4 fatalities

1961-01-19: Douglas DC-8 (XA-XAX) — Aeronaves de Mexico — New York-Idlewild, United States of America

New York-Idlewild, United States of AmericaTakeoff (climb)

On January 19, 1961, a Douglas DC-8 (registration XA-XAX) operated by Aeronaves de Mexico was involved in an aviation accident near New York-Idlewild, United States of America during takeoff. 4 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the unnecessary discontinuing of the takeoff by the check pilot, who was not in either pilot seat. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781246047Data APIEditorial standards

A takeoff was aborted by a check pilot, causing a runway overrun through a blast fence and across a road, striking a car. The aircraft caught fire and was destroyed. The captain was the only survivor of the four cockpit occupants.

Takeoff Roll

Control tower personnel visually observed the aircraft for the first approximately 6,200 feet of its takeoff roll until it was lost to view due to obscuring snow, about 3,800 feet from the tower. At that time, the aircraft had not taken off or rotated. Another controller tracked the aircraft by airport surface-detection radar from the start of the roll to the eastern end of runway 7R, where it disappeared. A few seconds later, a bright orange flash was observed on the sky northeast of the airport. Emergency procedures were initiated immediately, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to contact the flight on the departure frequency.

Captain's Account

Captain Poe, the only survivor of the four cockpit occupants, stated that the checklist was accomplished normally, the runway condition was good, and everything occurred routinely through the 100-knot time check. At approximately 130 knots (V1 speed), the first officer called out V1 and VR in rapid succession. The aircraft was then rotated quickly and somewhat excessively. Poe did not see the airspeed exceed 130 knots; upon rotation, the airspeed dropped rapidly to about 110 knots. At that time, the Aeronaves captain pointed to the airspeed indicator. Poe believed the aircraft could not become airborne and that insufficient runway remained to restart the takeoff. His only choice, he stated, was to try to stop on the runway.

Sequence of Events

Poe unfastened his safety belt, stood up to gauge progress, moved forward, briefly advanced the throttles (noting normal EPR readings of 2.52 to 2.54), then pulled the throttles full back. Captain Gonzales immediately pulled the reverse throttles into reverse thrust and applied wheel brakes. Poe extended the spoilers and sat on the jump seat without refastening his seat belt. These actions took about three seconds. The aircraft continued the full length of the 10,000-foot runway, beyond it, through a blast fence (catching fire), through the airport boundary fence, and across Rockaway Boulevard, where it struck an automobile, injuring the driver and sole occupant. After penetrating the blast fence, many parts were shed before the aircraft came to rest in flames 830 feet beyond the runway end.

Post-Accident Response

Emergency vehicles from the airport and the New York Fire Department responded quickly, although somewhat impeded by weather, reaching the scene within about six minutes and extinguishing the fire. Evacuation and rescue of occupants were completed within about five minutes, with most persons out of the wreckage and away from the fire site in half that time. Many survivors were taken to hospitals in privately owned vehicles. The aircraft was extensively destroyed.

Probable Cause

The Board determined that the aircraft did become airborne during the attempted takeoff. Investigation indicated that Captain Poe erroneously believed that rotation at a speed appreciably below the calculated VR would result in a longer takeoff run. The Board concluded that the takeoff was discontinued due to the check pilot, who was not seated in a pilot seat, reaching forward without warning and pulling the throttles back, causing power reduction on all four engines. The Board determined the probable cause was the unnecessary discontinuing of the takeoff by the check pilot, who was not in either pilot seat. Contributing factors were the marginally poor weather, snow on the runway, and the possibility of the Pitot head heat not having been on.