6 fatalities

2015-08-23: De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (C-FKRJ) — Air Saguenay — Les Bergeronnes, Canada

Les Bergeronnes, CanadaFlight

On August 23, 2015, a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (registration C-FKRJ) operated by Air Saguenay was involved in an aviation accident near Les Bergeronnes, Canada in flight. 6 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: 1. The pilot performed manoeuvres with a reduced safety margin at low altitudes. 2. With no restrictions on manoeuvres and no minimum altitude prescribed by the company prior to flight, the pilot flew according to his own limits and made a steep turn at… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781192848Data APIEditorial standards

A float-equipped DHC-2 Beaver on a sightseeing flight stalled in a steep turn and collided with terrain, killing all six occupants. The pilot performed the turn at low altitude with reduced safety margins.

Accident Summary

On a visual flight rules sightseeing flight near Tadoussac, Quebec, a de Havilland DHC-2 Mk. 1 Beaver (registration C-FKRJ, serial number 1210) operated by Air Saguenay (1980) inc. stalled in a steep turn and descended vertically into a rocky outcrop. The aircraft was substantially damaged upon impact and destroyed by a post-impact fire. All six occupants—one pilot and five passengers—received fatal injuries. No emergency locator transmitter signal was detected.

Aircraft and Flight

The float-equipped Beaver departed from its base on Lac Long, Quebec, at 1104 Eastern Daylight Time for a 20-minute sightseeing flight. The flight was conducted under visual flight rules in the region of Tadoussac.

Accident Sequence

At 1127, during the return leg approximately 2.5 nautical miles north-northwest of its destination (7 nautical miles north of Tadoussac), the aircraft entered a steep left turn. Aerodynamic stalling ensued, leading to an incipient spin. The altitude was insufficient to regain control before vertical collision with the terrain.

Findings

Official finding: The pilot performed manoeuvres with a reduced safety margin at low altitudes. With no company-prescribed restrictions on manoeuvres or minimum altitude, the pilot flew according to personal limits and initiated a steep turn at approximately 110 feet above ground level. The subsequent stall and spin occurred at an altitude too low for recovery. Additionally, the absence of an angle-of-attack indicator and an impending stall warning device eliminated the last line of defence against loss of control.

Other findings noted that the replacement of the ventral fin with Seafins complied with the applicable supplemental type certificate. The control wheel was in the left-hand (pilot) position at impact. The investigation also identified risks associated with the lack of lightweight flight data recording, regulatory rest period compliance, logbook recording, safety management systems, and stall training.

Aftermath

The accident resulted in the destruction of the aircraft and fatal injuries to all aboard. No further details were provided regarding the circumstances of the post-impact fire or emergency response.

Probable cause

1. The pilot performed manoeuvres with a reduced safety margin at low altitudes. 2. With no restrictions on manoeuvres and no minimum altitude prescribed by the company prior to flight, the pilot flew according to his own limits and made a steep turn at approximately 110 feet above ground level. 3. When the pilot made a steep left turn, aerodynamic stalling ensued, causing an incipient spin at an altitude insufficient to allow control of the aircraft to be regained prior to vertical collision with the terrain. 4. The absence of an angle-of-attack indicator system and an impending stall warning device deprived the pilot of the last line of defence against loss of control of the aircraft.