History of the Flight
The pilot, accompanied by two teams of tandem parachutists, took off at 08:45 from Fort‑de‑France aerodrome for a parachute drop flight. This was the second flight of the first day of commercial operation for this aeroplane.
While climbing through 2,600 m to 3,000 m, the pilot observed a decrease in engine speed and engine misfires despite throttle inputs. Based on the fuel gauge indication, he estimated about 10 US gallons remained in the selected fuel tank. Concerned about a possible technical failure after a long maintenance period, he received clearance for the drop and ordered the parachutists to evacuate at 09:13 overhead the drop point at the planned altitude.
The pilot then descended and set the appropriate engine speed for that phase without changing the fuel tank. The engine appeared to operate normally, so he began returning to the aerodrome. On final approach for runway 10 overhead Fort‑de‑France bay, the pilot was cleared to land at 09:18. When he moved the throttle, he found it had no effect and the engine behaved erratically. At 09:19, he told the controller nothing was responding and ditched in the bay within a minute. The pilot, wearing a life jacket, evacuated before the aeroplane sank about 550 m from the coast. He was rescued by a boat 25 minutes later.
Pilot Information
The 46-year-old pilot held a Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL (A)) issued in November 2016 with valid Instrument (IR), Single-Engine Piston (SEP) and Multi‑Engine Piston (MEP) ratings. He had been qualified for parachute drop flights since July 2018. His total experience was about 550 flight hours, including 155 hours in parachute drop flights. To prepare for Air Colibri Parachutisme operations, he completed training on a Cessna 206 in December 2019 with a pilot from another structure, as F-OKGO was unavailable. This training consisted of six flights in the right seat. The pilot-in-command of those flights noted that in his club it was recommended to fill one fuel tank with sufficient margin for the entire series of drops; thus the fuel tank selection was not changed during those flights.
The Air Colibri Parachutisme Operations Manual requires new pilots to undergo theoretical training covering aircraft flying, circuit procedures, normal and emergency procedures, fuel management, and evacuation. The investigation could not determine if this training was fully completed.
It was planned that on 14 February 2020, the pilot would carry out a familiarization session on F-OKGO with an instructor, but the instructor had a last-minute impediment. The pilot performed two aerodrome circuits alone, noting nothing unusual. He knew the aircraft had just come out of a long maintenance period but did not know the details. The pilot had not flown in the three months preceding the occurrence except for these flights.
Aircraft Information
F-OKGO, built in 1979, was a single-engine piston aircraft with fixed landing gear. Air Colibri acquired it in 2018 for parachute drop operations. It entered service in February 2020 after difficulties obtaining a certificate of airworthiness. The aircraft could carry 98 US gallons of fuel (94 usable), divided between two wing tanks. A three-position selector on the instrument panel pedestal allowed selection of the right tank, left tank, or fuel cutoff. The Flight Manual indicated average cruise consumption of 16.1 US gallons per hour. The operations manual adopted this and noted consumption per rotation in parachuting was 11 US gallons for drops at 3,000 m. As the aircraft was new to service, this estimate could not be empirically consolidated. The PA32 was not equipped with low fuel level or low fuel pressure warnings.
Meteorological Information
The Fort-de-France aerodrome 13:00 automatic METAR reported wind from 110° at 17 kt, gusts to 30 kt in downpours, visibility >10 km decreasing to 4,000 m in downpours, few clouds at 2,600 ft, broken at 19,000 ft, and passing isolated rain clouds at 1,500 ft. Temperature 27 °C, QNH 1015. No precipitation occurred in the accident zone.
Wreckage Findings
The wreckage was located about 15 m below the water surface on a muddy bottom. It was not examined by the BEA. De-contamination and salvaging operations were carried out months later at the request of French authorities. Divers observed the left wing fuel tanks seemed empty. The right wing fuel tanks were completely defuelled, yielding about 80 litres (approximately 21 US gallons) of fuel. The BEA did not participate in these examinations. Fuel gauges could not be examined due to underwater damage and salvaging operations.
Recorded Data
An Engine Data Management (EDM) computer, a Primary Flight Display (PFD), and a tablet were recovered. Only the EDM provided usable data. The analysis showed nominal engine behaviour during the first flight and the beginning of the second. During the second flight, anomalies in manifold pressure, engine speed, and fuel flow rate appeared at the end of the climb. This malfunction—quick variations in fuel flow rate—is consistent with fuel starvation, corresponding to irregular drying up of fuel at the engine intake causing misfires. The aircraft then lost about 7,000 ft in less than five minutes with characteristics similar to an idle power descent with the propeller windmilling. The pilot may have sensed normal operation, though this could not be verified. At the very end of the recording, a sudden increase in engine speed and fuel flow rate occurred before parameters dropped definitively, consistent with throttle inputs and use of remaining fuel in the pipes before complete fuel depletion.
Fuel Management
The pilot stated the aircraft’s fuel tanks contained 45 US gallons before the flights, equally divided between the two wings. He selected the left tank on start-up for the first rotation and did not change the selection. He estimated consumption at about 16 US gallons per hour and rotation duration at about 30 minutes. The first rotation lasted 35 minutes with off-block at about 08:00. He then boarded the second team with the engine running and left for the second rotation at about 08:40. The EDM data showed total consumption of 21 US gallons over the day. At the time of the failure, the pilot estimated less than a quarter of a tank remaining, visually confirmed by the left fuel gauge indicating about 10 US gallons. He noted no specific instructions from the operator regarding fuel management during the series of flights. The operations manual specifies that during descent the pilot should check the fuel selector is on the fullest tank.