Sequence of Events
The aircraft was operating a pleasure flight for the owner and friends. The captain calculated landing distances for both runway 28 and 10 based on briefing weather reports, which indicated a strong northerly wind component. An updated report received about 30 minutes before descent showed wind at 290 degrees and 7 knots. Approaching the island and becoming visual, the crew noted the windsock near the western runway end indicating a slight headwind component for runway 10 and decided on a straight-in approach to runway 10 to avoid an approaching squall or shower.
The aircraft touched down firmly a short distance beyond the threshold. Speed brakes were immediately extended and wheel braking applied. About four seconds later, the captain called for the drag chute to be deployed. The co-pilot correctly activated the handle, but no increase in retardation occurred, indicating the chute had not deployed. When the captain realized the aircraft could not stop on the remaining runway, he attempted to turn toward a clear grass area to the right. However, the aircraft was aquaplaning on the wet surface and did not respond to steering inputs for some distance.
The aircraft left the bitumen tracking to the right. It collided with a gable marker, passed through a fence, continued down an embankment, across a road, through a second fence, and came to rest approximately 90 meters from the runway end and 70 meters to the right of the extended centerline.
Damage and Outcome
The left main and nose gear legs were torn off. Witnesses reported that when the aircraft landed, the runway was very wet and the wind was westerly at 5 to 10 knots.
Investigation Findings
The investigation determined that the captain had made miscalculations in pre-flight assessments. He noted the landing distance available as the same for both runways, whereas runway 28 has a reduced length due to terrain clearance requirements on approach. Under conditions both forecast and prevailing, and using criteria applicable for an aircraft equipped with a drag chute, landing distances required for both runways were greater than the distances available.
The captain also applied incorrect landing techniques. He did not attempt to deploy the drag chute immediately after the nose wheel was on the ground, and did not apply unmodulated pressure to the anti-skid braking system, as required by the manufacturer for maximum performance.
The drag chute canister lid had been sealed with tank sealant and painted over. The latch assembly operated, but the drogue chute spring was insufficiently strong to break the seal. When the sealant was pried away, the system operated normally. This error was not found during a check of the aircraft immediately after repainting. The lid resembled an oblong radio antenna and was not marked. The problem should have been noticed during a subsequent inspection of the drag chute for moisture, which is required every 90 days if not deployed. That inspection involves removing the lid and drogue chute to feel the main chute for moisture; the condition of the sealant indicated it had not been carried out.
Factors considered relevant: inadequate pre-flight planning and preparation by the flight crew (runway distance required exceeded available on either runway), adverse runway and weather conditions (wet surface and downwind component), improper sealing of the drag chute canister, inadequate maintenance of the drag chute system, and improper operation of the wheel brakes.