Accident Summary
On the day of the occurrence, an aircraft departed Jean Lesage International Airport, Quebec, at 1107 en route to Charlo, New Brunswick, and Îles-de-la-Madeleine, Quebec. After landing at Charlo at 1243, the pilot waited for weather to improve at Îles-de-la-Madeleine before departing at 1748. The pilot conducted a LOC(BC)/DME approach to runway 26. Unable to maintain the localizer on the first approach, he executed a pull-up. On the second approach, the pilot observed a runway while over the airport, executed a 280-degree left turn, and landed on the last 200 to 300 feet of runway 34. The aircraft overshot the runway; when the pilot realized he could not stop before leaving the airport perimeter, he made a right turn. The nosewheel and left main landing gear broke off. The aircraft came to rest 270 feet from the end of runway 34 and 150 feet from the water's edge. The aircraft was evacuated quickly, and none of the occupants were injured. The accident occurred in daylight at 1949.
Weather and Runway Information
At the time of the occurrence, the sky was partly obscured, with a ceiling measured at 300 feet by balloon, visibility five miles in fog, winds from 010° True at 10 knots, and clouds consisting of 3/10 fog and 7/10 stratus fractus. These conditions prevailed for most of the day. The alternate weather minimum for Îles-de-la-Madeleine Airport, as published in the Canada Air Pilot, is 800 feet ceiling and two miles visibility. The pilot held a pilot proficiency check authorizing him to operate only within Schedule C limitations, which prohibit terminating a flight at an airport in weather less than the alternate minima. The measured ceiling of 300 feet was below this minimum, so the pilot was not authorized to make an approach as the only pilot on board.
Runway 26 is 4,500 feet long by 150 feet wide; runway 34 is 3,600 feet by 150 feet, both paved.
Pilot Actions and Approach Details
The pilot stated that the lateral deviation indication on the first approach seemed erratic. No other pilot reported anomalies, and maintenance confirmed all parameters were within limits. The pilot used navigation receiver No. 1 (NAV1); he noted he should have used NAV2 to corroborate indications. On the second approach, the deviation was more stable. The LOC back course beam is narrower and has less strict calibration standards than a front course beam.
During the second approach, the pilot maintained 300 feet altitude but did not see the threshold of runway 26 because the aircraft was left of the runway centerline; the fuselage masked the runway on his right. He saw runway 34, which he had just crossed. He requested and received clearance to land on runway 34. He made a 280-degree left turn and touched down on the last 200 to 300 feet of runway 34. The pilot stated he was disoriented because he expected to see a runway in front of him rather than cross over one. He also stated he never felt pressured by passengers or the company but wanted to satisfy them to improve the company's charter performance.
Investigation Findings
Throughout almost the entire day, clouds stayed at a maximum altitude of 300 feet over the airport. The pilot took off from Charlo expecting improvement. When the aircraft broke out below the cloud layer on the second approach, it was left of runway 26's centerline. Poor horizontal in-flight visibility at 300 feet agl prevented positive identification of the runway threshold, and the fuselage masked it. The pilot became disoriented when he saw runway 34. He made the left turn and landed, but poor visibility prevented safe maneuvering for a normal landing. Because the wheels touched down with only 200 to 300 feet of runway remaining, it was impossible to stop safely before the end of the runway.
The pilot put pressure on himself to satisfy the passengers. The weather minima were below those authorized for the pilot.