Accident Overview
On the evening of the accident, a HS 125-600A operated by Scott Aviation, registration N21SA, departed Montréal, Quebec, at 1756 eastern standard time for a night instrument flight rules flight to Bromont, Quebec. The aircraft had two crew members and four passengers on board. Upon approaching Bromont, the co-pilot activated the lighting system and contacted the approach UNICOM. The crew was advised that the runway edge lights were out of order, but the approach lights and the visual approach slope indicator (PAPI) turned on because their switches had been left on. The aircraft touched down at 1825 eastern standard time, 300 feet to the left of Runway 05L and 1800 feet beyond the threshold. It continued for approximately 1800 feet before coming to a stop in a ditch. Both pilots and one passenger sustained serious injuries; the three remaining passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft suffered major damage.
Flight Crew Information
The flight crew was certified and qualified. The pilot-in-command had accumulated 5000 total flight hours, including 550 hours on the HS 125 as captain and 200 hours as co-pilot. At the time of the accident, he was in the left seat acting as pilot flying. The co-pilot had approximately 1700 flight hours, including 100 hours as co-pilot on the HS 125, and was acting as pilot not flying in the right seat.
Weather and Airport Information
No weather observations were taken at Bromont Airport. The closest available METAR from Saint-Hubert Airport, 30 miles away, reported winds 110 degrees true at 5 knots, visibility 1 mile in light snow flurries, and cloud ceiling at 2000 feet. Similar conditions prevailed at Bromont. The runway, 05L, was 5000 feet long and 100 feet wide, equipped with ARCAL lighting including approach lights, low intensity runway edge lights, and a PAPI. A NOTAM had been issued indicating the runway edge lights were out of order until 2200 UTC on 22 February 2005.
Approach and Landing
The crew performed a front course localizer approach to Runway 05L. Approximately nine minutes before landing, the co-pilot activated the ARCAL and contacted the Bromont dispatcher, who stated that only the PAPI was operational. The PAPI and approach lights illuminated because their switches had been left on. At about five miles from the threshold, the crew had the approach lights and PAPI in sight. The Jeppesen airport chart indicated "PAPI L" (left), but the dispatcher, facing the aircraft, said the PAPI was on the right. The approach chart pictograph showed the PAPI on the left, but the crew did not notice. The approach was continued visually, keeping to the left of the PAPI. At approximately two miles, the co-pilot observed the approach lights to his right and reported this to the captain, who paid little attention. Less than two seconds before impact, the co-pilot asked if the captain had the runway in sight; the captain did not reply and continued the descent. The aircraft touched down left of the runway. The captain applied full power for a missed approach, but the aircraft struck a ditch approximately four feet deep, collapsing the nose and right landing gear. The aircraft came to a stop after traveling 1800 feet, during which it made a full turn followed by a 180-degree turn.
Evacuation and Damage
After stopping, the crew attempted to shut down the engines by closing the HP and LP cock levers. The left engine continued to run because the left LP cock lever was blocked at the halfway point, likely due to damage restricting the bellcrank. The engine stopped on its own after 20 minutes. The co-pilot entered the cabin to direct evacuation, but passengers had difficulty hearing due to engine noise. A passenger attempted to open the emergency exit, but it was jammed due to fuselage distortion. All occupants exited through the main entrance door.
Contributing Factors
The investigation stated that a series of decisions made by the flight crew contributed to the accident. These included the decision to carry out the approach with the intention to land after being advised that the runway edge lights were out of order, which was illegal under Canadian regulations, and the misinterpretation of the PAPI position. The crew had not obtained the NOTAM before departure, which would have provided additional information. The airport was not closed for night use despite the absence of runway edge lights, and nothing required it to be closed.