Incident
An aircraft operating a flight from Chita to Blagoveshchensk was involved in an accident during approach. The weather conditions at the time included reduced visibility, heavy rain, thunderstorm activity, and a cloud base at 150 meters. The crew initiated the approach despite these conditions.
Sequence of Events
On final approach, the captain continued the descent below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) without establishing visual contact with the runway or its lighting system. The aircraft was not properly aligned with the runway centerline. It descended too low and struck trees 210 meters to the right of the centerline and 50 meters short of runway 36. Upon impact, the left wing separated from the aircraft, and the aircraft crashed into a wooded area. It slid for 450 meters before coming to rest. There was no fire.
Injuries and Damage
All 41 occupants were rescued. Among them, nine sustained injuries. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable Cause and Contributing Factors
According to the official investigation, the probable causes of the accident were the failure of the crew to go around and the descent well below decision height without visual reference to landmarks when the aircraft approached the airfield in weather conditions below the captain's, aircraft's, and airfield's minima, and in dangerous/adverse weather phenomena like thunderstorm, heavy rain, and severe turbulence, as well as the lack of appropriate response and required actions following terrain awareness warning system alerts, resulting in a controlled flight into terrain, collision with obstacles, and destruction of the aircraft.
Contributing factors include: the crew underestimated the weather conditions at the destination airport, leading to an erroneous decision to attempt an approach in thunderstorm and heavy rain; unsatisfactory meteorological support of the flight, with the dispatcher and later air traffic control providing visibility, cloud, and wind data that did not correspond to actual conditions, which were significantly worse than minimums required; clearance for the approach by air traffic control despite the presence of dangerous weather phenomena (thunderstorm, heavy rain) at the aerodrome, which did not correspond to standard operating procedures at Blagoveshchensk; inadequate staffing with a first officer who was performing his first flight after a prolonged leave without proper preparation and training; and unsatisfactory crew interaction and failure to adhere to standard operating procedures, especially the callouts of approaching decision height, the absence of a decision by the commander to continue the landing or go-around, and the lack of action to recommend or initiate a go-around by the first officer.