No fatalities

2024-06-26: Bombardier Inc DHC-8-402 (VH-QOI) — Sunstate Airlines (QLD) Pty. Limited — Horn Island Airport, Queensland

Horn Island Airport, Queensland

On June 26, 2024, a Bombardier Inc DHC-8-402 (registration VH-QOI) operated by Sunstate Airlines (QLD) Pty. Limited was involved in an aviation accident near Horn Island Airport, Queensland. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The FO mistakenly set flaps to 5° for take-off at Horn Island when pre-flight planning identified flaps 15° should have been set. This summary draws on records from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)Primary reportUpdated 1779781772Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered VH-QOI
Aircraft registered VH-QOI. Photo: Bidgee / CC BY-SA 3.0 au, via Wikimedia Commons

On 26 June 2024, a QantasLink De Havilland Canada DHC-8-402 took off from Horn Island with flaps at 5° instead of 15°. The crew identified the error after becoming airborne and continued to Cairns without incident.

Incident Overview

On 26 June 2024, a De Havilland Canada DHC-8-402 (Dash 8) operated by QantasLink was preparing to operate a passenger flight from Horn Island to Cairns, Queensland. Due to runway length and high passenger and cargo weights, the flight crew determined that a flap setting of 15° and the bleed air system switched off were required. The first officer (FO), serving as pilot flying, inadvertently selected a flap setting of 5°. The crew completed after-start checks according to standard operating procedures but did not detect the incorrect setting.

During takeoff, the aircraft accelerated normally, but rotation was slow and performance differed from usual. The FO applied continued back pressure, and the aircraft became airborne slightly after the expected rotation speed. The FO then identified the flaps were at 5° and advised the captain. The captain instructed the FO to continue flying. The FO slightly lowered the nose to increase airspeed; the aircraft accelerated and maintained a positive climb. The flight proceeded to Cairns without further incident.

Findings

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found that the FO’s incorrect flap selection was likely due to habitual behavior, as a flap setting of 5° was the most common take-off setting for other sectors and had been used on the two prior flights. The flight crew conducted pre-flight checks and crosschecks, but failed to identify the error, likely due to automatic behavior during the checklist process. Standard operating procedures provided four opportunities to detect the mistake.

Operator Actions

Following the occurrence, the operator implemented several changes: review of standard operating procedures to reduce erroneous flap selection, revision of relevant checklists to strengthen crosschecking with computed takeoff performance data, and training for crews on standard operating procedures and compliance.

Safety Message

The ATSB emphasized that high workload during preparation, taxi, and takeoff demands heightened attention. Flight crews must carefully verify and methodically complete checks and checklists. Maintaining focus and being mindful of deviations from usual settings is essential during periods of high workload.