Cessna 500 accident at Bluefield, West Virginia, 21 Jan 1981

Accident narrative

On January 21, 1981, at 0844 eastern standard time, a Georgia-Pacific Corporation Cessna 500 Citation overran the runway following an instrument landing system (ILS) approach at Mercer County Airport in Bluefield, West Virginia. The aircraft touched down on a slush-covered runway, failed to decelerate normally, and the pilot attempted a late go-around. The aircraft did not gain sufficient flying speed, ran off the end of the runway, and crashed down a steep, wooded hillside. The pilot, copilot, and three passengers were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire.

### The flight

The flight was scheduled from Augusta, Georgia, to Frederick, Maryland, with an en route stop in Bluefield to drop off one passenger. The pilot, who had 10,463 total flight hours and 3,642 hours in the Citation, conducted his own weather briefing at the Augusta National Weather Service office before departure. He did not request Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) information, which at the time reported that braking action at Bluefield was nil. The copilot had 4,748 total flight hours, with 1,216 hours in the Citation. The flight departed Augusta at 0736.

### The approach and accident

En route, Atlanta Center advised the crew that Bluefield weather was a 700-foot overcast ceiling, 1 mile visibility in light snow and fog, and that snow plows were on the runway. When the flight contacted the Bluefield Flight Service Station (FSS) 35 miles out, an attendant reported the temperature as 32°F, winds from 070° at 13 knots, and that braking action had been reported as poor by a Beech 99 commuter pilot.

Roanoke Approach cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 23. FSS personnel observed the aircraft execute a missed approach after it appeared to enter clouds on a downwind leg for runway 05. The crew requested and received clearance for a second ILS approach to runway 23.

Witnesses stated the second approach looked normal, though one noted the aircraft appeared a little high and fast. The aircraft touched down between 500 and 2,000 feet from the approach end of the 4,742-foot runway. The landing roll appeared normal until the aircraft reached a taxiway intersection about 1,200 feet from the departure end of the runway. At that point, witnesses heard a substantial increase in engine thrust and saw the aircraft rotate for liftoff.

The aircraft did not become airborne. The main landing gear remained on the ground for 97 feet beyond the runway end. The aircraft became airborne briefly over a manmade depression, struck three localizer antennas and a 10-foot embankment, and traveled down a steep slope into several trees.

### What the investigation found

The wreckage was located 785 feet beyond the end of the runway, separated into three major sections and destroyed by impact and fire. Examination of the flight controls showed the landing gear was extended and locked, the flaps were extended approximately 15°, and the speedbrakes were retracted. Both engines exhibited damage consistent with rotation at impact, and fuel control components indicated high power settings.

A flight log entry from the accident flight noted "Rt Eng Ice Fail Light Won't Go Out." The Board could not determine the reason for this discrepancy but found no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have caused or contributed to the accident.

The investigation focused on the runway conditions and aircraft performance. Weather records indicated 0.7 inch of wet snow had fallen overnight. Although the runway had been plowed, witnesses and other pilots reported that a thin layer of slush remained, obscuring the runway grooves and resulting in poor or nil braking action.

The Citation's aircraft flight manual (AFM) based its landing performance data on a paved, dry runway, which required 2,625 feet to stop with a 10-knot tailwind. The aircraft operating manual advised that pilots should expect landing distances to increase by 50 percent on wet runways and 100 percent on icy runways. Applying the icy runway factor, the aircraft would have required 5,250 feet to stop—508 feet more than the total length of runway 23.

Furthermore, the operating manual noted that the Citation's minimum dynamic hydroplaning initiation groundspeed was 90 knots. Because of a 9-knot tailwind component, the aircraft's computed groundspeed at touchdown was 111 knots. The Board noted that at speeds above 90 knots, the icy runway correction factors were inadequate, meaning the actual required stopping distance would have been even greater than 5,250 feet.

The Board concluded that the pilot failed to immediately recognize the insufficient braking action and delayed his attempted go-around. According to the manufacturer, the aircraft required a minimum speed of 91 knots to become airborne. The drag produced by the slush extended the distance needed to accelerate, and the aircraft did not reach sufficient speed for liftoff in the remaining 1,200 feet of runway.

Medical examinations showed the flightcrew died of blunt impact trauma, while the passengers died of thermal injuries from the intense postcrash fire. The Board noted the decelerative forces were within human tolerance and the accident might have been survivable had the pilot not attempted the go-around but continued to decelerate the aircraft.

### Probable cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was "the pilot's attempt to land on a slush covered runway with insufficient stopping distance available, and his delayed initiation of a go-around which resulted in there being insufficient runway available to complete the maneuver successfully." The Board found that a contributing factor was "the lack of adequate emphasis in the manufacturer's aircraft flight manual regarding the required aircraft landing/stop distances under wet and icy runway conditions."