Incident Overview
On 18 July 2020 at 1228 local time, a serious incident occurred at Malta International Airport (LMML) involving a Tecnam P2002JF Sierra, registration 9H-VLT, and an Airbus A321 NEO, registration HA-LVH. The Tecnam was conducting a circuit on Runway 05 during a first solo flight under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), while the Airbus was on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) approach to Runway 31. Both aircraft landed safely, and no injuries or damage were reported.
Sequence of Events
According to surveillance radar data, 9H-VLT proceeded on a right-hand downwind leg, crossing the threshold of Runway 31 at an altitude of 1,500 feet. Meanwhile, HA-LVH was on final approach to Runway 31, approximately 8.5 nautical miles from the threshold at the Final Approach Fix SUKAL. The Tecnam was instructed to orbit over the Blue Grotto Visual Reporting Point (VRP). After reaching the coast, 9H-VLT initiated a wide left orbit that brought it near Hal Far. It then turned left over land, reversed the turn on a north-westerly heading, and ended up approximately 1 nautical mile from the Runway 31 threshold on a reciprocal heading at 1,000 feet. At that moment, HA-LVH was 2 nautical miles from the threshold at 1,000 feet descending on the glidepath.
Both aircraft continued toward each other. When HA-LVH was 0.5 nautical miles away at 900 feet descending, 9H-VLT was 100 meters off the extended centerline of Runway 31 at 1,000 feet. 9H-VLT then commenced a right turn, and the two aircraft flew within 200 feet vertically and less than 500 meters laterally.
Air Traffic Control and Pilot Actions
The air traffic control Tower controller was aware that 9H-VLT was on a solo flight but not that it was a first solo. Recordings confirmed that the flight instructor requested clearance for a single circuit but did not explicitly indicate a first solo. During the incident, the controller instructed 9H-VLT to conduct a right-hand orbit at its present position. The pilot asked for a repeat of the instruction while still turning left, flying toward the approach path. The controller then instructed 9H-VLT to proceed directly to Blue Grotto via the coast, but the pilot did not acknowledge, and the controller did not challenge the omission. The pilot subsequently initiated a right turn that placed the aircraft on the approach path of Runway 31 on a reciprocal heading.
TCAS and Equipment
The crew of HA-LVH reported that a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory (RA) was triggered for 2-3 seconds during final approach. The RA provided a "Monitor Vertical Speed" aural alert and visual guidance on the instantaneous vertical speed indicator (IVSI). The crew followed the alert and visually acquired 9H-VLT to the left, approximately 200 feet above. All RAs are inhibited below 1,000 feet AGL. 9H-VLT was not equipped with TCAS, as it was not required, but it had a transponder that allowed detection by HA-LVH's TCAS.
Meteorological and Operational Conditions
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevailed with day light, visibility exceeding 10 km, few clouds at 2,600 feet, variable wind at 7 knots, temperature 29°C, and QNH 1013 mb. The airport operates Class D airspace.
Preliminary Findings
Weather was not a contributing factor. HA-LVH was flying a stabilized approach. No technical malfunctions were found on either aircraft or ground systems. The lack of awareness that 9H-VLT was on a first solo flight contributed to a situation requiring piloting skills beyond those of a student on their first solo. The wide left orbit and deviation from ATC instructions brought the aircraft into conflict.
Recommendations
The preliminary report recommends that local flying schools inform ATC prior to a first solo flight and that the call sign of such flights explicitly include "First Solo" for the duration of the flight. The investigation will continue to examine the events leading to the traffic conflict and the effectiveness of the ACAS system.