the aircraft began to descend below the glideslope and drift right. The captain applied nose-up elevator and left aileron, causing the aircraft to pass left of the centerline and continue descending. A right aileron input was maintained until just before touchdown. The aircraft crossed the threshold at approximately 20 feet with an increasing right bank, reaching a maximum of 10.9° at 5 feet during the flare.
Just prior to touchdown, precipitation intensified and visibility decreased, causing the crew to lose most visual references. The aircraft was in a low-energy state. The captain rejected a go-around as a high-risk maneuver and committed to landing. The runway was covered with standing water.
Runway Excursion
The aircraft touched down approximately 640 feet from the threshold, left of the centerline with about 7° of right bank. It drifted right through the centerline toward the edge. Spoilers deployed and thrust reversers were selected. Despite left rudder input, the aircraft continued right, exiting the runway approximately 1700 feet from the threshold at about 130 knots. It then tracked parallel to the runway with a 10° left crab for approximately 1745 feet. During this time, the engines developed reverse thrust. At about 4300 feet from the threshold and 40 knots, the aircraft re-entered the runway. The crew determined the aircraft was fit to taxi to the gate and did so without fire or evacuation. The aircraft sustained minor damage; no injuries were reported.
Findings
The investigation identified that the loss of visual cues due to heavy precipitation prevented the crew from detecting and correcting the right drift before touchdown. The captain committed to landing believing a safe go-around was no longer possible. The combination of momentum, low tire cornering forces on a contaminated runway, and some form of hydroplaning caused the aircraft to drift off the runway. Once off the runway, wet ground, reverse thrust, slope, and wind prevented the captain from steering back until speed reduced enough for better traction. Additionally, the company's lack of emphasis on the rain repellent system likely contributed to the crew not using it, which could have improved forward visibility.
Communication Issues
After the excursion, the crew attempted to inform the control tower, but the controller's reaction suggested the message was not heard or understood. An unidentified pilot from another aircraft facilitated communication. Only after shutdown at the gate could the crew confirm that proper authorities were notified and a runway inspection was conducted. The report notes that communication difficulties following a runway excursion may delay runway inspection, increasing the risk of foreign object damage to other aircraft.