Accident at Durango, Colorado, 19 Jan 1988

Accident narrative

On January 19, 1988, about 1920 mountain standard time, a Fairchild Metro III operating as Continental Express flight 2286 crashed on approach to Durango, Colorado. The aircraft, operated by Trans-Colorado Airlines Inc., was carrying two flightcrew members and 15 passengers. Both crewmembers and seven passengers were killed; the remaining eight passengers survived with varying injuries.

**The flight**

Flight 2286 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight operated under 14 CFR Part 135 from Stapleton International Airport in Denver, Colorado, to Cortez, Colorado, with an intermediate stop in Durango. The flight departed Denver around 1820 and climbed to a cruising altitude of 23,000 feet.

The captain had accrued about 4,184 hours of flight time, including 3,028 hours in the Metro III. The first officer had about 8,500 total flight hours, with 305 hours in the Metro III.

**Sequence of events**

At 1853, the captain, who handled all radio communications, reported level at 23,000 feet. Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) provided the 1803 Durango weather observation, which included an indefinite ceiling of 800 feet, sky obscured, visibility of one mile in light snow and fog, and calm winds.

At 1900, Denver ARTCC asked if the flight would prefer the instrument landing system (ILS) approach or the VOR DME approach to runway 20. The captain stated they would plan on the DME approach. The controller then approved the flight to proceed direct to the 11-mile fix.

The flight was cleared to descend at the pilot's discretion to 16,000 feet, and later to 15,000 feet. At 1914, the captain reported that they were down to 14,000 feet and cleared for the approach. At 1916, Denver ARTCC informed the flight that radar coverage was terminated. The captain acknowledged, which was the final transmission from the flight.

Passengers recalled a crewmember announcing they were beginning their initial descent and asking them to fasten their seatbelts. The flight was described as uneventful until the final moments, when the airplane leveled off briefly, hit hard, pitched up abruptly with an increase in engine power, and rolled several times before striking the ground and sliding to a stop in the snow about 5 miles from the airport.

**What the investigation found**

The wreckage path extended about 1,000 feet. The airplane initially struck trees 6 to 8 feet below the top of a hill at an elevation of 7,180 feet, flew over the hill, and impacted the ground on the opposite side. The investigation found no evidence of preimpact defects in the airplane's systems, structure, or powerplants.

Because the captain was performing radio communications, the Board concluded he was the nonflying pilot and the first officer was flying the airplane.

The VOR DME approach to runway 20 was a "special approach" originally developed for another airline. The published procedure required aircraft to cross the 11 DME initial approach fix at 10,400 feet. Radar data showed Flight 2286 crossed the 11 DME fix at approximately 14,000 feet. Instead of flying the published DME arc, which would have allowed time to descend safely, the crew flew straight in. The airplane descended at a rate of over 3,000 feet per minute, and its ground speed increased to over 190 knots in the final seconds. The Board noted the flight also encountered a 10- to 15-knot tailwind.

The Board found that the first officer had a documented history of deficiencies in his instrument flying abilities, including failing a proficiency check less than a year before the accident. The Board believed that the first officer maintained a poor instrument scan and diverted his attention, allowing the airplane to descend prematurely below the published profile.

Toxicological tests on the captain revealed the presence of cocaine and benzoylecgonine (a cocaine metabolite) in his blood and urine. A corporate pilot reported to the Board that a woman claiming to be the captain's fiancee admitted she and the captain had consumed a "bag of cocaine" the night before the accident. The Board believed the captain's use of cocaine the night before impaired his ability to fly and monitor the first officer, most likely due to fatigue. The Board also noted the captain had a reputation among colleagues for being in a hurry, and his record included a 1983 aircraft accident, several traffic convictions, and a falsified FAA medical certificate application.

The airplane was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), nor was it required to be. The Board determined that a GPWS probably would have triggered an alert and may have prevented the accident.

**Probable cause**

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "the first officer's flying and the captain's ineffective monitoring of an unstabilized approach which resulted in a descent below the published descent profile. Contributing to the accident was the degradation of the captain's performance resulting from his use of cocaine before the accident."