What happened
On a day characterized by low visibility and freezing temperatures, a Bell 212 helicopter, registration C-GMOH, departed from a radar facility at Shepherd Bay, Nunavut, for a flight to Gjoa Haven. The aircraft was carrying two pilots and three passengers as part of a routine personnel and equipment transport for the North Warning System.
During the takeoff sequence, the helicopter entered a low hover and began a transition to forward flight. As the aircraft moved forward, recirculating snow from the rotor wash obscured the crew's vision, creating whiteout conditions. While attempting to establish a climb, the helicopter's nose-low, left-banked attitude led it to strike the terrain approximately 250 metres from the departure pad. The impact resulted in one fatality and two serious injuries.
The investigation
Investigators examined the aircraft's performance, the cockpit voice recorder, and the environmental conditions at the time of the accident. The investigation established that the crew had sufficient power available for a safe departure, but the execution of the takeoff deviated from standard operating procedures.
Analysis of the flight path showed that the helicopter drifted rearward during the initial hover, which exhausted the aircraft's vertical momentum. When the crew transitioned to forward flight, the aircraft was unable to maintain a positive rate of climb. The investigation also reviewed the cockpit instruments, noting that the standard vertical speed indicators used could provide lagging or misleading information during rapid changes in altitude, and that the radio altimeter readings were influenced by the sloping terrain.
Findings
- The departure occurred in environmental conditions that promoted whiteout and the loss of visual micro-texture needed for orientation.
- The risk of entering whiteout was hidden because nearby structures remained visible during the initial stages of takeoff.
- The crew failed to prioritize a positive rate-of-climb during the transition to forward flight, and an inadequate instrument scan prevented them from recognizing the descent.
- The pilot flying had limited experience on this specific aircraft type, which increased the cognitive workload during the critical departure phase.
- The use of a standard vertical speed indicator rather than an instantaneous version may have contributed to the crew misidentifying the aircraft's vertical movement.
Safety action
Following the accident, Canadian Helicopters Limited conducted an internal review and implemented several changes, including:
- Increasing the use of full-motion flight simulators to replicate whiteout conditions and monitor crew interaction.
- Implementing a policy requiring pilots to have at least 50 hours of experience on the aircraft type before performing departures in whiteout conditions.
- Evaluating the use of reflective markers at remote helipads to provide better visual cues during departures.