Casualties unknown

Socata TB20 'Trinidad' Accident at Toussus-le-Noble (F-GKVO)

Toussus-le-Noble, FR

On July 3, 2014, a Socata TB20 « Trinidad » (registration F-GKVO) was involved in an aviation accident near Toussus-le-Noble, FR. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The runway excursion was due to the pilot's decision to turn left toward taxiway W after interrupting the takeoff, leading to a collision with an obstacle that caused significant damage. This summary draws on records from the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA).

Sourcesthe French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA)Primary reportUpdated 2026-09-13Data APIEditorial standards

On July 3, 2014, a Socata TB20 (F-GKVO) suffered an interrupted takeoff and runway excursion at Toussus-le-Noble. The aircraft struck an obstacle, causing a fire that destroyed the left wing. All three occupants evacuated safely.

Incident Overview

On July 3, 2014, at 15:58 local time, a Socata TB20 registered as F-GKVO was involved in an accident at Toussus-le-Noble aerodrome. The aircraft was operated by Club Aviation for a general aviation local flight to Le Havre Octeville. Three individuals were on board: one pilot and two passengers. The incident resulted in severe damage to the aircraft, including a fire that destroyed the left wing, though all occupants evacuated safely.

Sequence of Events

The pilot aligned with runway 25R for an instrument flight. During the takeoff roll, the aircraft failed to rotate, prompting the pilot to interrupt the takeoff. To avoid localizer antennas, the pilot turned left toward taxiway W. The aircraft exited the runway on the left side between the stop bar extension and taxiway W. The left wing struck the electrical housing of a strobe light, puncturing the fuel tank. Fuel spilled and ignited, spreading fire along the trajectory. The aircraft stopped after traveling 250 meters. Firefighters extinguished the blaze less than four minutes after the start of the takeoff roll.

Contributing Factors

The investigation highlighted that the pilot tested the autopilot before the gyroscopes reached nominal speed, likely causing erroneous attitude data to command the pitch trim compensator into a full nose-down position. The pilot used personalized checklists that did not include verifying the pitch trim position before takeoff, contrary to the flight manual recommendations. Additionally, the pilot was unaware of the stop bar extension and overestimated the stopping distance based on experience with twin-engine aircraft.

Conclusion

The runway excursion resulted from the pilot's decision to turn left after interrupting the takeoff. The collision with the frangible obstacle caused significant damage. The BEA noted that personalized checklists may not ensure the same safety level as manufacturer procedures and emphasized the importance of defining clear decision points for interrupted takeoffs.

Probable cause

The runway excursion was due to the pilot's decision to turn left toward taxiway W after interrupting the takeoff, leading to a collision with an obstacle that caused significant damage.