What happened
On 23 April 2024, a De Havilland DHC-8-402, registered 9H-LWB, was returning to Guernsey Airport from London Gatwick under a wet lease arrangement. The aircraft carried 63 passengers and a crew of five, including a commander conducting line training for a newly joined first officer.
During the approach to Runway 27, the commander elected to fly the landing manually due to the airport's short runway constraints. Crossing the threshold at approximately 50 feet, he attempted a gentle touchdown by flaring high. This resulted in the aircraft floating along the runway for an extended period, aided by a downslope that obscured visual perspective of the remaining distance. The main landing gear finally contacted the pavement roughly two-thirds down the runway.
Upon touchdown, the commander applied normal braking but withheld reverse pitch, believing it unnecessary. Realizing too late that stopping within the remaining distance was unlikely, he applied maximum braking pressure. Despite anti-skid activity and steering corrections, the aircraft veered right and departed the paved surface at low speed, coming to rest approximately 30 meters beyond the runway end in the grass. The engines were eventually shut down six minutes later without reference to emergency checklists. All occupants evacuated safely with no injuries or structural damage to the airframe.
The investigation
The AAIB examined flight data recorder (FDR) information, CCTV footage, and operator Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) alerts. FDR data confirmed the aircraft crossed the threshold at 124 knots and remained airborne for ten seconds below 10 feet, consuming significant landing distance. CCTV reviews of previous flights by 9H-LWB revealed a pattern of landings beyond the optimal touchdown zone.
The investigation highlighted organizational factors related to the short-notice ACMI contract, which limited time for safety management integration between the lessee and lessor. Additionally, technical inspections found minor tyre wear and a single brake stator issue, but these were deemed insufficient to cause the excursion. A significant finding concerned the manufacturer’s Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), where emergency shutdown checklists were buried under engine sections rather than indexed prominently.
Findings
The primary cause was the commander’s decision to flare high for a gentle touchdown, leading to a long float and late touchdown on a runway with insufficient remaining length. Contributing factors included:
- Visual perspective errors caused by the runway slope, which prevented the crew from realizing how far down the runway they had traveled.
- Delayed braking actions, as the commander did not apply reverse pitch or maximum braking until it was too late.
- Crew resource management challenges, where junior pilots failed to challenge the commander’s technique despite recognizing the abnormal landing profile.
- Inadequate safety monitoring prior to the incident, as existing FDM data showing excessive touchdown speeds had not been proactively addressed by the operators.
Safety action
Following the incident, the Channel Islands Director of Civil Aviation amended procedures to require an Augmented Review for Foreign Carrier Permits involving frequent or extended wet lease operations. The lessee implemented a requirement for flight deck observations by training captains during new ACMI contracts. Additionally, the AAIB issued a safety recommendation urging De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited to improve the indexing and accessibility of emergency checklists in the DHC-8 QRH.