Accident Overview
On a local flight under visual flight rules from Montréal/St-Hubert Airport, Quebec, a twin-engine aircraft (registration C-GJSU) with one pilot and three passengers experienced fuel exhaustion in both engines. The purpose of the flight was to check the rudder trim indicator and confirm a potential synchronization issue between the autopilot and the GPS. The aircraft approached Runway 24R at Montréal/St-Hubert when both Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-28 engines stopped. The pilot diverted toward St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil Airport and attempted a forced landing in a field 0.5 nautical mile west of that airport. The aircraft struck the ground 30 feet short of the selected field at 1725 Eastern Daylight Time. The aircraft was extensively damaged; the four occupants sustained minor injuries. The emergency locator transmitter activated. The flight occurred during daylight hours, and there was no fire.
Sequence of Events
The aircraft had approximately 260 pounds of fuel on board at takeoff. The pilot relied solely on fuel gauge readings without cross-checking consumption since last fueling. The fuel gauges were misread, leading the pilot to assume adequate fuel for the flight and required reserves per Canadian Aviation Regulations, but not the greater reserves required by the company operations manual. The pilot did not monitor fuel gauges during flight and extended the flight to practice an instrument approach with insufficient fuel. The right engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion first; the pilot did not execute the approved engine failure procedure and did not feather the propeller, increasing drag. The pilot continued toward Montréal/St-Hubert despite advising air traffic control of an intention to divert to St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil, without declaring an emergency. The left engine stopped 36 seconds later, 7.4 nautical miles from Runway 24R at 2,400 feet above sea level. Lowering the landing gear at 1,600 feet further increased drag, preventing the aircraft from reaching the runway at St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil.
Findings
The official investigation identified several causes and contributing factors: the pilot's exclusive reliance on fuel gauge readings without cross-checking, misreading of fuel gauges, failure to monitor fuel in flight, extending the flight with insufficient fuel, not following engine failure procedures, ineffective communication of the emergency, and premature landing gear extension. Additional findings noted that the operations manager was unable to perform supervisory duties, compromising flight safety. Other findings indicated that the chief pilot did not meet Canadian Aviation Regulations requirements at appointment, and there was no evidence of fuel gauge malfunction or fuel leak during the flight.