3 fatalities

2001-01-11: Britten-Norman Islander (PT-KNE) — LASA - Engenharia e Prospecções — Cascalho, Brazil

Cascalho, BrazilFlight

On January 11, 2001, a Britten-Norman Islander (registration PT-KNE) operated by LASA - Engenharia e Prospecções was involved in an aviation accident near Cascalho, Brazil in flight. 3 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Loss of control after the crew encountered adverse weather conditions with low level windshear. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781202960Data APIEditorial standards

A twin-engine aircraft on a prospecting flight crashed in mountainous terrain after encountering adverse weather and windshear, killing all three occupants. The wreckage was found near Mt Serra Preta.

Accident Overview

A twin-engine aircraft departed Paramirim Airport at 1400 local time on a three-hour ore prospecting mission, carrying two pilots and one passenger. En route, weather conditions deteriorated, and the crew apparently decided to return to Paramirim when the aircraft encountered atmospheric turbulence and windshear. It stalled and crashed in a mountainous area.

Search and Wreckage

After 17 hours without contact, the aircraft was declared missing. Its wreckage was located the following day at 1800 local time near the summit of Mt Serra Preta, near Cascalho, approximately 27 km east of Paramirim. The aircraft was destroyed, and all three occupants were killed.

Official Findings

The probable cause of the accident was loss of control after the crew encountered adverse weather conditions with low-level windshear. Contributing factors included:

  • Although operations complied with regulations, pilots regularly exceeded flight times; the tiring nature of low-altitude prospecting without autopilot in high temperatures led to greater than normal physical wear.
  • Poor flight preparation regarding probable weather evolution.
  • Low visibility as the crew presumably attempted to return to base.
  • The accident occurred outside the intended flight area.
  • The flight, scheduled for three hours, began with full fuel tanks (seven hours autonomy), unnecessarily increasing weight.
  • Poor flight planning.
  • Non-compliance with standard operator procedures: the crew positioned flaps at an inappropriate angle for obstacle clearance.
  • Two unreported incidents involving the captain at Paramirim Airport in the days preceding the accident, indicating absence of effective operational control.
  • Poor supervision of crew schedules.
  • The operator preferred morning flights to avoid regional turbulence, but the crew took off in the afternoon when conditions were unfavorable.