No fatalities

2006-04-03: Lockheed C-5 Galaxy (84-0059) — United States Air Force - USAF (since 1947) — Dover AFB, United States of America

Dover AFB, United States of AmericaLanding (descent or approach)

On April 3, 2006, a Lockheed C-5 Galaxy (registration 84-0059) operated by United States Air Force - USAF (since 1947) was involved in an aviation accident near Dover AFB, United States of America during landing or approach. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Based on clear and convincing evidence, the Board President determined the primary cause of the mishap was the pilots' and flight engineers' failure to use the number three, fully operational, engine; the instructor's and primary flight engineer's failure to… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781198969Data APIEditorial standards

An aircraft departing Dover AFB experienced technical problems and crashed short of runway 32 on return. All 17 occupants were injured. The official probable cause cited failures in engine use, flap settings, and approach procedures.

Incident Details

An aircraft departed Dover Air Force Base at 0621 local time, bound for Kuwait City with an intermediate stop at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. On board were 17 individuals: three passengers and 14 crew members. Ten minutes into the flight, the copilot informed air traffic control about technical problems and was cleared for an immediate return.

Approach and Crash

On final approach to runway 32, the aircraft descended below the glidepath and impacted the ground a few hundred meters short of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in a prairie, broken into three sections. All 17 occupants sustained injuries.

Probable Cause

According to the official investigation, the primary cause of the mishap was determined to be clear and convincing evidence of the following: the pilots' and flight engineers' failure to use the number three engine, which was fully operational; the instructor's and primary flight engineer's failure to brief, and the pilots' failure to consider or utilize a 62.5 or 40 percent flap setting instead of a 100 percent flap setting; and the pilots' attempt at a visual approach to runway 32, descending well below a normal glidepath for an instrument-aided approach or the normal VFR pattern altitude of 1,800 feet. A contributing factor was MP1's failure to give a complete approach briefing, as nonstandard factors, configuration, landing distance, and missed approach intentions were not addressed.