Summary of Events
On June 6, 2019, a Cessna 402B, registration HK5126, operated by Aeroexpreso del Pacífico (Aexpa), was on a scheduled flight from Nuquí's Reyes Murillo Airport (SKUI) to Quibdó's El Caraño Airport (SKUI). The aircraft carried two pilots and four passengers. The flight proceeded normally until 20 nautical miles from Quibdó, when the crew contacted the control tower and was instructed to report 8 nautical miles out due to traffic on final approach for runway 13.
Approximately 5 nautical miles from the runway at an altitude of about 1,500 feet, the crew performed the landing checklist but deferred the landing gear extension until after reducing speed. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 13. During the landing attempt, the propellers of both engines struck the runway, causing an abrupt stoppage of the engines. The fuselage slid along the asphalt surface because the landing gear was retracted. The aircraft traveled 700 meters before coming to a stop on the runway.
The control tower activated the emergency plan and closed the airport. Airport firefighters and a ramp inspector responded and assisted the occupants in evacuating. All six individuals exited the aircraft unaided and were uninjured. They were escorted to the terminal.
Injuries and Evacuation
No injuries were reported among the two crew members and four passengers. All occupants were unharmed and evacuated by their own means.
Aircraft Damage
The aircraft sustained damage to the lower fuselage, though the internal structural performance was not compromised. The nose gear doors were damaged and lost material due to friction with the runway. Navigation and communication antennas (ATC, DME, VHF, ADF) were damaged. Both left and right flaps exhibited deformations in their internal structure and skin. Both engines experienced sudden stoppage, and propeller blades showed deformations greater than 15 degrees.
Investigation Findings
The investigation determined that the probable cause of the serious incident was the crew's lack of situational awareness, as they did not execute pre-landing procedures that would have allowed them to verify the extension and security of the landing gear. Contributing factors included complacency in not using the before-landing checklists specified in the company's operating manuals, weak maintenance practices in adjusting and calibrating the landing gear unsafe detection/indication systems, a lack of reporting culture among crews and maintenance personnel that could identify and manage latent failures, and deficiencies in the Safety Management System, including inadequate supervision and control by the company.