2 fatalities

1953-03-04: Curtiss C-46 Commando (N4717N) — Slick Airways — Windsor Locks-Bradley, United States of America

Windsor Locks-Bradley, United States of AmericaLanding (descent or approach)

On March 4, 1953, a Curtiss C-46 Commando (registration N4717N) operated by Slick Airways was involved in an aviation accident near Windsor Locks-Bradley, United States of America during landing or approach. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that after missing his first approach to the airport, the pilot displayed poor judgment in attempting a circle under the overcast in rain and at night, rather than execute a standard instrument… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781253519Data APIEditorial standards

During an instrument approach in rain and fog at Bradley Field, a pilot reported intermittent ILS and continued with an ADF approach. After being cleared to land, the aircraft struck trees southwest of the field. Both pilots died. The probable cause was the pilot's poor judgment in circling under the overcast after missing the first approach.

Accident Overview

On the early morning of [date not specified], a flight conducting an instrument approach to Bradley Field crashed after striking trees southwest of the field. The crew consisted of pilot Jefferson R. Elliott and copilot John Bielak. The aircraft was destroyed on impact, killing both pilots.

Flight Progress

At 0139, the pilot reported to Bradley Approach Control that the aircraft was over Hartford at 0138 and would maintain 3,000 feet to the outer marker. The tower controller, managing all three radio positions, acknowledged the report, gave a time check at 0139, and cleared the flight for an instrument approach, advising Runway 6 was in use. Weather conditions were given: wind calm, ceiling indefinite at 500 feet with obscurement, visibility one and a half miles in light rain and fog, and altimeter 30.01 inches. The pilot was asked to report over the outer marker inbound and was informed that the glide path was inoperative due to its decommissioning for Runway 6 extension, as published in Notices to Airmen.

At 0141, the pilot inquired whether the ILS localizer was also inoperative. The controller replied that the monitoring panel indicated normal operation of all components except the glide path. The pilot responded, "I believe my ILS is cut momentary and I will continue to make an ADF let-down."

At 0144, the flight reported over the outer marker. The controller acknowledged and confirmed the flight was inbound. The pilot replied "Roger," and the aircraft was cleared to land. The controller noted that the high intensity lights were set at intensity 5 (maximum brilliance) and requested the pilot to inform the tower when lower intensity was desired. The pilot again acknowledged with "Roger," which was the last communication.

Final Moments

At approximately 0149, the controller requested the aircraft's position. Receiving no response, the controller transmitted an advisory: "If you are experiencing transmitter difficulties and have missed your approach you are cleared to reverse course, climb to 2,500 feet to the outer marker for another approach." Several additional attempts to contact the flight were unsuccessful. Shortly after the last contact, the aircraft was seen and heard flying low to the southwest of Bradley Field before striking trees.

Investigation and Probable Cause

The investigation found no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction of the aircraft or engines. The pilot did not cancel the IFR flight plan at any time. The controller did not receive any indication that the pilot had missed the first approach, was conducting a missed approach procedure, was circling with visual contact, or requested clearance for a second approach. The probable cause was determined to be that after missing his first approach, the pilot displayed poor judgment in attempting a circle under the overcast in rain and at night, rather than executing a standard instrument approach.