14 fatalities

Twin-Engine Aircraft Crash in Honduras (HR-AUQ)

Tegucigalpa, HondurasFlight

On February 14, 2011, a Let L-410 (registration HR-AUQ) operated by Central American Airways was involved in an aviation accident near Tegucigalpa, Honduras in flight. 14 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The following findings were identified: 1) Weather conditions existing at the time of the event, during the approach to the runway the aircraft was operated slightly above the stall speed and a major change in wind speed could cause a stall. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards

A twin-engine aircraft crashed in a wooded area 12 km from San Pedro Sula after a go-around and second approach in marginal weather, killing all 14 occupants.

Flight Details and Accident Sequence The twin-engine aircraft departed San Pedro Sula-Ramon Villeda Morales Airport at 0704 local time on a 40-minute flight to Tegucigalpa. The aircraft was carrying 12 passengers and two pilots. After being cleared to descend to 9,000 feet for an approach to runway 20, the crew informed air traffic control that they were initiating a go-around procedure for unknown reasons. A few minutes later, the aircraft was cleared for an approach to runway 02. During the approach in marginal weather conditions, with the aircraft in a full flaps down configuration, it stalled and crashed in a wooded area located 12 km from the airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces, and all 14 occupants were killed. ## Official Findings The investigation identified several contributing factors. Weather conditions during the approach to the runway meant the aircraft was operated slightly above the stall speed, and a major change in wind speed could cause a stall. The altitude at which windshear occurred, the reaction time of the pilot, and the responsiveness of the aircraft determined whether the descent could be arrested in time to avoid an accident. No published descent procedures were performed, possibly due to misinterpretation of flight instruments, including the altimeter and airspeed indicator. During the descent to the VOR/DME for runway 20 and 02, the pilot in command did not check the approach chart and did not continually consult the first officer on altitude and course. There was no adequate communication between the crew, indicating deficient crew resource management, as no approach briefing was made for either of the two approaches. The aircraft was configured for landing with flaps fully down (flap 42) at a very long distance from the track without having it in sight. The investigation noted that the aircraft would not respond to an adverse windshear condition as it appeared at that time with such a configuration. It was also noted that in both approaches, it is mandatory to perform a circling procedure.

Probable cause

The following findings were identified: 1) Weather conditions existing at the time of the event, during the approach to the runway the aircraft was operated slightly above the stall speed and a major change in wind speed could cause a stall. The altitude at which the windshear occurred, and the reaction time of the pilot and the responsiveness of the aircraft determined whether the descent could be arrested in time to avoid an accident. 2) No published descent procedures were performed, possibly misinterpretation of Flight Instruments (altimeter, airspeed indicator). 3) During the descent to the VOR/DME for runway 20 and 02, the pilot in command (PIC) did not check his approach chart, and did not continually consult the first officer on the altitude and course. 4) There was no adequate communication between crew; deficient CRM (No approach briefing was made for any of the two approaches). 5) The aircraft was configured for landing with flaps fully down (flap 42) at a very long distance from the track without having it in sight. It is noteworthy that the aircraft will not respond to an adverse condition windshear as it appeared at that time with such a configuration. It should be noted that in both approaches it is mandatory to perform a 'circling' procedure.