Cessna 414 accident at Brighton, Florida, 13 Sept 1976

Accident narrative

About 0954 e.d.t. on September 13, 1976, a U.S. Air Force F-4E and a Ruel Insurance Corporation Cessna 414 collided in flight about 7 nautical miles south of Brighton, Florida. The collision occurred at 12,500 feet outside the boundaries of restricted airspace. The pilot and three passengers aboard the Cessna were killed. The pilot in the front seat of the F-4E was also killed, while the instructor pilot in the rear seat ejected successfully and escaped injury. Both aircraft were destroyed.

### The flights

The Cessna 414, registration N8PR, departed New Tamiami Airport near Miami around 0835 on a business trip with the pilot and one passenger. After landing at Executive Airport in Fort Lauderdale to pick up two more passengers, the pilot told the tower he intended to fly to Tallahassee. This was the aircraft's last known radio transmission. The pilot, 49, had 798 flight-hours, including 266 in the Cessna 414. The flight operated under visual flight rules (VFR) without a flight plan.

The F-4E, serial number 67-0255, was part of a flight of three F-4Es from the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing at Homestead Air Force Base. They were scheduled for a student training flight involving ground attack practice at the Avon Park Gunnery Range. The flight departed at 0935 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The lead aircraft used the call sign REED 11, with the other two designated REED 12 and REED 13. Upgrading student pilots occupied the front seats, while instructor pilots flew in the rear seats. The student pilot in REED 13 had 293.2 flight-hours, and the instructor pilot had 2,591.8 hours.

### The collision

At 0943, REED 11 flight reached flight level 180 and received clearance from Miami Center to maintain a block altitude of FL-190 to FL-210. The aircraft moved into a tactical formation separated by about 1,000 feet. At 0948:59, Miami Center cleared the flight to descend to 14,000 feet at the pilots' discretion. The lead aircraft directed the flight into a route formation, spacing the aircraft about two to four wing-widths apart for the descent.

At 0952:20, REED 11 advised Miami Center that the flight was passing 17,000 feet and canceled its IFR clearance. Miami Center acknowledged. REED 11 changed its transponder to VFR code 1200, instructed the flight to switch to the Avon Park frequency to obtain range weather information, and initiated a 30-degree left turn to a heading of 315 degrees.

About 0954, while descending at 12,500 feet in visual meteorological conditions, REED 13—the number three aircraft, positioned on the left wing—collided with the Cessna. None of the surviving F-4E crewmembers saw the Cessna before the collision. The pilot in the front seat of REED 11 stated he noticed a flash past his left radome and recognized it as an aircraft just as it struck REED 13. The instructor pilot in REED 11 was busy copying weather information at the time.

Following the collision, the Cessna went out of control and crashed on the Brighton Indian Reservation. REED 13 remained in formation momentarily before starting a nose-low spiral to the left. The rear-seat instructor ejected, but the front-seat pilot's ejection system was damaged in the collision, and he was unable to escape.

### What the investigation found

Wreckage from both aircraft was scattered across the Brighton Indian Reservation. The Cessna's left wing, left engine nacelle, and left horizontal stabilizer were found separated from its main wreckage, alongside parts from the F-4E's right side. Smeared paint matching the F-4E was found on the Cessna's left-side components, and a piece of cloth liner from the Cessna's baggage compartment was found in the F-4E's inlet ramp hinge. Tests determined the F-4E overtook the Cessna from behind and above, striking it with a bank angle of 30 degrees and a track angle difference of about 2 degrees.

Radar data from Miami Center showed that when REED 11 was cleared to descend, the Cessna was about 22 nautical miles ahead and 5,500 feet below the military flight. When REED 11 canceled its IFR clearance, the Cessna was about 5.5 miles away, 4,500 feet below, and on a diverging course. However, after REED 11 turned 30 degrees to the left, the courses converged. A recorded radar tape showed an uncorrelated VFR target, which the Board concluded was the Cessna, maintaining 12,500 feet until it merged with the REED 11 flight track.

The Miami Center controller stated he did not see the VFR target. The Board noted that because the military flight was cleared to 14,000 feet while IFR, the controller had no reason to issue a traffic advisory regarding a VFR target at 12,500 feet. After REED 11 canceled IFR, no separation minima applied, and the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft rested with the military pilots.

Investigators evaluated visibility from the F-4E cockpits. Binocular photographs showed that from the front seat, no part of the aircraft should have obstructed the pilot's ability to see the Cessna, which was painted white and should have been visible against the background of Lake Okeechobee. In the rear seats, forward visibility was obstructed by the front ejection seat and instrumentation, requiring the instructor pilots to move their heads to see ahead. The Board believed that because the instructor pilots were concentrating on copying range wind information, the flight's capability to clear the area was effectively reduced.

The investigation also found an inconsistency in military regulations. A local Homestead Air Force Base supplement allowed a VFR descent into the gunnery range, which induced crews to cancel IFR early to avoid delays. However, Air Force Regulation 60-16 required flights to be conducted under IFR to the maximum extent possible. The Board believed that remaining IFR longer would have reduced the collision potential.

### Probable cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "the failure of the pilots of REED 11 flight to maintain adequate vigilance in order to see and avoid the light aircraft."

Contributing to the accident was "the inconsistency between Homestead Air Force Base Supplement 1 to Tactical Air Command Manual 55-4 which allowed a VFR descent into the Avon Park gunnery range and Air Force Regulation 60-16 which required all flights to be conducted under IFR conditions unless to do so would result in unacceptable mission derogation."