What happened
On the morning of the accident, a scheduled domestic flight was traveling from Louisville, Kentucky, to Roanoke, Virginia, with intermediate stops in Cincinnati and Charleston, West Virginia. After departing Cincinnati under IFR clearance, the aircraft was cleared by Indianapolis ARTCC to descend through 5,000 feet while navigating toward the Milton Intersection.
As the flight approached Charleston, weather conditions were characterized by fog and smoke, with visibility significantly reduced near runway 2/3. The crew received vectors from Charleston Approach Control for an ILS approach, though they were notified that the glide path was out of service. During the final stages of the descent, the crew established contact with the tower and was cleared to land. At approximately 0855 hours, the crew inquired about the intensity of the approach and runway lights.
During the final seconds of the approach, cockpit communications indicated that the pilots were attempting to maintain visual contact with the lights. The pilot-in-command noted they were maintaining an altitude of roughly 1,250 feet AMSL. Shortly after a brief fluctuation in engine power, the aircraft type struck a steep hillside approximately 250 feet before reaching the runway threshold. The impact occurred at an elevation of 865 feet AMSL, which was about 33 feet below the threshold elevation. Following the collision, the aircraft moved across the terrain and came to rest off the right side of the runway. The accident resulted in 35 fatalities and 2 serious injuries.
Findings
Investigations concluded that the primary cause was an unrecognized loss of altitude orientation during the final approach due to shallow, dense fog. This disorientation occurred because the pilot experienced a sudden reduction in available ground guidance. Specifically, the aircraft transitioned from visual meteorological conditions into a layer of fog covering the approach lights only seconds before impact. The visibility at the runway threshold was estimated to be 500 feet or less during this period. Because the initial part of the approach offered sufficient visual guidance, the pilot could not accurately judge the impending loss of visibility until entering the fog bank, leaving insufficient time to execute a successful go-around.