History of Flight
On the day of the accident, the crew of C-GMOH were on the fourth day of a deployment to the North Warning System (NWS) site at Shepherd Bay. They initially planned a departure at 0800 to Simpson Lake, but the flight was cancelled due to weather. The destination was changed to Gjoa Haven, and the flight plan was amended. The captain had the helicopter's fuel topped up to about 2400 pounds for a possible weather diversion. Communications problems delayed departure until approximately 1100.
The helicopter was loaded and prepared for flight shortly before 1100. The first officer occupied the right seat as pilot flying (PF) and the captain performed pilot non-flying (PNF) duties from the left seat. Three passengers were seated in the rear. A normal start was accomplished, and all systems functioned normally except the automatic direction finder. The crew set altimeters to 29.63 and radio altimeters to 200 feet above ground level. The helicopter was heading 165° on the pad, and the departure heading was set to 280°.
Accident Sequence
The PF brought the helicopter to a low hover and turned right to establish the departure heading. The PNF monitored instruments and made advisory calls. During the climb to low hover, the helicopter drifted rearward over the pad. As the PF climbed vertically, recirculating snow obscured the helicopter in security video. Both pilots could discern ground references and pad lights. Maximum torque limit of 100% was reached within 15 seconds, and the vertical climb stopped.
For the next 15 seconds, the helicopter hovered above the pad while pilots mentioned visual references. The PNF expressed concern about rearward movement toward structures and urged forward departure. Torque reached 105% as the helicopter moved forward. The helicopter moved at a constant height of about 20 feet above ground level from the rear of the pad until it disappeared from view at the departure end.
The PNF instructed the PF to lower the nose and called torque at 110%. The PF did not respond for the remaining 15 seconds. The PNF nudged the collective down and called torque at 100%. When pad lights disappeared, the PNF believed outside visual references were lost in whiteout. About two seconds later, the PNF called that the helicopter was climbing and airspeed was alive at 40 knots. The PNF instructed the PF to keep climbing. Approximately five seconds later, the PNF warned about heading and a left roll. Almost immediately, the helicopter struck the terrain.
Global positioning system data indicated the helicopter flew forward at over 30 knots for about 18 seconds. Ground scars were obliterated by a blizzard before investigators could examine them. Survivors reported that the left skid scar was significantly longer than the right. The skids broke through the frozen surface of a pond, and pop-out floats deployed. The wreckage was found upright with the left skid rolled under the main body. Pieces were found about 250 metres from the pad, and main wreckage about 100 metres further. The right skid was torn off, and there was substantial impact damage to the underside of the nose. The transmission had separated from its mounts. Main rotor blades had separated and broken. Damage was consistent with high engine power at impact. No pre-impact anomalies were found.
Weather and Environment
At the time of the accident, the Shepherd Bay automated weather station reported visibility 1 statute mile, temperature -18°C, wind 200° True at 7 knots, and altimeter 29.65. Prior to departure, the crew could clearly see the hangar about ½ mile away. Security video showed an obscured sky with no discernible horizon. Structures near the pad were clearly visible with no shadows. There was no falling snow, but loose snow obscured the camera after the helicopter climbed from its initial hover. The terrain was completely snow-covered with no visible vegetation or rock.
Aircraft and Equipment
The Bell 212 (C-GMOH) was certified for air taxi operations under CAR 703 for both VFR and IFR. It was equipped with dual flight instruments, including radio altimeters, vertical speed indicators, torque and rpm gauges, a force trim system, a stability and control augmentation system, and an automatic flight control system (not to be used below 40 knots). The pilot's pressure altimeter, VSI, radio altimeter, attitude indicator, airspeed indicator, and horizontal situation indicator were tested and found serviceable. The digital cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was recovered and played back. The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder. The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) did not activate on impact and was found damaged.
Standard Operating Procedures
The company's SOPs for NWS operations during whiteout or low-light conditions prescribed a specific take-off procedure: lift off into a low stabilized hover, climb through 30 feet with a PNF call to rotate, then rotate nose-down approximately 5 degrees, call positive rate of climb, call airspeed live at 40 and 58 knots, call 100-foot altitude increments to 500 feet, adjust attitude to climb at 70 knots at 80% torque, with no turns below 500 feet.
Injuries and Damage
The captain and three passengers were seriously injured. The first officer died at impact. The helicopter sustained substantial damage but no fire occurred.